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ABSTRACT

Companies have become major players with enormous economic powers enabling them
to cause significant damage to our society. Recent corporate misdeeds and resultant
failures significantly contributed to the most recent global financial crisis, which
prompted numerous national governments and international organisations around the
world to intensify corporate regulation and impose stringent civil and criminal liabilities
on wrongdoers. As is the case in many other countries, companies in the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia (KSA) are involved in the commission of crimes, but the laws of the
Kingdom remain outdated and therefore ineffective in combating those criminal
activities. The present study aims to examine the weaknesses and drawbacks of the legal
framework for corporate criminal liability with respect to incorporation of companies
under the Companies Law 1965 in the KSA. The crimes that are the concern of this
study are primarily related to the constitutional and other documents of companies.
However, crimes concerning the formation of company capital are also included in this
research as they are directly relevant to the incorporation of companies.
A comparative analysis of the criminal liability provisions carried out in this study
reveals that although the law intends to prevent the culpability of corporations in
relation to their incorporation, this objective could not be achieved due to several
weaknesses inherent in the liability provisions. Some of those weaknesses are: (i)
imprecision in defining physical and mental elements of the crimes; (ii) ambiguities in
identifying the persons responsible for the offending conduct; (iii) extent of defences
that allow the avoidance of liability; and (iv) softness of the penalties for such serious
offences.

xxi

Findings suggest that the existing provisions need a thorough revision as they are
outdated and therefore ineffective in dealing with the contemporary offending conduct
of companies in the KSA. This study makes specific suggestions for reforms, among
them that the previously mentioned existing ambiguities in the criminal liability
provisions be clarified to facilitate the smooth enforcement of the law, and that penalties
for conduct constituting an offence be increased, thus creating effective deterrence for
the potential offenders. It has been argued that clear provisions of law help prevent
corporate crimes and create public confidence in the market.

xxii
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Ch 1: Introduction

Chapter 1
1 Introduction
1. 1 Problem Statement
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is the largest country in the Middle East and the
twelfth largest in the world.1 With an area of about 2,250,000 sq kms and a population
of approximately 19 million people, it occupies most of the Arabian Peninsula.2 It is the
birthplace of Islam and the guardian of the Islamic holy places, Makka and Madinah.3
The foundation of the Constitution of the KSA, its national laws,4 and to some extent its
foreign policy, are premised on strict Islamic/Shari‘ah5 laws.6 Despite this, and because
of its growing affluence, the KSA has begun embracing a free market economic policy,
1

Neva Helena Alexander, 'Teaching Leadership to Female Students in Saudi Arabia' (2011) 31
Advancing Women in Leadership 199, 199.
2
Wafaa M El-Ghanim, Loutfy M Hassan and Adelfattah Badr, 'Floristic Composition and Vegetation
Analysis in Hail Region North of Central Saudi Arabia' (2010) 17(2) Saudi Journal of Biological
Sciences 119; Sajjad M Jasimuddin, 'Analyzing the Competitive Advantages of Saudi Arabia with
Porter’s Model' (2001) 16(1) Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing 59, 120; Alexander, above n
1, 199.
3
Jan Michiel Otto (ed), Sharia Incorporated: A Comparative Overview of the Legal Systems of Twelve
Muslim Countries in Past and Present (Amsterdam University Press, 2010) 145.
4
State laws in the KSA are called (Anz}imh /  )أنظمةand law is called (Niz}am
> /)نظام.
5
‘Shari‘ah’ has a number of spelling variations. The author has selected Shari‘ah. Similarly, the author
has used the terms KSA, Saudi Arabia, and Saudi interchangeably where appropriate.
6
Janet K Mullin Marta et al, 'Some Important Factors Underlying Ethical Decisions of Middle-Eastern
Marketers' (2004) 21(1) International Marketing Review 53, 55. Islamic Law also known as Shari‘ah
Law means the comprehensive Islamic law derived from two sources, a) the Book of God (The Holy
Qur’ān) and b) the Sunnah (Tradition) of the Prophet Muhammad. See Hisham M Ramadan (ed),
Understanding Islamic Law: From Classical to Contemporary (AltaMira, 2006) 3–6; Jamila Hussain,
'Islamic Jurisprudence' (2004) 25 Australian Bar Review 80, 80; Mohamed Elewa Badar, 'Islamic Law
(Shari’a) and the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court' (2011) 24(2) Leiden Journal of
International Law 411, 414. According to the Basic Law of Government 1992 (Aniz}am
> Alasa>sy
Lilh}ukum /  )النظام األساسي للحكمenacted by Royal Decree No A/90 of 27 Sha‘ban 1412 AH (2 March
1992), all the laws and regulations in the KSA must be based upon the Shari‘ah/ Islamic Law, or at least
must not conflict with it. See the Basic Law of Government 1992 (KSA) s 1 that states: ‘The Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic State. Its religion is Islam. Its constitution is Almighty God’s
Book, The Holy Qur’ān, and the Sunnah (Tradition) of the Prophet peace be upon him (PBUH). Arabic is
the language of the Kingdom. The City of Riyadh is the capital.’ Likewise, section 7 of the Basic Law of
Government 1992 states that, ‘Government in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia derives its authority from the
Book of God and the Sunnah of the Prophet (PBUH), which are the ultimate sources of reference for this
Law and the other laws of the State.’ Also, section 8 of the Basic Law of Government 1992 provides:
‘Government in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is based on justice, Shurah (consultation) and equality
according to Islamic Shari‘ah.’ See Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Majlis Ash-Shura, The Basic Law of
Government <http://www.shura.gov.sa/wps/wcm/connect/Shuraen/internet/Laws+and+Regulations/The+
Basic+Law+Of+Government/>.
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loosening its controls over certain economic sectors, such as telecommunications and
public utilities.7 The KSA is a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),8 and the World Trade
Organization9 (WTO).10 Being a member the KSA is committed to adhering to those
organisations’ objectives in pushing for substantial economic reforms, including the
removal of trade barriers and the promulgation of laws appropriate to such reform in
regard to labour and investment.11 The GCC also prompts further developments as it
aims to achieve coordination and interconnection between members in most areas
(including economic, commercial, industrial and customs policies, as well as financial
and monetary policies, even to eventually securing a joint currency).12 All of these
developments have greatly facilitated the expansion of domestic corporate sectors, as
well as attracting foreign investment into the country. More importantly, this policy
enables its oil and gas-related industry — the backbone of the Kingdom’s economy —
to flourish, benefiting private commercial companies13 and local communities alike.

7

Mohamed Branine and David Pollard, 'Human Resource Management with Islamic Management
Principles: A Dialectic for a Reverse Diffusion in Management' (2010) 39(6) Personnel Review 712, 715,
716; Nicholas H D Foster, 'Islamic Perspectives on the Law of Business Organisations II: The Sharia and
Western-Style Business Organisations' (2010) 11(2) European Business Organization Law Review 273,
280–2.
8
For more information (member countries, secretariat, mission etc), see Organization of the Oil
Exporting Countries, About Us <http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/index.htm>.
9
The KSA has been a member of WTO since 11 December 2005.
10
World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: The Organisation – Members and Observers (23
July 2008) <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm>.
11
Svitlana Khyeda, 'Foreign Direct Investment in the Middle East: Major Regulatory Restrictions' (2007)
9(2) Insight Turkey 73, 74, 83.
12
For more information (Charter, Economic Agreement, Member States etc), see Cooperation Council for
the Arab States of the Gulf Secretariat General website <http://www.gcc-sg.org/eng/index.html>.
13
The term ‘commercial company’ is used intentionally as it differentiates a profit-oriented company
operating in the business or industrial sector from other non-profit companies or companies incorporated
in whole or in part by a Royal Decree. For more detailed definition and further explanation, see Chapter
2, subsection 2.2.1. Later on (unless otherwise indicated), the terms ‘company’ and ‘corporation’ shall
refer to ‘commercial company’ as well. So, the study uses terms ‘company’ and ‘corporation’, where
appropriate, interchangeably. See Scope and Limitation of the Study in Section 1.3 of the present Chapter.
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Significant developments recorded in business and corporate areas have combined to
improve the current Saudi Arabian business environment.14 The KSA, like any other
growing economy, has witnessed a number of key developments over the years in its
business environment that have played a role in facilitating competition and improving
strategies to regulate business operations.15
Within the last few years, the expansion of private corporations in the KSA has been
clearly evident, as their numbers have substantially increased from tens to hundreds.
The latest statistics published in 2010 show that by the end of 2009 the total number of
companies in the KSA had reached 15,387 with a total capital of 782 billion Saudi

14

Office of the United States Trade Representative, 'National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade
Barriers (NTE)' (Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2009) <http://www.ustr.gov/sites/
default/files/uploads/reports/2009/NTE/asset_upload_file856_15503.pdf> at 30 July 2010. See ‘Saudi
Arabia’: 431–7.
15
See, eg, Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF), Annual Report for the Fiscal Year 1431/1432H
(2010G) <http://www.sidf.gov.sa/En/MediaCenter/Documents/Annual_Report_2010_En.pdf>. According
to the 2010 SIDF Annual Report, during the first 10 months of 2010G, bank deposits grew by 0.5% to
SAR 955 billion. Moreover, commercial banks continued their vital role in supporting and expanding the
economic activities of the private sector. The total credit extended by banks to the various economic
activities in the private sector amounted to more than SAR 774 billion during the first 9 months of 2010G
(at 11). Also, the non-oil manufacturing sector in the KSA achieved substantial growth, approximately
5% in 2010G, contrasted with 2.2% in 2009G. In addition, the relative contribution of the sector to the
country’s GDP increased by 10.1% in 2010G. Furthermore, the Saudi non-oil exports to international
markets increased 14% over that of 2009G and reaching SAR 124 billion in 2010G (at 13). Also, on
December 2008, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) issued the Anti-Money Laundering and
Counter-Terrorist Financing Rules. On January 2009, SAMA amended sections 9(h) and 12(c) of the
Corporate Governance Regulations so that the requirements of these provisions are now mandatory. In
1998, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) adopted the ‘Saudi Economists Programme’ to
attract gifted Saudi youth who have university degrees with various majors and offer them ‘on-the-job’
training at SAMA, then send them abroad to complete their degrees in economics. Eighty-nine Saudis
have joined the programme since its inception. See SAMA (Research and Statistics Department), Forty
Fifth Annual Report – The Latest Economic Developments (2009) 75 <http://www.sama.gov.sa/sites/
samaen/ReportsStatistics/ReportsStatisticsLib/5600_R_Annual_En_45_2009_08_31.pdf>
at
11
September 2011.
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Riyals (SAR) (almost 208.5 billion United States Dollars (USD)),16 and the number
continues to increase.17
Table 1.1: Number of Companies in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and their
Capital by Type (200518 and 200919)*
Type of Company

2005
Number

Joint Stock Company

2009

Capital
(SAR million)

Number

Capital
(SAR million)

16

12,203.3

575

569,393.9

1,145

16,583.5

10,437

200,031.6

Limited
Company

Liability

General
Company

Partnership

126

41.8

3,126

3,767.4

Limited
Company

Partnership

39

1,181.1

1,245

8,816.8

0

0

4

2.9

Company
Shares

Limited

by

* Note: Sources for this table are the official statistics published by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency.
These show the rising number of companies operating in the KSA (2005–2009). The latest statistics on
the progress in the sectors of commerce and industry were published on 14 October 2010 and relate to the
year 2009.

The ongoing economic liberalisation and structural policy reforms currently underway
in the KSA20 create a need for effective legal regulation for Saudi businesses in the new

16

Values of exchange rate that are mentioned in this study (rounded to the nearest USD 10), according to
OANDA Corporation website <http://www.oanda.com/currency/converter/> and all USD approximations
are to the nearest dollar.
17
SAMA (Research and Statistics Department), Forty-Sixth Annual Report – The Latest Economic
Developments (2010) 159 <http://www.sama.gov.sa/sites/samaen/ReportsStatistics/ReportsStatisticsLib/
5600_R_Annual_EN_2010_11_14.pdf> at 11 September 2011.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid. Note: in the English language version (the text here cited) the companies are referred to somewhat
differently: JSCs as is; LLCs as Limited Liability Partnerships; GPC as Joint Liability Partnerships; LPCs
as Mixed Liability Partnerships and CLSs as Mixed Liability Partnerships by Shares: at 159.
20
For example, 42 new trade-related laws and regulations have been put into force; the judicial system
has been reformed; and corporate taxation has been reduced from 45% to a flat 20%. For all reforms that
have taken place, see ‘Speech by H.E. the Governor for the Institute of International Finance Inc., MENA
[Middle East and North Africa] Regional Economic Forum, Riyadh, 7 November 2007,
<http://www.sama.gov.sa/sites/samaen/OtherReportsLib/20071215speech_by_his_excellency_the_gover
nor_en.pdf> at 30 July 2010. In addition, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry released commercial
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business environment. This will ensure that any negative effects arising from the
operation of corporations and the detrimental effects of globalisation will be properly
addressed.21
Criminal liability is one of the factors that can affect the activities of business entities.
Planning by businesses to avoid incidents that result in criminal liability plays an
important role in ensuring that business operations are carried out smoothly and within
legal bounds at all times.22 The existence of criminal liability influences the operational
strategies of companies, by shaping their operational environment as well as the
strategies they develop.23 Liability improves not only a business’s functionality but also
its internal rules and regulations.24 It is unfortunate, however, that generally the
expansion of companies correlates with an increasing number of cases of corporate
crimes, including corporate tax evasion, internal corporate investment violation or
embezzlement.25 To discourage corporate law violation, Solaiman asserts that stringent
and comprehensive national laws and regulation on corporate criminal liability are

registers showing the establishment of 2831 new companies as compared to 2274 in the preceding year.
There was an increase in the number and total capital of new companies by 24.5% and 36.3% respectively
in 2008 as compared with the preceding year. By the end of 2008, the total number of companies existing
in Saudi Arabia had increased by 13.2% over the preceding year. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry
issued 68,400 new commercial registrations of the establishment of new commercial proprietorship firms
during 2008 in different regions of the Kingdom, raising their total number by 9.6% to 763,600. See
SAMA, Forty Fifth Annual Report (2009), above n 15, 31: The number of intermediaries at the beginning
of 2008 stood at 42, with that number rising to 110 by the end of 2008: at 31, 93.
21
AMEinfo.com, Saudis Move to Modernise Legal System (2007) <http://www.ameinfo.com/
134904.html>; Maher Hammoud and Peter Vayanos, 'Promoting the Growth and Competitiveness of the
Insurance Sector in the Arab World' in World Economic Forum ' in World Economic Forum, Arab World
Competitiveness, Report, 2006–2007, Part 8/11 (2007) 97, 108.
22
S M Solaiman, 'Investor Protection and Criminal Liabilities for Defective Prospectuses: Bangladeshi
Laws Compared with their Equivalents in India and Malaysia' (2006) 13(4) Journal of Financial Crime
467, 469, 470.
23
Pamela H Bucy, 'Corporate Criminal Liability: When Does it Make Sense?' (2009) 46(4) American
Criminal Law Review 1437, 1440, 1445; John Hasnas, 'The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years
of Corporate Criminal Liability' (2009) 47(4) American Criminal Law Review 1329, 1340.
24
F N Baldwin, 'Exposure of Financial Institutions to Criminal Liability' (2006) 13(4) Journal of
Financial Crime 387, 390.
25
Edward D Diskant, 'Comparative Corporate Criminal Liability: Exploring the Uniquely American
Doctrine through Comparative Criminal Procedure' (2008) 118(1) Yale Law Journal 126, 166.
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needed.26 Unlike corporations in the United States and in commonwealth countries such
as Australia and Great Britain, those in the KSA are not subject to a wide range of strict
liability criminal laws.27
Despite economic development and the liberalisation of the market, the Saudi
government has not revised the relevant law to take into account new trends. Therefore,
current legislation fails to provide sanctions for some forms of activities that elsewhere
would be punishable as crimes as these activities (whether they are difficult to detect or
not) are not identified within the relevant legislation.
The absence of comprehensive guidelines and robust legal provisions, along with
outdated private commercial legislation, has been identified as the primary reason for
the Saudi government’s failure to effectively regulate the activities of corporations in
the KSA. In fact, the Kingdom’s main corporate law, the Companies Law 1965 (Niz}am
>

Asharikaat / ( ) نظام الشركاتCL’65), which was made by the Royal Decree No M/6, is
considered outdated as it was promulgated in the mid 1960s (22 Rabi>‘al-awwal 1385
AH (21 July 1965)). While this particular legislation has been amended a number of
times,28 it continues to have shortcomings, in particular in regard to measures to regulate
company activities.29 Not only is the CL’65 outdated and inefficient, the rest of the
regulatory instruments30 merely provide basic guidelines without having any legal or

26

Solaiman, ‘Investor Protection and Criminal Liabilities for Defective Prospectuses’, above n 22, 485.
Karen Wheelwright, 'Goodbye Directing Mind and Will, Hello Management Failure: A Brief Critique
of Some New Models of Corporate Criminal Liability' (2006) 19 Australian Journal of Corporate Law
287, 288.
28
For instance by Royal Decrees No 5 of 12 S}afar 1387 AH (22 May 1967), No M/23 of 28 Juma>da althani 1402 AH (23 April 1982), No M/46 of 4 Rajab 1405 AH (26 March 1985), No M/63 of 26 Dhul-'lqi‘dah 1407 AH (23 July 1987), No M/22 of 30 Rajab 1412 (4 February 1992), No M/29 of 16 Ramad}an
1418 AH (15 January 1998) and No M/60 of 3 Rajab 1428 AH (18 July 2007).
29
Muhammad Asayed Arafa, 'Control of Joint-Stock Companies Has Become a Pressing Issue at Present
Time', Saudi Economic Newspaper (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia), 28 December 2006, 10.
30
For instance, the Commercial Court Law 1931 (Niz}am
> Almah}kamah Atijary>ah / )نظام المحكمة التجارية
(CCL’31) enacted by Royal Decree No M/32 of 15 Muh}arram 1350 AH (2 June 1931), the Law of
27
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mandatory requirements. Notable in this respect are the Corporate Governance
Regulations 2006 (CGR’06) introduced by the Kingdom’s Capital Market Authority
(CMA) in 2006.31 It could be argued that even though the KSA is a leader of the GCC32
and OPEC,33 and a member of the WTO, its rules and regulations dealing with
companies are outdated, and many restrictions inhibiting commercial activities still
apply to the Saudi economy.34 These have arguably contributed to the failure to
effectively enforce the law. Considering the importance of legal certainty about
subjects’ rights and obligations together with their effective enforcement, the current
CL’65 undermines the effectiveness of the domestic legal framework. Moreover, the
shortcomings in the CL’65 create obstacles to the country’s economic development.
Hand by hand with ambiguous or obsolete laws there comes a possibility of the
existence of legal lacunae, or misinterpretation or circumvention of laws. With regard to
Handling Public Funds 1975 (Niz}am
> Mubasharat Alammwa>l Al‘a>mah /  )نظام مباشرة األموال العامةissued
by Royal Decree No 77 of 23 Shawwal 1395 AH (29 October 1975), Arbitration Law 1983 (Niz}am
>
At>ah}ky>m /  )نظام التحكيمissued by Royal Decree No M/46 of 12 Rajab 1403 AH (24 April 1983), and Law
> Ad>afa>tir Atijary>ah /  )نظام الدفاترالتجاريةissued by Royal Decree No
of Commercial Books 1989 (Niz}am
M/61 of 17 Dhul-h}ijjah 1409 AH (27 June 1989).
31
The CGR’06 were issued by the Board of Capital Market Authority by Resolution No 1/212/2006 of 21
Shawwal 1427 AH (12 November 2006) based on the Capital Market Law 2003. It is noteworthy that
according to section 1(b) of the CGR’06, these regulations merely provide basic guidelines for all
companies listed on the Exchange without having any legal or mandatory requirements except paragraph
[c] of section 1 related to disclosure in the Board of Directors’ Report. Then the Board of the Capital
Market Authority issued Resolution No 1-36-2008 of 12 Dhul-'l-qi’dah 1429 AH (10 November 2008),
making section 9 of the Corporate Governance Regulations 2006 mandatory for all companies listed on
the Exchange effective from the first board report issued by the company following the date of the Board
of the Capital Market Authority resolution mentioned above. Also, the same resolution made paragraphs
[c] and [e] of section 12 of the CGR’06 mandatory for all companies listed on the Exchange effective
from the year 2009. This resolution also made section 14 of these regulations mandatory for all
companies listed on the Exchange effective from the year 2009. See Capital Markets Authority,
Corporate Governance Regulations (2009) <http://www.cma.org.sa/cma_cms/upload_sec_content/
dwfile19/convE.pdf>.
32
Andrys Onsman, 'Dismantling the Perceived Barriers to the Implementation of National Higher
Education Accreditation Guidelines in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia' (2010) 32(5) Journal of Higher
Education Policy and Management 511, 518; M S Rafiq, 'The Optimality of a Gulf Currency Union:
Commonalities and Idiosyncrasies' (2011) 28 Economic Modelling 728, 730.
33
Douglas B Reynolds and Michael K Pippenger, 'OPEC and Venezuelan Oil Production: Evidence
Against a Cartel Hypothesis' (2010) 38(10) Energy Policy 6045, 6047.
34
John Hooman Donboli and Farnaz Kashefi, 'Doing Business in the Middle East: A Primer for U.S.
Companies' (2005) 38 Cornell International Law Journal 413, 434; Mohamed El Hedi Arouri, Amine
Lahiani and Duc Khuong Nguyen, 'Return and Volatility Transmission between World Oil Prices and
Stock Markets of the GCC Countries' (2011) 28(4) Economic Modelling 1815–17, 1823.
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corporate crimes it is then very difficult to maintain a high standard of compliance with
legal provisions. Application of unamended outdated rules on new forms of crimes that
have accompanied new technologies can never cover all the aspects of malicious acts
and identify the persons responsible. Problems with interpretation and application of the
respective laws by judges consequently cause difficulties with enforcement. Therefore,
it can be seen that the current version of the CL’65 has been ineffective in dealing with
increasing corporate crime.
Hence, a reform of the existing legal and regulatory regime governing corporate
criminal liability so as to prevent or impede corporate crime is imperative. It follows
that appropriate recommendations for reform could be submitted after a proper
investigation into the law and regulations is carried out. This study is devoted to that
pursuit.
1. 2 Research Aims and Objectives
This study aims to provide a clear and coherent overview of the subject matter relating
to corporate crimes in the KSA at the time of company’s incorporation. By undertaking
critical analysis, the study strives to find ways to improve not only provisions of the
CL’65 relating to these corporate crimes, but also the system of judicial enforcement of
the CL’65. The study, therefore, aims to contribute to the further economic development
of the KSA.
The objectives of this study are stated below:
i

To critically examine the provisions of the CL’65 in the light of their equivalents
in comparable jurisdictions.
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ii

To identify the flaws and drawbacks of the CL’65 in relation to incorporation of
corporate commercial entities in terms of attracting criminal liability.

iii

To discuss judicial enforcement related to the CL’65 so as to understand the most
important principles that affect the course of implementing judicial judgments and
resolving commercial disputes in the KSA.

iv

To analyse the legal aspects of the CL’65 so as to gain an understanding of
whether there is a need for reform with regard to the flaws and drawbacks
identified and so to develop the CL’65 as a more attractive means of encouraging
foreign investment as well as to increase efficiency.

This approach is important, given the fact that the KSA has international responsibility
to adopt and implement the rules and principles of the WTO.35 However, the KSA
remains a country described as having not very transparent rules.36 More attention
should be paid to reviewing and then appropriately revamping its outdated laws. There
needs to be more thought going into the development of new laws to clarify any
ambiguity and to develop confidence in the marketplace. Therefore, it can be said that
the KSA government should revamp and strengthen the current domestic commercial
laws as soon as possible in order to effectively govern and regulate companies involved
in behaviours that are or could be subject to criminal liability.
1. 3 Scope and Limitations of the Study
The scope and limitations of this study are stated below:

35

Gwenn Okruhlik, 'A Review of “Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats: Oil and the State in Saudi Arabia”
by Steffen Hertog' (2011) 1(1) Journal of Arabian Studies 124, 125.
36
Susan Ariel Aaronson and M Rodwan Abouharb, 'Unexpected Bedfellows: The GATT, the WTO and
Some Democratic Rights' (2011) 55(2) International Studies Quarterly 379, 385, 386.
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i.

Companies are generally classified into commercial and non-commercial
entities.37 The latter, however, are excluded from this study, while the research
focuses only on the issues related to commercial corporations that have played a
vital role in the financial and economic sectors in the country. Recently,
companies have spread more than ever and they have increased the rate of world
investment changes.38 For instance, globalisation has given corporations access to
wider markets, many having established branches and extended the reach of their
brand names, which has further facilitated the spread of their investments to an
increasing number of countries across the world. In view of the imposing role of
corporations in the economic, political and social spheres and due to rapid growth
and globalisation, corporate crime is not restricted to local jurisdictions but is
global (that is, international) in nature. Thus, to impose criminal liability on
corporations would be significant.39 They are deemed as able to commit crimes
and hence be made criminally liable.40 The addition of such means of punishment
would have a deterrent effect on the commission of corporate crime.41
Consequently, provisions of the CL’65 related to companies during phase of their
incorporation need to be investigated to help the companies become more
competitive by improving their commercial performance and preventing their

37

Getahun Seifu, 'Revisiting Company Law with the Advent of Ethiopia Commodity Exchange (ECX):
An Overview' (2010) 4(1) Mizan Law Review 102, 115; Ashraf Hilal, ‘qwu>d Ta’siys Asharikaat
[Corporations Establishment Contracts] (Maktabat Almalik Fahad Alwat}aniyah, 2008) 5. Commercial
entities refer to entities that involve commerce. While non-commercial entities are formed for non> Atijary Alsa‘udi
commercial purposes, such as charities: Hamadalah Mohammed Hamadalah, Aniz}am
[Saudi Commercial Law] (Khwarizm, 2nd ed, 2004) 152.
38
Kozeta Sevrani, Klodiana Gorica and Doriana Matraku, 'Investing in it: Some Challenges for
Globalization Process in Albania' (2011) 6(1) Romanian Economic Business Review 43, 45.
39
Jennifer Arlen, 'The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability' (1994) 23(2) The
Journal of Legal Studies 833, 833–7; V S Khanna, 'Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does it
Serve?' (1996) 109(7) Harvard Law Review 1477, 1477–1534.
40
Albert W Alschuler, 'Two Ways to Think About the Punishment of Corporations' (2009) 46(4)
American Criminal Law Review 1359, 1373; Bucy, above n 23, 1440, 1445.
41
Erik Luna, 'The Curious Case of Corporate Criminality' (2009) 46(4) American Criminal Law Review
1507, 1522.
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being subject to activities attracting criminal liability or perpetrating such actions,
particularly in such an important stage.
ii.

The initial stage of a company’s incorporation phase is very crucial in its life, so
this stage requires effective and efficient legal provisions to ensure the success of
the company. The process of incorporating entails the preparation of important
certain documents, such as the licence for the company’s incorporation and its
constitution. This stage is very important because it separates corporate
personality from its management and third parties.42 Thus, in order to be able to
go into great detail, this study will solely concentrate on the crimes committed by
corporations at the time of their incorporation under the CL’65, but it will not
consider the crimes committed during a company’s period of operation or crimes
associated with their demise. In addition it will not consider the crimes committed
beyond the scope of the CL’65.

1. 4 Significance and Benefits of the Study
Companies may engage in activities violating criminal, civil and administrative law,
such as fraud, illegal political contributions, breach of antitrust laws, exceeding
emission standards, violations of labour laws, and so forth. Research findings by Wang
and Hoftreter suggest that illegal behaviour is more prevalent in growth situations. As in
the KSA, privatisation continues and market opportunities multiply; this fact makes an
investigation of the legal constraints on such behaviours imperative.43

42

The Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 13 mentions that when a company is incorporated under the CL’65,
such a company will enjoy body corporate personality, with the exception of those taking the form of a
silent partnership company (Sharikat Almahs}ah / ( ) شركة المحاصةSPC).
43
Xia Wang and Kristy Holtfreter, 'The Effects of Corporation- and Industry-Level Strain and
Opportunity on Corporate Crime' (2011) 48(2) Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 1, 4, 23.
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An area critical to determining the legality of the activities of companies is the
interaction between procedural rules and equitable punishment when legal provisions
have been violated.44 The equitable punishment aspect, which is often referred to as
involving criminal liability,45 is important because the criminal liability is attributable to
a company after an illegal act has been committed. Within the CL’65, individuals and a
company should be held liable for a crime if they carried out the criminal activity in the
initial stage of a company’s incorporation phase. With the increased growth of the KSA
investment market, there is likely to be an increase in illegal and misleading dealings by
companies. Government should improve the existing weak laws related to the activities
of companies in order to prevent corporate crimes,46 because inappropriate laws equate
with a reduced capacity to attract foreign financial investments.47 Though the KSA has
been minimally affected by such developments, an increased activity of its financial
markets is likely to lead to higher awareness of the strict requirements placed on
potential businesses.
This study will first undertake a comprehensive analysis of the provisions of the CL’65
related to corporate crimes in the KSA. A serious lack of in-depth and comprehensive
studies currently exists in this area in the KSA. Corporations are going virtually
unpunished owing to the legal and regulatory weaknesses.48 This study will attempt to

44

Amy J Sepinwall, 'Guilty by Proxy: Expanding the Boundaries of Responsibility in the Face of
Corporate Crime' (2011) Hastings Law Journal 63 <http://works.bepress.com/amysepinwall/7> 11.
45
Gabriel Hallevy, A Modern Treatise on the Principle of Legality in Criminal Law (Springer, 2010) 50,
51.
46
David E Barlow and Melissa Hickman Barlow, 'Corporate Crime News as Ideology News Magazine
Coverage of the Enron Case' (2010) 1(1) Journal of Criminal Justice Research 1, 2.
47
Tea Kbiltsetskhlashvili, 'Attracting Investors: Case of Impact of FDI on the Achievements of Economic
Growth in Georgia' (2010) 4(2) IBSU Scientific Journal 35, 48.
48
For example, the CL’65 does not contain any section that penalises a company when it has committed a
crime except for section 231 that imposes a fine between SAR 1000 (approximately USD 267) and SAR
20,000 (approximately USD 5330), where the law states that in cases where a suit cannot be brought
against a company’s representative for committing a violation of provisions of the CL’65, a fine that
provided in sections 229 and 230 may be imposed on the company itself.
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carry out an analysis of the legal provisions of the CL’65 only with respect to
incorporation, with the intention of making suggestions to revamp the Saudi regime of
corporate regulation.
Efficiency and effectiveness are not only important in terms of the framing of laws and
regulations, they are also important in their practice, that is, in relation to their practical
outworking and enforcement.49 However, the existence of theoretically wellcoordinated, effective and efficient laws and regulation in a country does not necessarily
provide a good environment for companies; it depends upon the way in which such laws
and regulations are applied.50 Therefore, this thesis will highlight the judicial
enforcement of corporate laws in an attempt to improve efficiency of the judiciary in
dealing with the corporate criminal liability and the enforcement of such liabilities
under the CL’65 in the KSA. This study is an important step in the creation of an
appropriate legal regime that will ensure a healthy corporate culture, which will in turn
attract and increase both local and foreign investments. Finally, the present study is
significant in that it intends to carry out a crucial comprehensive study in this area of
corporate regulation with an aim to create a beneficial environment for both
corporations and their stakeholders.
1. 5 Research Questions
The central research questions of this study are:
i.

How can the Saudi corporate criminal liability and enforcement regime be
improved?

49

Vinod Kumar Singh and Anurag Singh, 'Corporate Governance in the Middle East: Meeting Points for
the Advancement of Social Citizenship' (2010) 3(1 and 2) ASBM Journal of Management 1, 10.
50
Sevrani, Gorica and Matraku, above n 38, 46.
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ii.

What are the crimes committed during the phase of incorporation of a company
under the CL’65

iii.

Who should be held criminally liable for corporate crimes committed during its
incorporation under the CL’65?

iv.

Are the current penalties related to corporate criminal liability sufficient
deterrence?

However, in order to answer this central research question, the following major subquestions will be addressed:
i.

What are the different types of companies and their structures in the KSA?

ii.

How is the criminal liability of corporations regulated?

iii.

What corporate conduct is considered to be criminal under the CL’65?

iv.

Who are liable and what defences are available to them?

v.

What are the crimes relating to company constitutions under the CL’65?

vi.

What are the crimes relating to company documents under the CL’65?

vii.

What are the crimes relating to formation of company capital under the CL’65?

viii. What are the crimes related to subscription to company shares committed in
violation of the provisions of the CL’65 during the incorporation of a company?
ix.

What is the crime related to exaggerating the estimation of shares in kind under
the CL’65 during the incorporation of a company?
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x.

What are the criminal sanctions for corporate crimes during the phase of
incorporation of a company under the CL’65?

xi.

How is the liability regime enforced juridically?

1. 6 Literature Review
The Literature Review is organised in sections that generally correspond to the themes
developed in the dissertation chapters — the general law of the KSA and its influence
on CL’65, legal rules on company formation in the KSA and corporate crime as well as
judicial enforcement.
1.6.1

General Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Law and its Influence on the Companies
Law 1965 and Company Formation

1.6.1.1 Shari‘ah Law
As a general proposition, the Saudi legal system, based on Shari‘ah law, retained tribal
or other customary practices of Arabian societies in four key areas: public law, personal
law, commercial transactions, and criminal law.51 Bearing in mind the lack of related
literature, in this respect, there are important cultural observations to be made
concerning the legal analysis on corporate crime committed not only in the KSA but
also in any other Shari‘ah-influenced legal system. For example, the general prohibition
against the imposition of interest in the CL’65 would seemingly heighten attention on
how investment capital is attracted to a KSA company in its formation phases. Yahya
underscores the fundamental importance of Saudi traditions in business relations; it is

51

Hossein Esmaeili, 'On a Slow Boat towards the Rule of Law: The Nature of Law in the Saudi Arabian
Legal System' (2009) 26(1) Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 1, 24.
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clear that this is a point of reference that must be taken into consideration when
analysing KSA corporate crime liability.52
Baamir makes an important observation concerning the influence of Shari‘ah law on
KSA corporate and commercial activity. Given the relatively recent advent of the KSA
as a freestanding legal jurisdiction (it was founded in 1932), the rigidity of the legal
traditions of the Shari‘ah and the corresponding influence of Islamic jurisprudence
(fiqh /  )فقهare likely to be ameliorated as the KSA moves more confidently into the postWTO accession world. This apparent confidence is not perceived as a denunciation of
the Shari‘ah or the corresponding promotion of a preference for Western law. Instead,
Baamir echoes the argument made by Esmaeili that there is a ‘slow boat’ that will carry
the KSA legal system, and most critically, its entire corporate / commercial branches
into the mainstream of international legal norms.53
Further, the theme (discussed from numerous perspectives throughout the academic
commentaries) is the influence of personal relationships and the need to establish trust
between all partners as being of paramount importance to all KSA corporate owners.
Otto and others have linked this modern day corporate feature to the tribal influences
that remain influential in all aspects of Saudi society. In this specific context, the work
of Al Ghamdi assumes a position of interest.54 He suggests that the attitude of British
firms to Saudi companies and their managers is a useful one, given the long history of

52

Khalid O Al-Yahya, 'Power-Influence in Decision Making, Competence Utilization, and Organizational
Culture in Public Organizations: The Arab World in Comparative Perspective' (2009) 19(2) Journal of
Public Administration Research and Theory 385, 386.
53
Abdulrahman Yahya Baamir, Shari‘ah Law in Commercial and Banking Arbitration: Law and Practice
in Saudi Arabia (Ashgate, 2010) 144, 148.
54
Salem M Al Ghamdi, 'The Attitude of British Firms towards Saudi-British Business Negotiations: An
Empirical Examination' (2010) 27(2) International Journal of Management 226, 266.
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British involvement in joint ventures and other corporate entities.55 Al Ghamdi found
that ‘Saudi managers tend to be high in uncertainty avoidance, power distance, and
collectivistic behavior, all of which are diametrically opposite to the British orientation.’
The social and cultural traditions of the KSA ensure that Saudis are generally ‘loyal to
their organization, are autocratic and rely on a network of family and friendships for
support’.56
This observation is supported in a tangential manner in the 2010 work of Al-Kahtani.57
He commented on the rise of Internet marketing firms in the KSA. The proposition that
Al-Kahtani identifies, without providing his definitive opinion, is whether these types of
enterprises that are more likely to be ‘formed in haste’ are equally more likely to
comply with the provisions of the CL’65.
The related commercial sphere of technology transfers is another emerging aspect of
KSA business activity that will change the traditional shape of Saudi business. It is
acknowledged that given the paucity of scholarly articles in this area, the boundary
between informed commentary and unsupported speculation is uncomfortably close.
What needs to be considered is whether there is a greater potential for corporate crime
in the commencement phases of companies that will be dealing with intellectual
property rights and associated commercial activity. Merdah and Sadi considered the
ability of small Saudi enterprises to participate in technology transfers with foreign
owned enterprises.58 A tentative conclusion that can be extracted from this work in the
context of the present dissertation is that the KSA will experience different kinds of
55

Ibid.
Ibid 227.
57
Abdulwahab S Al-Kahtani, 'Barriers of Internet-Based Marketing Communications: An Empirical
Investigation of Saudi Manufacturing Firms' (2010) 8(2) Competition Forum 175, 175–81.
58
Walid Omar Awad Merdah and Muhammad Asad Sadi, 'Technology Transfer in Context with Saudi
Arabian Small-Medium Enterprises' (2011) 7(1) International Management Review 30, 30–6.
56
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corporate crime from that which it has previously seen because the corporate
environment will be inevitably altered through the influence of these new business types
and the commercial forces they unleash and the vulnerabilities they will reveal.
1.6.1.2 Corporate Entities in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
An extensive body of literature exists related to the legal analysis of corporate entities
under Saudi Arabian laws. Nonetheless, one of the key missing elements in the
literature is a comprehensive legal study with regards to corporate criminal liability
within the concept of the criminally liability, as outlined in the CL’65. References to
several studies on the legal concept of corporate criminal liability will be included in the
discussion below, which will initially look into the studies that examine the legal
concept of artificial person within different legal systems.
i.

Artificial and Juridical Personality

The doctoral thesis authored by Ali Saleh (1980) focuses on artificial and juridical
entity and characteristics, with a strong emphasis on the nature, essence and definition
of the artificial person in comparative jurisprudence.59 By using selected Egyptian laws
as well as Western and Middle Eastern laws to form the basis of his studies, Saleh
comprehensively explores the trends in the contemporary judiciary and legislative
frameworks to deepen research on the nature of the juridical person, and at the same
time to discuss issues of criminal liability of the juridical person. At the same time he
discusses the two viewpoints — that of those who accept corporate criminal liability
and those who reject it — based on his comparative examination of the said laws. He
states that there are two types of ‘persons’ identified in law, that is, the ‘natural person’
59
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and the ‘artificial person’. He defines as ‘natural’, ‘[a] human being that has the
capacity for rights and duties, whereas ‘artificial’ is defined as ‘[a] legal entity, not a
human being, recognised as a person in law to whom legal rights and duties may attach
— e.g. a body corporate.’60 His findings show that there exist a so-called ‘legal
adaptation / legal standpoint’ of inter-relationship among artificial and natural persons,
and penal responsibility. Saleh’s study focuses on artificial persons acting as the agents
of numerous entities, entities that encompass private companies, corporations as well as
governmental bodies, all of which are under the purview of respective private or public
law. Taking into account Saleh’s definition of artificial persons, the proposed study will
focus on the recognition of artificial personality in the CL’65 in discussing corporate
crimes during the phase of company incorporation.
ii.

General Rules of Corporations in Islamic Jurisprudence

Another relevant doctorate study is that conducted by Albaqami (1983).61 His study
mostly concerns the general rules of corporations in Islamic jurisprudence and Western
law, with a strong emphasis on the validity of corporation law and its effectiveness for
joint-stock companies within the context of Islamic law.62 Moreover, the work by AlHarbi (2003) examines the criminal liability of artificial persons within the context of
jurisprudence under Saudi laws.63 Using analytical methodology, he examines the
criminal liability of artificial persons and the relevant legal sanctions and their
application in the KSA.
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1.6.2

Corporate Crime in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA)

There is a subtle thread that runs through the examples of scholarship identified in this
Review that deal specifically with the incidence of corporate crime in the KSA.
Thorough analysis of the existing literature on corporate crime in the KSA makes it
apparent, according to this writer’s view, that Shari‘ah law serves as a deterrent to
corporate crime. There is no statistical analysis or other empirical evidence to confirm
this perception, with the exception of Esmaeili, however, who expresses his opinions in
a straightforward manner. The argumentation that leads to this conclusion is revealed by
a careful reading of his work.64
Armour et al provide a well reasoned and sound assessment of the fundamental
differences that exist between common law and continental (or civil) law countries and
why the resulting corporate law regimes are distinct, notwithstanding the influences of
globalisation on modern commerce. In this regard Glaeser and Shleifer suggest that
countries which use a common law legal system favour freedom of contract and the
protection of private property, whereas countries which use civil law legal system
emphasise an activist role for the state.65 Armour et al note that the legal differences
lead to tangible economic outcomes, as the common law systems have been found to
have more dispersed share ownership, more liquid and extensive capital markets, and
more highly developed systems of private credit than those that are rooted in the civil
law tradition.66
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The logical conclusion to be drawn from this finding is that type of criminal activity that
one would expect to see at the time of company formation would be driven by the
nature of the company structure. The CL’65 is significantly influenced by the UK
Companies Act 1948.67 The Saudi regime, notwithstanding the primacy of Shari‘ah law
in the regulation of companies, has been influenced by the English common law
corporate philosophy. Armour et al also contend that legal systems
…are not the independent, “exogenous” force that legal origins theory takes
them to be… [Legal systems are] more “endogenous” in the sense of being
shaped by their economic and political environment.68
Saudi laws adopt a definition of liability that assigns a responsibility to the guilty party
to offer compensation, typically in the form of financial compensation, when an injury
occurs to another party.69 The term for such liability used by Islamic legal scholars is

T}ama>n/ ضمانwhich describes both criminal and civil liability.70 This term explains
injury that may be inflicted and compensated when applied to both personal injury and
damage to property. The T}ama>n is also applicable to other nations that base their
commercial law on Islamic tradition, including countries such as Egypt, Jordan,
[Northern] Sudan and Iran. The type of compensation will depend upon the injury and,
as stated above, is typically financial in nature. This liability system does not evaluate
the motives of the guilty party but rather focuses upon the extent of the injury. There are
several kinds, including injury to the body and injury to the reputation.71 Liability is
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either direct or indirect, depending upon the circumstances of the injury.72 The
government assumes the responsibility for developing law that will deter injurious
behaviour. Therefore, the Saudi government has established quite stringent and detailed
guidelines for businesses regarding the distribution and production of their services and
goods, together with a wide range of penalties to deter injury, with such penalties
including imprisonment, physical punishment, and fines; and insurance requirements.73
Dammer and Albanese selected the KSA as one of their six model nations in their
comparative analysis of national justice systems.74 They make two important
observations concerning the quality of the available data from the KSA justice system
generally. The first is the suggestion that all crime committed in the KSA is
underreported. Dammer and Albanese state that this phenomenon is attributable to the
overarching desire on the part of Saudis to resolve disputes informally and through
negotiation.75 The second observation is that, notwithstanding the empirical weaknesses
in the available data (and Dammer and Albanese go so far as to state that the KSA
government deliberately conceals information that may have a negative impact on social
policy), the KSA has a very low crime rate, even when compared to other Islamic
nations.76
As Dammer and Albanese note in the specific context of company formation, the
Shari‘ah is cited as the basis for all corporate structures and regulation. The Prophet
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Mohammed (PBUH) is cited as the authority for the legitimacy of partnerships and
companies generally.77
It is a particularly telling comment on the entire sweep of the scholarship identified in
this Review that the Dammer’ and Albanese 2010 volume cites sources from 1985 and
1987 in its KSA criminal law section. In this well-written and otherwise current legal
authority, there is evidently no other more recent information concerning the KSA
system on which to draw or to consider. Hvidt also addressed this matter in the context
of whether the economic and institutional reforms initiated in the KSA (particularly
those that followed in the wake of the WTO accession) and the data published by the
government concerning the compliance of KSA companies with its investment and
capitalisation rules as provided by the Saudi Arabia General Investment Authority
(SAGIA).78
Hvidt has reviewed all of the available data to early 2011; he concludes that SAGIA
‘which is charged with the task of implementing the reform program, has been
instrumental in depicting the reform process to be more rosy than it really is’.79 Hvidt
suggests that the reason for this is that
…SAGIA employees, eager to please the King (and not least to receive the
personal bonuses promised to them by King 'Abdullah if they succeeded)
are believed to have targeted their reform efforts to specific items which
would most heavily affect their ranking. As such, the Saudi reform program
appears fragmented and only superficially implemented.80
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These circumstances are important when the entire concept of KSA corporate crime and
its potentiality is assessed. The following question is generated by the combined effect
of Dammer and Albanese’s observations concerning the reporting of crime in the KSA
generally, and the apparent reluctance of government officials to robustly and resolutely
enforce the national investment laws: ‘Is there a culture within the KSA corporate and
commercial structure that is likely to encourage the prosecution of any crimes
committed in the formation phases?’ Andrew Walter would likely conclude that no such
culture exists nor is it likely to emerge with any speed or influence in the near term. He
describes the movement to reform KSA laws as a form of ‘mock compliance’, where
the nation and its regulatory agencies ‘might have a rhetorical and outward appearance
of compliance with international standards while having hidden behavioral divergences
from such standards’.81
The crimes most closely associated with the conduct of business generally in the KSA,
involve either the advancement of the company or its owners at the expense of another,
or the efforts made to secure a favourable future position. Such offences can occur at
any stage in the life of the legal entity. Losman provides an excellent analysis of why
certain crimes, including bribery, influence peddling and other well known corporate
crimes occur with apparent greater frequency in states such as the KSA.82 His theories
are centred on the concept of the ‘rentier state’, an expression that refers ‘to a country
that garners a substantial portion of its income from external sources, most generally
from the sales of resources such as oil and gas’.83 The KSA and the other GCC nations
have been prominent beneficiaries of rents derived from oil and gas exports. These rents
81

Andrew Walter, Governing Finance: East Asia’s Adoption of International Standards (Cornell
University Press, 2008) 5.
82
Donald L Losman, 'The Rentier State and National Oil Companies: An Economic and Political
Perspective' (2010) 64(3) Middle East Journal 427, 427–45.
83
Ibid 428.

24

Ch 1: Introduction

— when calculated as a percentage of KSA government revenue — comprised 89.3 per
cent in 2009.84
Losman articulates an attractive and highly persuasive argument as to why states such
as the KSA will, firstly, be less concerned about imposing rigorous regulation on
companies at any stage of their existence, including formation; and secondly,
reminiscent of the points variously developed by Dammer and Albanese, Armour et al,
and Hvidt, why in rentier governments
...there is little need to develop mechanisms of fiscal accountability for their
citizens since the latter have been “bought off” by the absence of taxes and
the provision of social services and state-subsidized commodities.85
Losman suggests that, for these reasons, in the KSA (as in other rentier states) because
the government has less incentive to extract taxes from the companies on their income,
the main economic function of the state is devoted to the orderly distribution of rents.
Losman states that enforcement mechanisms give way to this reality:
Not surprisingly, favored recipients — regime family/ friends, geographic
regions, tribes, welfare agencies, etc. — receive state-directed funds in what
become patron-client relationships. Loyalty to the system and the regime is
the primary course of action for both economic and political actors as they
seek their share of state largess. Under such conditions, there is little
transparency in government and influence-peddling is the most common
means of obtaining economic gain.86
It is evident when the authorities in this aspect of the Review are viewed as a single
body of scholarship, there is a reasonable consensus that whatever the provisions of the
CL’65 and its related regulations may state as the ‘black letter law’, the operative social
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and commercial imperatives are such that corporate crime generally will be a secondary
concern.87
It is noted that the creation of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA)88 and the
KSA ratification of the UN Convention on Transnational Crime89 are recent legal
enactments that move entirely against the usual grain of KSA corporate regulation.
Money laundering is a crime that can be committed in the stages of company formation;
the monies used to establish a particular business can be the proceeds of criminal
activity. Section 2 of the relevant statute provides that it is an offence to conduct ‘any
transaction involving property or proceeds with the knowledge that such property or
proceeds came as a result of a criminal activity or from an illegal or illegitimate
source’.90
It was noted in the Overview that one must approach the scholarly literature with care to
ensure that ethnocentric biases do not cloud or otherwise distort the guidance to be
taken from the sources cited here. In the context of why Westerners come into conflict
with the laws of other states, Renteln offers a useful observation regarding the
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relationship between international legal standards and domestic laws.91 He suggests that
when
…international legal standards are incorporated in domestic legal systems,
they will eventually necessitate a rethinking of the mono-cultural paradigm.
This will lead to the realization that individuals have vastly different life
experiences, and that divergent conceptions of justice are relevant to the
proper functioning of a legal order.92
This comment is of interest for what may be described as a reverse perspective — that
is, Westerners often violate laws in the KSA and other Islamic nations by manifesting
behaviours that are obvious affronts to the Shari‘ah law. Alcohol offences or acts that
offend accepted standards of public decency are the most prominent ones. In regard to
other offences such as bribery or corruption (such as those described by Losman), there
is very little evidence that Western business concerns operating in the KSA have
violated the national law more or less often than native Saudi operations. Nor is there
any literature that suggests a ‘cross-pollination’ occurs between Western business ethics
and KSA sensibilities that have made the KSA company environment more lawless.
The ‘rentier state’ arguments crafted by Losman retain their appeal from this
perspective.
1.6.3

Crimes in the Course of Corporate Formation

This section of the Review provides further confirmation of the central weakness of the
scholarship assembled here. There are no peer-reviewed articles, journal commentaries,
or texts published in the relevant period that specifically discuss the crimes committed
against either a company constitutions or with respect to company capital. The sources
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considered here are well-written and their authors are plainly scholars who have welldeveloped insights concerning various aspects of Saudi corporate activity.93 The points
harvested from these sources are presented in this spirit. The relevance of the present
dissertation is highlighted by the lack of authoritative work conducted and published in
this specific area.
In particular, the prevailing KSA company culture and its relationship to the available
scholarship was succinctly summarised by Al-Yahya. He suggests that
…Saudi Arabia is a unique place in which to test propositions derived from
leadership and organizational behavior literature in public administration….
there is a shortage of data coming from the region that in general has not yet
received enough attention from social scientists and organizational
analysts.94
The enduring relationship between the United States and the KSA provides the
opportunity to examine what types of crime might be committed when American and
KSA interests form Saudi-based companies. Baker examines the extra-territorial reach
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), the American legislation that claims
authority over the conduct of any firms involving an American interest no matter where
they are located in the world.95 The FCPA presents obvious issues for Saudi companies
that have an American partner or any other substantial connection to the United States.
The United States Congress enacted the FCPA as a means to restore public confidence
in the American business community. The FCPA was designed to ‘preclude the bribery
of foreign officials and require those qualifying as issuers to comply with certain book
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keeping requirements’.96 American policy makers realised that US businesses ‘faced a
competitive disadvantage in international markets when operating with foreign
businesses unrestrained by FCPA prohibitions’.97 For this reason, the FCPA was
amended to encourage international anti-corruption efforts to foster a level business
playing field, whereby US companies and citizens are prohibited from ‘corruptly paying
or offering to pay, directly or indirectly, money or anything of value to a foreign official
to obtain or retain business’.98 If an American citizen working with a KSA company
offered a bribe to a Saudi (or any other) government official, the extra-territorial reach
of the FCPA would attach to this conduct. Baker’s approach to the FCPA and his
analysis of its consequences is a helpful means to develop other analyses that might
explore the prevalence and seriousness of the types of crimes likely to be committed at
the time of KSA company formation.
The temptation to violate the company constitutions extends to the issuance of the initial
business prospectus and financial documents associated with company formation. AlMoghaiwli observes in his paper that there is evidence that when the KSA government
attempted to advance the goals of the 2005–2009 Saudi development plan that involved
wealth transfers and their attendant political costs, ‘managers of Saudi-listed companies
which are most politically visible tend[ed] to exercise discretion in the preparation of
financial statements.’99 ‘Discretion’ is the apparent euphemism for financial statements
that did not properly reflect the true state of the enterprise.100
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1.6.4

Corporate Crime and Penalties

The work by Al-Haydary (2004) concentrates on comparative studies involving
corporate crimes and penalties from the legal context of Saudi law and Islamic law.101
He criticises the identification of ‘company’ in the CL’65, and argues that company
may be identified as a ‘financial contract among the parties to obtain goal’.102 He
indicates that there are two types of company crimes, either financial crimes that aim
directly to obtain the money from the company (such as embezzlement) or crimes
related to money that aim indirectly to gain money from others (such as by establishing
companies to carry out illegal activities).103 Similar to the work by Al-Haydary is the
study carried out by Koumin and Hamid.104 These studies consider, however not in
depth, provisions regarding definitions of corporate crimes and their corresponding
penalties in general, but they do not analyse the provisions related to corporate crimes
or the liability provisions in detail. Neither Al-Haydary or Koumin and Hamid provides
an examination of the judicial enforcement of the CL’65. The proposed study aims to
critically examine the corporate criminal liability provisions, particularly corporate
crimes committed during the incorporation of company under the CL’65, in order to fill
the existing gap. Moreover, the proposed study examines the judicial enforcement of the
CL’65, which is a real indicator of litigation success.
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The subject of corporate criminal liability has evolved since the first half of the 20th
century.105 Undoubtedly, this development has significantly influenced the legal regimes
governing various matters, including the criminal, commercial and social aspects of
corporations. There exist different legal views on the matter. Soloveièikas (2004), citing
the work of Professor V S Khanna, disagrees with the argument that criminal liability
could be a substitute for civil liability, and argues that the latter has a greater deterrent
effect than the former.106 Moreover, he is opposed to the common notion that there is a
linkage between corporate criminal liability and deterrence. He argues that civil liability
alone could achieve the same beneficial effects as corporate criminal liability, for
example in terms of penalties and deterrence.107 Other scholars argue that using civil law
alone is inadequate to achieve deterrence of what otherwise would be deemed
criminally liable activities, and that criminal laws can be an efficient deterrence tool
instead.108 On the same note, Soloveièikas (2004) further states that ‘civil liability fails
to ensure the efficient social protection in the case of public goods. For instance, there is
no individual damage when the water or air is polluted. Hence, this makes the effect of
deterrence less effective.’109
It can be observed that the use of criminal liability can complement civil liability as an
effective tool to deter corporate crimes, which are often hidden through systematic and
deceptive business practices. For this reason, prosecution procedures for corporate
crimes have been generally costly and investigation into the crimes has been fraught
with difficulty. Internal fraud and other corporate criminal activities have beset many
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giant corporations. Examples include Enron in the United States, where such activities
resulted in its collapse and the subsequent loss of approximately USD 63.3 billion; and
the HIH company in Australia, which lost around AUD 4 billion.110 Following these and
other collapses, the criminal liability regimes in both countries have been strengthened.
Thus it is clear that criminal sanctions need to be stringent, and therefore there is a need
for so-called ‘draconian sanctions’,111 sanctions that provide useful tools to deter
corporate criminal activities on a massive scale.
1.6.5

Judicial Enforcement of the Companies Law 1965 (CL’65)

The best authorities that were identified in the course of developing and assembling this
Review are those that discuss the judicial enforcement of the CL’65. As with the
preceding sections of the Review, these authorities provide commentaries and insights
that were directed to other elements of KSA law. A concerted effort was made to
fashion these specific sources into a coherent body against which the analysis
undertaken in the dissertation can be evaluated.
The Shari‘ah law is the undoubted primary influence on all contemporary KSA legal
systems. The enforcement mechanisms are rooted in its tradition. Esmaeili states that
the KSA is under pressure generally ‘to develop good governance and encompass
democratic principles conducive to promoting the rule of law’.112 Therefore, almost all
aspects in the KSA may be transformed rapidly.113
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Colon shares this position, albeit from another perspective. He contends that ‘the rapid
growth of Islamic finance will require the international legal system to develop an
understanding of the foundations of Shari‘ah-compliant business transactions.’114 The
synthesis of Western and Islamic legal enforcement standards may lead to changes in
the KSA; Mantilla suggests that the Esmaeili ‘slow boat’ will ultimately arrive in the
KSA, as the mix of nationalist allegiance and financial interest within the business
sector exerts political, legal and economic leverage.115
The attitude towards crime in the KSA is largely influenced by the combination of
Islamic and traditional social forces. The title of the Varghese paper is a deceptive one
in the context of the present thesis.116 A casual glance at the title and the phrase
‘policing models’ might lead to the conclusion that the Varghese treatment of policing
as a theoretical abstract in the manner will not necessarily advance an understanding of
the types of criminal offences committed in the formation phases of a Saudi company.
A careful review of the work reveals it as a surprisingly useful contribution to an
appreciation of why certain offences are more likely than others to be committed in the
Saudi corporate milieu.
The contention advanced by Varghese is that the nature of a national police service and
its philosophical approach to law enforcement is a reflection of the broader national law
enforcement culture. If one accepts this proposition, one must necessarily accept the
inevitable conclusion that all citizens, including the corporate variety, will organically
adapt to the prevailing law enforcement culture in furtherance of their primary objective
114
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— that is, to the pursuit of all available means to maximise earnings for owners and
shareholders.
The prevailing forms of illegal conduct, as pursued in this hypothesis, will be tailored to
what the prevailing corporate culture appears to be most tolerant of or least equipped to
detect. In recent American experience, the glorified Ponzi schemes that provided the
basis for Enron and Bernard Madoff may be largely attributed to a relaxed US
regulatory environment, where the ‘too good to be true’ rates of return on subject
investments were insulated from effective regulation until the losses and damage
sustained were irreparable.
The assessment of the materials cited with respect to judicial enforcement in the KSA
concludes with the joint consideration of the authorities published by Otto, Van Eijk,
and Esmaeili. As their respective titles confirm, these three works are specifically
directed to the prevailing features of the KSA legal system. Otto engages in a
comparative analysis of Islamic legal systems in history and in modern times;117 Van
Eijk examines the specific structural aspects of the KSA system, including the Board of
Grievances and its unique relationship to the King;118 and Esmaeili evaluates the
influences of Islam, tribalism, and the more modern Saudi corporate regulatory regime,
of which the CL’65 is the most prominent feature.119
It is possible to distil a common message from these commentaries without doing
violence to the individual position of any of the authors. If one were to take only three
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sources from this entire Review to lay the foundation for an assessment of
contemporary KSA law, it is submitted that these would be the materials selected.
It is evident that no matter what external pressures are directed at the KSA to have the
CL’65, and subsequent regulations enacted under its auspices, be more consistent with
accepted international norms, Islam and the Shari‘ah law will never be likely to be
toppled from their place of precedence. The KSA is the birthplace of Islam; Esmaeili
describes the prospect of wholesale change in any aspects of KSA law as essentially
unthinkable for this reason.
However, the point of distillation for Otto, Van Eijk, and Esmaeili comes from their
shared opinions concerning the influence of the Western rule of law doctrines on KSA
justice. The rule of law is not always equated with democracy; but the rule of law is a
feature of almost all democracies. The rule of law and its ever more pervasive influence
as a international legal norm brings into the sharpest possible contrast the Wahhabi
Shari‘ah legal principle that every Muslim jurist could infer all applicable legal
principles directly from their two permitted sources — the Qur’ān and the Sunnah.
Further, the codification of the CL’65 undertaken in the KSA since 1965 has occurred
with the express concurrence of the country’s religious leadership.
The three authors perceive that there will be a movement, however, to a rule of law
styled enforcement of KSA corporate laws because the process will be evolutionary and
not mandated. These observations are important because it is therefore far more likely
that prosecutions for company law violations, especially those committed in the
formation phase, will be more prevalent — not because more offences will be
committed, but because the legal system will be less dependent on Shari‘ah and more
attuned to international standards.
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1.6.6

Islamic Law v Western Law

Referring to the difference between the Western law and Islamic law, McCary (2000),
for example, demonstrates that legal scholars base their decisions upon the available
legal precedent and upon their reading of the Qur’ān. The religious inspiration of
Islamic law translates into a greater reverence for the sanctity of business relationships
than the attitude found in Western jurisprudence. He asserts: ‘The approach a Muslim
takes to entering a contract, may, in many cases, differ greatly from that taken by an
American attorney or businessman.’120 McCary further adds that under Islamic law,
business and economic relationships are similar to personal relationships; they are
expected to reflect an ethical posture that is consistent with the teachings of Islam. In
his opinion, ‘under the principles of the Shari‘ah, a contract between two individuals is
divine in nature. The sanctity of the contract is viewed as a sacred duty to be upheld by
both parties under the eyes of God.’121 When evaluated using Islamic religious
principles, a breach of business law by one participating party carries the associated
gravity of breaching an ethical or moral law. McCary suggests that the Qur’ān offers a
great deal of guidance on how to evaluate the liability of business entities. For example,
one section of the Qur’ān specifically addresses the issue of how a legal expert should
evaluate the breaking of a business contract:
You who believe fulfill any contracts [that you make] Fulfill God's
agreement once you have pledged to do so, and do not break any oaths once
they have been sworn to. You have set God up as a Surety for yourselves.122
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The criminal liability scheme within Islamic law is distinct from the criminal/civil law
structure found in Western legal jurisprudence, as the former is premised on the
teaching of the Qur’ān. Rather than distinguishing liability according to acts that fall
within the category of criminal and civil torts, Islamic law assigns negligence according
to a more fluid scale and is likely to depend upon factors that might not commonly be
considered within the Western legal system, such as the honest intent of the individuals
involved in the disputed business transaction.
Legal scholars have commented that the moral principles of the Muslim references have
been applied to the business realm. Langman (2005) offered a critical analysis of the
legal application of Islamic fundamentalist beliefs within the legal jurisprudence of the
Middle East, noting that:
Islam, as a set of laws and ethical regulations that applied to all pacified and
unified diverse peoples, enabled vast networks of trade and commerce. The
fairly universal, but flexible, Islamic law, Shari‘ah, enabled the expansion
of trade throughout the region.123
The quotation by Langman is important because it introduces the application of
Shari‘ah law to the commercial and trade realm. Shari‘ah law is a collection of
precepts, both legal and religious, that are believed to have been handed down by God
to the Prophet Mohammed (PBUH) as documented in sources such as the Sunnah and
Qur’ān. Islamic commercial law represents a rare and very successful integration of
moral beliefs and commercial sensibilities.
As underlined, Saudi Arabian commercial law, particularly the CL’65, is a combination
of Western-style laws of commerce and the Shari‘ah legal system; nevertheless,
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Fundamentalism' (2005) 31(1–2) Critical Sociology 243, 250.
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Shari‘ah law remains the most influential factor in shaping the KSA’s business laws,
liabilities and penalties.124
1.6.7

International Aspects

1.6.7.1 Impact of Globalisation
One of the topics that have recently initiated a lot of theoretical debate has been the
impact of globalisation on Islamic legal development with regards corporate
commercial activities. Donboli and Kashefi (2005) highlight how globalisation
continues to compel the followers of Islamic legal tradition to reevaluate and change
their interpretations and evaluations of commercial legal transactions. Since the
beginning of globalisation, Islamic countries have continued to reassess their legal
systems. Utilising Islamic principles, Islamic jurists established the essential foundation
for the development of Islamic countries as they made statutes, collected taxes,
dispensed justice, engaged in diplomacy, and assisted in the development of an area.
Recent issues of globalisation have led to the progressive development of modern
commercial laws in most of the Islamic states. An influx of foreign trade and the
improvement of technology in the region have led to a synthesisation of the traditional
Shari‘ah principles in the development of commercial laws and regulation. Recently,
the legal systems of Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries have been
generally improved in order to address the sophisticated issues of globalisation and
trade.125
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There is little question that the WTO accession and the parallel Saudi rise to prominence
in the Group of Twenty (G20)126 group of nations are powerful imperatives that have
driven the current reconsideration of the interrelationship between KSA company
formation and criminal law. The overarching influence of globalisation has directed a
brighter international spotlight onto how the KSA asserts domestic control over
company formation and the ongoing regulation of companies once they are operative.
An issue that serves as a vital connective tissue between the sources selected in this
Review is the present and future ability of the KSA to integrate its company law system
into the broader construct of accepted international corporate law norms127 that are
largely reflected in the legal systems of the KSA’s fellow G20 and WTO members.128 If
the system is not entirely consistent with such norms, the question will inevitably arise
with reference to crimes committed in the company formation phase — has the CL’65
moved to within hailing distance of the international mainstream?
It should be noted that the formulation of Islamic law has been nonstandard across the
different national boundaries, resulting in some variance between the different Arab
nations. Nonetheless, a comparative analysis of the Western and Islamic models is
instructive for evaluating the development and application of Saudi Arabia’s
commercial laws and regulation. Furthermore, a legal analysis as proposed in this study
would allow the readers to see the strengths and weaknesses of the CL’65, specifically
in regards to corporate crimes during company incorporation.
126
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A legal analysis can help to demonstrate how Saudi Arabian commercial laws are a
mixture of the Islamic legal system and business laws borrowed from the European
system.129 Therefore, it makes sense from a theoretical standpoint to use the CL’65 as
the basis for analysing Western commercial laws and Islamic laws (since it is a mixture
it is not self-comprehensive). It may be noted that the determination of criminal liability
for corporate entities is handled in a similar manner to determining criminal liability for
individuals.
1.6.7.2 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Trade Barriers
The KSA is one of the wealthiest nations in the region and commands the world’s
largest known oil reserves. Globalisation, together with national concerns over being
too dependent upon oil as the KSA’s primary source of revenues and thus desiring
greater economic diversification (and investment), has prompted the Saudi leadership to
re-evaluate the status of its corporate laws.130
The KSA permitted international investors to join in its securities market through
investing in open-end mutual funds. Such investors are allowed to own up to 49 per cent
of a Saudi company’s capital.131 The KSA has updated some of laws relating to
investment, and has reformed some of the necessary institutions.132 These reforms
demonstrate how the KSA has attempted to modernise and westernise its commercial
legal framework in order to draw foreign investment interest as well as support Saudi
Arabia’s position in the WTO.
129
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Despite the KSA’s attempts to reform its commercial codes, some barriers to
liberalisation remain. There are serious limitations upon the activities of business in the
KSA, as Donbohli (2005) explains:
Many restrictions on commerce still exist in Saudi Arabia. Companies may
not import products containing alcohol and pork, and need special approval
to import certain products such as livestock, books, periodicals, movies, and
pharmaceutical products. Additionally, foreign individuals and companies
are not allowed to own real property in Saudi Arabia, although locally
registered companies can acquire or sell real property.133
The KSA government also imposes strict guidelines and regulation on the employment
sector. In many respects, the KSA and Egypt share a number of similarities as both
countries base their commercial law upon Shari‘ah laws and principles. However, in
contrast to the KSA, Egypt has consistently reformed its economic policies to reduce
state interference:
Egypt has significantly relaxed state controls on its economy during the last
decade and, in general, permits the use of agents while retaining a few
restrictions on their use in the sale of certain commodities. Saudi Arabia’s
free enterprise economy is dominated by public sector procurements, and
requires the use of local agents for all government purchases except
armaments.134
The above argument certainly helps to demonstrate and support the significance of this
proposed study. The current barriers to progress in the corporate sector may be deeply
rooted in Saudi Arabia’s jurisprudence, substantially influenced by the Hanbali school
of Muslim jurisprudence — a school of thought dominated by a conservative, literal
interpretation of the law. Because of the close association of Hanbalist scholars with the
present day KSA government, any reform in the corporate sector that contradicts the
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teaching of Hanbalism is often confronted by various forms of resistance from these
scholars, who are often equated with a rigid, conservative literalism that is focused upon
traditional interpretations.135
It has been demonstrated that one of the key contributions to a corporation becoming
successful is that the applicable laws and regulation of a particular country are
understood and obeyed.136 In many cases, the failure of some corporations to succeed
derives from the fact that the country where they are operating lacks an effective
corporate governance code and cogent domestic provisions, combined with weak
economic fundamentals.137 This situation clearly suggests that the existing models of
corporate governance, corporate control and corporate prosecution in the KSA will need
to be reassessed and probably changed to be more sensitive towards the dynamic
changes in market; while at the same time, it needs to make efforts to restore trust in the
corporate sector. Indeed, it can be argued that corporate criminal liability laws and
regulation in the KSA are currently too rigid and likely to deter foreign investors.
Furthermore, the provisions of the CGR’06 used to determine appropriate business
conduct have been criticised for being flawed and non-mandatory, circumstances that
cause much confusion for companies.138 Therefore, the proposed study will examine the
CL’65 in order to determine how it can be improved, especially in terms of criminal
liability.
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1.6.7.3 The Companies Law 1965 (CL’65): International Credibility
A second question falls naturally in line with the first — can the CL’65 and its overt
adherence to Islamic values as promoted by the Shari‘ah law maintain its credibility in
the international community where the KSA now plays a more central role?139 This
point is not specifically developed in this dissertation; however, it is a common thread
among the authorities discussed in this Review. The examination undertaken in this
thesis concerning the crimes committed at the company formation stage is a vital
contribution to this question. For this reason, the sources considered have been mined
for any analytical nuggets, however small or tangential to the themes explored in the
dissertation, that contribute to a more nuanced understanding of how crime occurs in the
company formation phase in the KSA. In many cases, a careful reading of the sources
that are considered in this Review confirms that the title of the source does not
accurately reflect its relevance to the present thesis.140
The importance of personal relationships as a factor in the success or failure of the
company is likely an equally significant factor to impede the temptation to engage in
crimes that would compromise the position of the erstwhile trusted partner. Several of
the commentaries cited in this review confirm that of all of the characteristics most
desired in a Saudi company, personal trust and loyalty assume overarching
importance.141 On this basis, if the types of crimes most likely to be committed at the
company formation stage are enumerated, it is suggested that on a putative scale of most
to least: offences where a corporate principal acts against a partner or trusted associate
139
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are least likely; crimes involving the state or foreign interests would be more likely.
This analysis does not suggest that a KSA corporate principal will engage in such
conduct; Al Ghamdi’s analysis, as with many of the sources whose principal thrust is
distinct from the present dissertation, is of interest because there is a useful
identification of a factor or issue that has relevance beyond the stated scholarly
parameters.
The influence of the United States on all aspects of the legal and economic structures is
undoubted. It is of interest that events in the United States such as the Enron scandals
prompted a concerted legislative reaction from American lawmakers that rippled across
most Western legal systems. It is noted that whilst there is no question that the KSA
accession to the WTO has altered the commercial legal landscape in the KSA, there was
apparently little interest in enacting legislation to mirror the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
provisions concerning corporate accounting and other reporting requirements. Posner
and Sunstein are noted American academics who argue that US foreign relations are
now influenced by global corporate activity; their arguments apply to the emerging
post-WTO KSA.142 It is evident that the efforts made in recent years to pursue a
‘Saudization’ policy in the KSA is distinct from the influences exerted by exogenous
legal forces such as WTO membership and the commitments made by the KSA to adopt
international commercial norms.
Sadi and Al-Buraey examine the efforts to reduce the number of foreign / ex-patriate
workers in the KSA; the pressures that drive this initiative are social, as the high birth
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rate has created a youthful cohort of under-employed Saudis.143 The interesting
conclusion that can be developed from their analysis is that there is no apparent corelation observed in the available data of literature that companies that were large
employers of foreign workers (including managers) tended to engage in any particular
kinds of criminal conduct as distinct from Saudi dominated companies.144 One may
move to the literature associated with corporate crime generally with the reasonable
assurance that the uniqueness of the CL’65 landscape as shaped by Shari‘ah and KSA
traditions will exert a profound influence on how corporate crime is perceived and
assessed.
1.6.8

Selected Sources and Bibliography

1.6.8.1 Bibliography of non- Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Legal Scholars
A final point is advanced as a consideration when one reviews the sources cited in this
Review. Care must be taken with the work of the non-KSA scholars that their
contributions are not unduly tainted by ethnocentrism, the blanket presumption that
Western corporate models are inherently better structures within which to fashion
companies than those contemplated by the CL’65. Montagu convincingly makes this
point in a commentary that evaluates the emergence of a civil society in the KSA.145 She
observes that the Western understanding of the KSA is rooted in ‘the overall Western
lack of knowledge about Saudi society’, where the end result is the denial of any respect
for the KSA, its traditional institutions, and their modern counterparts.146 Montagu
observes that this lack of knowledge is ‘regrettable’, an outcome that is the combined
143
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effect of the limited domestic Saudi scholarship, and the fact that very little research
concerning KSA legal and social institutions has been undertaken by Western
academics. Montagu adopts a tone concerning Western academic attitudes that
buttresses the concerns of Esmaeili. The Western-based scholarship that discusses Saudi
institutions is generally crafted from the apparent perspective that
a hegemonic and primitive monarchy could entertain neither civility nor an
associational society. Likewise, informed Western perceptions of the
complexity and depth of Saudi Arabian civil society are unfortunately
scanty, except for a few scholars.147
This concern gains particular credence when the influence of the external factors on the
CL’65, such as the WTO, and the determined pursuit of foreign investment are
assessed. The assumption that one finds in the Western scholarship that has assessed the
movement of the KSA towards a more mainstream international legal position is that
the existing the CL’65 structure must be inferior or else why would it be forsaken.
1.6.9

Concluding Remarks

There is a relatively modest quantity of Saudi company formation crimes scholarship
when this body of work is assessed with reference to the number of published articles
and texts. The lack of universally accepted ‘leading authorities’ that consider the issues
associated with the CL’65 and the crimes committed during the formation phase
requires the scholar to expand the ambit of the search for cogent and relevant material.
The Bibliography appended to this Review confirms the strength of this observation, as
a similar selection of authorities concerning a Western corporations law point would be
drawn from dozens of potential candidates.148 Until 2002, the Saudi corporate
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environment was universally accepted as a restrictive system where foreign influences
were limited and the Shari‘ah law remained the primary influence.149 The available
articles and published papers at that time were more discussions of the accepted status
quo than a provision of informed commentary concerning the strengths, weaknesses, or
anticipated directions of the CL’65.
The domestic policy decisions made by the KSA leadership in the past decade to
encourage greater foreign investment in the KSA, coupled with the accession of the
KSA to the WTO in 2005, have placed the regulatory scheme, which was enacted in
1965, under greater international academic scrutiny. This Literature Review confirms
that the size of the existing scholarship must not be confused with the level of
engagement demonstrated in the selected commentaries. The intersection created by the
CL’65 and KSA criminal law issues in the KSA has a number of attractive issues
generated by the nation’s movement into the international commercial mainstream.
Esmaeili sounded an accurate if unsettling note in his negative 2009 assessment of all
prior published work concerning the KSA legal system. He dismissed the entire
assemblage as ‘poor’, a situation that he attributed to the equally substandard quality of
the limited available information concerning the Saudi legal system generally.150 The
few direct commentaries and the articles that consider specific issues through the careful
assessment of section 299 and its companion the CL’65 provisions have served to
elevate the quality of the scholarship. It is notable that Esmaeili characterised the state
of the academic literature in language that left nothing to the imagination:
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There is not, to my knowledge, a single serious study based on adequate
statistics of the Saudi economy, of the structures of power and influence
within the state, of the social classes of Saudi Arabia, of the ethnic and
social composition of the major cities (Mecca, Medina, Jeddah, Taif,
Riyadh, Dammam) in which most Saudis live …. Those who rule the
country, and make a pretence of pluralism and openness, ensure that
concrete issues are not discussed or investigated, while those who, from
outside, make money from the country, notably oil companies, banks and
contractors, have just as little interest in the truth. All is misrepresented in
propaganda and by the four ideological blankets that between them smother
the realities of the country – oil, religion, monarchy and desert. 151
It is in this rather arid scholarly environment that the themes that provide the foundation
to the present dissertation are advanced, an environment that ironically mirrors the
physical landscape of much of the KSA.
Finally, although the studies discussed earlier have benefited the proposed study, there
are gaps which the present study attempts to cover. To name but a few examples of
those gaps, the previous studies neither focused on companies and their criminal
liabilities in the legal stages of the companies in the KSA, nor considered whether the
provisions of the CL’65 deterred corporate criminal activities. In addition to the legal
provisions regarding criminal actions, defences, penalties and enforcement concerning
the CL’65 have not been sufficiently addressed.
To this end, what this study aims at, is to fill the gaps described above, through a
critical, in depth analysis of the existing regulatory framework on corporate criminal
liability in the KSA, particularly with regards to crimes committed during the phase of
company formation, thus complementing existing studies, which have left this area
untouched.
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1. 7 Contributions of the Study
This study intends to make significant theoretical and practical contributions towards
the development of corporate regulation in general and corporate criminal liability in the
KSA in particular. This approach not only will enrich the existing literature in this area
but also will offer a wide range of measures to improve and strengthen the KSA’s
corporate laws and regulations, notably regarding corporate crimes and the appropriate
legal sanctions. The study is both timely and important, given the fact that the KSA is
currently in urgent need to modernise its economy to correspond with the obligations
incurred by its accession to international institutions such as the WTO.152 Economic
reforms, ‘shoulder to shoulder’ with reforms in the regulatory regime, will integrate the
KSA more fully into the international economic system. The suggested measures are
likely to be beneficial to the commercial sectors in the KSA, facilitating active
participation by local investment as well as attracting more foreign investors to invest in
the KSA. This study will contribute to an improvement in the Kingdom’s national
economy by advocating appropriate and timely legal reforms. Again, this is especially
important as the KSA dominates the GCC politically and economically and plays a
crucial role internationally.153
1. 8 Research Design
1.8.1

Methodology

This research project finds its origins in a need to study the legal framework of
company activities in the KSA. The framework is derived from Islamic law. Hence, it is
152

K A Al-Abdulqader, G Hannah and D M Power, 'The Appraisal of Ordinary Shares by Saudi
Investors' (2007) 21(1) Research in International Business and Finance 69, 70; Mohamed A Ramady,
The Saudi Arabian Economy: Policies, Achievements, and Challenges (Springer, 2010) 41, 349;
Aaronson and Abouharb, above n 36, 386.
153
Rafiq, above n 32, 730.

49

Ch 1: Introduction

likely that Saudi lawmakers will adopt Islamic principles and approach and incorporate
them into the country’s laws and regulations for corporate regulation. This may then
require amending other corporate laws as well. By legal analysis of both the positive
and negative aspects of the CL’65 regarding corporate crimes, many underlying reasons
can be found to change or maintain the current Saudi legal approach in this area. In
order to achieve the objectives of this research, it is essential to study the provisions of
the CL’65 concerning corporate crimes during stage of incorporation. This is done by
demonstrating the link between effectiveness of provisions of the CL’65 and the
prevention of the corporate crimes.
The research will examine and analyse the approach of the KSA’s laws related to
corporate crime, with a focus on those crimes committed during incorporation of a
company based on CL’65. The related literature in the field will be reviewed by using
the content analysis method.154 This will lead to the building of a firm theoretical
foundation that shall provide a critical legal view of corporate crimes and examine the
legal framework of corporate criminal liability in the KSA. The following methods will
be applied:
i.

Both primary and secondary materials will be used in interpreting the legal
principles of corporate criminal liability to find patterns and trends in the CL’65
in order to provide a contextual background for the understanding of legal aspects
of corporate crimes in the KSA.

ii.

Systematic content analysis of provisions of the CL’65 will be employed through
a legal examination of the provisions of law concerning corporate crimes in
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relation to incorporation of company. Content analysis aims for scientific
understanding and examination of legal texts of the CL’65. It will lead to findings
on the strengths and weaknesses of the Saudi provisions governing corporate
criminal liability in phase of incorporation.
iii.

A qualitative description and analysis will be carried out based on archival
resources in order to strengthen the objectivity of the study.

iv.

This thesis uses English transliteration (Arabic words written with English letters)
in the case of Arabic names such as names of sources and laws except authors’
names, based on the system used by the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill
University, a copy of which is attached to the thesis.

1.8.2

Data Collection

Primary materials, which are essential for this study, include various Saudi laws on
corporations, specifically the CL’65. In obtaining secondary data, the research will
utilise relevant journals, magazines, handbooks, previous research reports, newspaper
publications, official records, and conference proceedings; and some relevant cases will
be examined in this thesis in order to help further analysis of corporate crimes. The
complete texts of conventions and treaties, as well as the reports and research of other
international studies can be obtained from electronic databases. To collect the materials
from the KSA, a fieldwork trip will be required.
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Chapter 2
2 Definitions, Origins and Types of Commercial Companies
in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
2. 1 Introduction
A comprehensive investigation of corporate crimes by companies requires an
understanding of the types of companies that operate in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
(KSA). Crimes can be committed by different types of companies in diverse ways and
at various stages of their life spans, from inception to their dissolution. In this context,
this chapter aims to discuss fundamental aspects concerning the operation of Saudi
companies under the laws of the KSA. Amongst such laws, the Companies Law 1965
(Niz}am
> Asharaikaat / ( )نظام الشركاتCL’65), which deals with the establishment and
operation of companies, is regarded as the most relevant law with respect to the
concerns of this chapter.155
Discussion in this chapter is divided into seven sections. Section 2.2, which follows this
introduction, considers the definitions and origins of companies in the KSA; section 2.3
focuses on the different types of companies, while section 2.4 examines the formation
of companies under the CL’65; section 2.5 concentrates on corporate capital and
finance, which is followed by section 2.6 that describes the dissolution of companies in
the KSA; section 2.7 contains the conclusions of this chapter.
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2. 2 Definition and Origins of Companies in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA)
2.2.1

Definition of a Company

A company is an entity, which has a legal personality independent of its owners, and is
involved in trade and commerce of goods and services in the market.156 It must abide by
the rules and ethical principles of normal and acceptable business operation in addition
to accepted business practices so as to achieve its main aim, which is to earn profit.157
The concept of a ‘company’ has been defined in section 1 of the CL’65, the KSA’s
main law with regard to companies, as a ‘contract by which two persons or more
undertake to participate in an enterprise, with each of them offering a contribution or
share in the form of money or work to the undertaking and thus qualify for a share in
the yield of this project, whether profit or loss’. Section 11 of the Commercial Court
Law1931158 further provides that a company is ‘a contract between two or more persons
where they undertake to carry out a certain activity to realise legal profit’.
As a consequence, the contract, which is concluded between two or more persons,
creates a relation among them, which is ongoing and particular in nature. The
particularity is based on the fact that there should be no conflict of interest between the
persons involved. To this end, the contributions of one partner (shareholder) to the
company promote the interests of the other partners as well as the partner’s own.159 In
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157
Ibid; Andy Gibson and Douglas Fraser, Business Law (Pearson Education Australia, 4th ed, 2009) 577;
Mohammed Hussein Ismail, Alh}imayah Alqanwnyah Lithabaat Ra’s Almaal fy Sharikaat Ala’mwaal
Alsa‘udiah Dirasah Muqaranah [Legal Protection of Capital Adequacy in Saudi Financial Corporations:
Comparative Study] (Institute of Public Administration, 2002) 36.
158
The Commercial Court Law 1931 (Niz}am
> Almah}kamah Atijary>ah / ( )نظام المحكمة التجاريةCCL’31) was
issued by Royal Decree No M/32 of 15 Muh}arram 1350 AH (2 June 1931).
159
In the KSA laws, partners and shareholders are synonymous although they are completely different in
common law. This is so because, as forms of business organisation, both partnerships and companies are
treated as a company. See the Companies Law 1965 (KSA) ss 3–9.
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addition, the contract is personal and confidential in nature. Some of the contracts
contain confidentiality provisions that are designed to protect the confidential
information of the parties. The confidentiality provisions generally protect trade secrets,
propriety information and personal information. Its personal character emerges from all
the legal provisions, according to which death, bankruptcy or incapacity of one of the
partners constitute reasons that would lead to the company’s dissolution, as will be
discussed in section 2.6. Its confidential character is demonstrated by the two following
remarks. Firstly, partners aim to achieve a common objective; and secondly, they are
not allowed to support on their behalf or on behalf of third parties160 acts that are
contrary to the interests or objectives of the company.161 The personal element can be of
substantial nature in respect of certain elements of functionality of the company. Its
commercial character is not, however, abolished, given that a company is considered as
a ‘sui generis’162 formation of commercial law, aiming to achieve common commercial
objectives and profit.
Companies in the KSA present certain characteristics, which differ from those of the
companies in the common law. The following are two such differences. In common law
jurisdictions, firstly the owners of the company are called shareholders and secondly,
the death of a shareholder does not affect the perpetuity of a company.163
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A third party is any individual or entity other than founders. Abdul Hadi Mohammed Alghamdi and
Bin Younis Mohammed Hosni, Alqanwn Atijary [Commercial Law] (Alsheqry Library, 2nd ed, 2007) 147.
161
See the definition provided in the Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 1. It is worth mentioning that the
definition provided in section 1 of the CL’65 is identical to those adopted in most of the Arab laws, such
as the United Arab Emirates Companies Law No 8 of 1984 (s 5) and the Commercial Companies Law of
Bahrain No 12 of 1975 (s 1).
162
Companies must strictly comply with the provisions of the CL’65 that set specific legal requirements
with regard to the formation of companies. These requirements have been mentioned in section 2.4 of the
present Chapter.
163
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 201F.
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The Islamic jurists define the word ‘Sharikah / ’شركة, the term used in Arabian laws and
is commonly translated as ‘company’, in the sense of ‘joining together’.164 Sharikah is
further elaborated as ‘participation of two or more persons in a certain business with
defined amounts of capital according to a contract or jointly carrying out a business and
for sharing profits and losses’.165 Islamic Law further provides rules166 and legal forms
pertaining to companies. As a consequence, companies in Islamic Law (Shari‘ah) have
been grouped under the following types: Company of Negotiation (Sharikat Al-

Mufawad}h / )شركة المفاوضة,167 Company of Equals (Sharikat Al-‘Inan / )شركة العنان,168
Company of Body (Sharikat Al-Abdan / )شركة األبدان,169 Company of Reputation
(Sharikat Al-Wujooh / )شركة الوجوه,170 and Company of Body and Capital (Sharikat Al-

Mud}arabh / )شركة المضاربة.171
In particular, section 2 of the CL’65, defines eight forms of companies, those being:
i) general partnership company (Sharikat Atad}amun / ( )شركة التضامنGPC), ii) limited
partnership company (Sharikat Ataws}yah Albas}yt}ah / ( )شركة التوصية البسيطةLPC),
164

Ahmed Mahmoud Al-Khouli, Naz}aryat Ashakhs}yah Ala‘tibaryah Bayn Alfiqh Alislami wa Alqanwn
Alwad}‘y [Legal Personality Theory between Islamic Doctrine and the Rule of Law] (Dar Assalam, 2003)

50.
Ibid 50, 132.
166
These rules cannot be explained at length, as the length of this study is limited to certain particular
aspects.
167
The term means ‘delegation’ or ‘the Company of Negotiation’ – when the partners have equal shares
in the company and also equal profits and management. See Atawi, above n 156, 571.
168
The concept signifies ‘reins’ or ‘the Company of Equals’ – where partners use their money in a
business and work with it. All partners would have the right to buy and sell and take the company
forward. The partners’ shares are distributed between them accordance with their agreement. See Atawi,
above n 156, 581.
169
The terms could be translated as ‘the Company of Body’ – where two or more persons (including
persons such as lawyers) come together with their skills but without their capital. The skill they have is
what constitutes the basis of the company and its profits are distributed according to the agreement of the
partners. See Atawi, above n 156, 589.
170
It means ‘the Company of Reputation’. This company is incorporated when two or more people
associate in what they buy using the trust of merchants in them, and the reputation that is based on this
trust, without having property. The profits of the company are divided between the partners based on their
agreement. See Atawi, above n 156, 601.
171
The concept signifies ‘the Company of Body and Capital’ – when one or more funds the capital of the
business and the other partner or partners work with it, and the resulting profit is divided amongst them
according to what they stipulated. See Atawi, above n 156, 610.
165
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iii) silent partnership company (Sharikat Almah}as}ah / ( )شركة المحاصةSPC), iv) joint
stock company (Sharikat Almusahamh / ( )شركة المساھمةJSC), v) limited liability
company (Asharikah dhat Almasw’liah Almah}dudah / ( )الشركة ذات المسؤولية المحدودةLLC),
vi) company limited by shares (Sharikat Ataws}yah Bilashum /)شركة التوصية باألسھم
(CLS), vii) company with variable capital (Asharikah dhat Ra’salmalalqabillitaghyyr /
( )الشركة ذات رأس المال القابل للتغييرCVC) and viii) cooperative company (Asharikah

Ata‘wunyah / ( )الشركة التعاونيةCC). Section 2 of the CL’65 also states that any company
that does not possess any of the types defined in the said section, will be considered as
invalid.
2.2.2

Origins of Companies in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA)

Τhe discovery of oil in the KSA in 1936 triggered a huge commercial production of this
precious commodity in 1938, which culminated in an unprecedented growth of
companies in the KSA.172 A brief account of a few notable examples follows. The very
first company was formed by the house of Alireza, also known as Beit Zainal.173 Zainal
Alizera began trading in 1845 by importing food stuffs, textiles and other merchandise
from across the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent. This was later complemented
by the company’s acquisition of shipping lines’ agencies, assisting the transport of those
commodities.174
The company’s business prospered and continued to develop in the 20th century. The
business was renamed Haji Abdullah Alireza and Company in 1929, and received the

172

Richard D Lewis, When Cultures Collide: Leading across Cultures: A Major New Edition of the
Global Guide (Nicholas Brealey Publishing, 3rd ed, 2005) 417.
173
It is the oldest family business in the KSA, dating back one and a half centuries.
174
Haji Abdullah Alireza & Co Ltd, History (2011) <http://www.alireza.com/history.htm>.
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country’s first commercial registration (number 1).175 From the 1930s the size of the
Company continued to grow as trading opportunities increased.176
The Haji Abdullah Alireza Company was incorporated as a limited liability enterprise
with capital totalling SAR 130 million (approximately USD 34.7 million)177 in 2003.178
The Company further extended its business operations, entering into areas such as the
real estate market. The Company was financially strong enough to launch further
projects in a plethora of industrial sectors, such as telecommunications, travel and
tourism, as well as maritime services.179
Most of the companies that emerged in the KSA, however, were state owned. The state
owned companies constituted up to 65 per cent of the nation’s operational companies.180
The Saudi company, Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO), founded in 1933
and still operational, constitutes a representative example of implementation of an
overseas strategy.181 The company was founded when the first king of the KSA, Abdul
Aziz bin Abdul Rahman Al-Saud, signed partnership agreements with Standard Oil of
California, which later acquired the following three corporations: Mobil, Exxon and
Texaco.182 In 1944, the name of Standard Oil of California Company was changed to
Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO). In 1980, the Saudi Government acquired
100 per cent interest in ARAMCO, and in 1988 the company became known as Saudi
Aramco.183 Through its affiliates, it has joint ventures and subsidiary offices in the
175

Ibid.
Ibid.
177
Note: all USD approximations are to the nearest dollar.
178
Haji Abdullah Alireza & Co Ltd, above n 174.
179
Ibid.
180
L R Aalund, 'Saudi Arabia' (1993) 91(33) Oil and Gas Journal 38, 43.
181
Ibid 43–47.
182
Gawdat Bahgat, 'The New Geopolitics of Oil: The United States, Saudi Arabia, and Russia' (2003)
47(3) Orbis 447, 456.
183
Ibid 457.
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Middle East, Asia, Europe and America. This company is the world’s largest producer
and exporter of oil.184
Another notable company that emerged in this period was the Savola Group. The
Savola Group still remains one of the KSA’s leading companies in the industrial sector.
This company has a strong presence, in particular in the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) region and even beyond, such as in Asia.185 It was established in 1979, with an
initial capital of SAR 40 million (approximately USD 10.7 million), which in the
subsequent years has grown significantly to surpass the SAR 5 billion (approximately
USD 1.33 billion) mark.186 The company is a publicly listed company.187 The Savola
Group’s main business operations were in the edible oil industry, but their business has
also expanded and diversified into other areas, including food lines, retail, plastics and
real estate.188 In recent years, the company has become one of the most successful as
well as one of the fastest growing companies in the Middle East.189
Another company worth mentioning is the Saudi Cable Company, which commenced
operations 35 years ago. It was not only the first cable company in the KSA but also the
first of its kind to have an operational base anywhere in the entire Middle East region.
More recently, it became the only company in the Middle East to have entered into the
manufacture of optic cables. Today, it is placed among the top ten companies in the
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For more information about ARAMCO, see its website: Saudi Aramco, History of Saudi Aramco
(undated) <http://www.jobsataramco.eu/51/about-saudi-aramco/history-of-saudi-aramco.htm>.
185
Savola Group, 30 Years of Growth and Achievement, Annual Report 2009 (2009)
<http://www.savola.com/savolae/pdf/Savola_Annual_Report_2009_E.pdf> 1, 28.
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Ibid 4.
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Ibid 4, 33, 68.
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Ibid 4, 11.
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Ibid 11.
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world that have been successfully manufacturing extra high tension 400kV underground
cable.190 Saudi Cable Company is a JSC.191
There is a plethora of companies that are operational in the KSA in various market
sectors, such the banking, gold and jewellery, foreign exchange, engineering, and
automobile sectors.192
The emergence of an increased number of companies, active in various sectors, as
demonstrated above, underlines the necessity for the existence of a legal framework that
should clearly and thoroughly outline the rules and regulations that define their
operation, among these rules and regulations being rules defining the incorporation,
functions and liability of companies, their shareholders (owners, partners, associates),
officebearers and so forth.
2. 3 Types of Companies under the Companies Law 1965 (CL’65)
There are a number of different types of companies that can be formed in the KSA.
There are three types of companies of persons and three types of capital companies that
can be registered under the CL’65.193
Companies of persons, which include the types of GPC, LPC and SPC,194 are formed
primarily on the basis of family or personal relations.195 The existence of the personal
element is important in companies of persons. As a consequence, when an associate is
190

Sharaf Sabri, The House of Saud in Commerce: A Study of Royal Entrepreneurship in Saudi Arabia
(Sharaf Sabri, 2001) 107.
191
Ibid.
192
See top 100 the KSA companies, Saudi Network, Top 100 Saudi Arabia Companies (undated)
<http://www.the-saudi.net/business-center/saudi-top-100.htm>.
193
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 1.
194
Section 1 of the Income Tax Law 2004, which was enacted by Royal Decree No M/1 of 15 Muh}arram
1425 AH (7 March 2004), referred to the GPC, the LPC and the SPC companies as ‘Companies of
Persons’.
195
Atawi, above n 156, 47.
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declared bankrupt, dead or incapable, the company ceases to function. In addition, the
change of an associate’s contribution amount is not possible without the consent of
every one of the remaining associates.196
Capital companies in the KSA include the following three types: the JSC, the LLC and
the CLS.197 Capital companies are not based on personal or family relationships, but on
purely financial interests. In capital companies, the crucial consideration is the
investment of capital for the business — regardless of any special relationship. A capital
company cannot be dissolved by the death of a shareholder, nor by bankruptcy,
insolvency, or interdict. A member of a capital company is responsible for the company
debts to the extent of the nominal shares198 he/she owns in the capital.199
In addition to the six types of companies mentioned above, the CL’65 provides for two
additional types of companies. These are the CVC and the CC.200
In the case of a CVC, its memorandum of association (MoA) or articles of association
(AoA)201 state that its capital can be subject to variation.202 Accordingly, the CL’65
196

Partners may not transfer more assets or contribute more to the company’s capital as agreed through
the initial Memorandum of Understanding, unless there is consent of all partners involved. In this way,
the personal element, on the basis of relations of trust, is safeguarded. See, Mustafa Kamal Taha,
Asharikaat Atijaryah [Commercial Corporations] (Dar Alfikr Aljami‘y, 2007) 70.
197
Section 1 of the Income Tax Law 2004 called the JSC, the LLC and the CLS ‘Capital Companies’.
198
The nominal shares are that contain names of the shareholders. Such shares shall be circulated by
registering in the shareholders registry prepared by the company, which includes names of the
shareholders, their nationalities, places of residence, professions, number of shares and the paid amount
of shares. See the Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 102.
199
Hamadalah, above n 37,150.
200
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 2.
201
The memorandum of association (MoA) is the contract that the founders use to create and operate the
business. It gives the company’s name, names of its shareholders and number of shares held by them, its
objectives and the names and addresses of the directors of the company. See Taha, Commercial
Corporations 2007, above n 196, 170. The articles of association (AoA) comprise that document that
governs the relationship between a company and a third party. It contains the capital requirements, issuing
of shares, requirements of the transfer of shares, the rules of board meetings and liquidation of the
company. MoA with AoA are considered the constitutions of a company. See Alghamdi and Hosni, above
n 160, 257. Further discussion on MoA and AoA please refer to Chapter 4 that deals with crimes relating
to company constitutions and other documents during the incorporation phase.
202
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 181.
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underlines that the MoA or AoA of a company may state that its capital can be subject
to variation. As a result, a company is eligible to be a JSC with variable capital, and a
company is eligible to be an LLC with variable capital, likewise the other companies.203
In the case of the CC, the company can take the form of a JSC or an LLC, and its capital
is subject to variation.204 Thus, a CVC and a CC are not considered specific types of
companies which exist under such names, but they are added to the six types of
companies mentioned above.
Figure 2.1: Classification of Companies under the Companies Law 1965 (CL’65)

Companies under the CL’65*

General Partnership
Company

Limited Liability
Company

Limited Partnership
Company

Company Limited by
Shares

Silent Partnership
Company

Company with Variable
Capital

Joint Stock Company

Cooperative Company

* Note: These are the types of companies that are the prime concern of this thesis.

The following sections discuss in more detail these types of companies as provided in
the CL’65.

203
204

Alghamdi and Hosni, above n 160, 144.
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) ss 189, 191.
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2.3.1

Companies of Persons (Personal Companies)205

Under the CL’65 the following types of companies of persons can be created: the GPC,
the LPC and the SPC. Each of these types of companies has specific characteristics,
which will be addressed below.
2.3.1.1 A General Partnership Company (Sharikat Atad}amu
munn / ( ) شركة التضامنGPC)
The CL’65 defines a GPC as ‘an association of two or more persons who assume joint
liability, to the extent of their entire fortune, for the company debts’.206 Partners of a
GPC can be either a legal entity or a natural person.207
Characteristics of a GPC
There are several characteristics related to the position of the general partner and his/her
relations to the rest of the partners as well as third parties. These are the following:
1)

Personal and joint liability of the partners

According to section 16 of the CL’56 partners are held jointly and personally (severally)
responsible for the company’s debts.208 Their responsibility is not limited to their shares
in the company; instead, all of their assets are at stake.209 Creditors can choose any
general partner and claim individually full payment of the company’s debt, subject to
two conditions as stated in section 20 of the CL’65. The conditions are: firstly, that the
company’s debt shall be established by consent of the directors or by a judgment of the
205

This division has been borrowed from section1 of the Income Tax Law 2004 that divided types of
companies in the KSA to three types of personal companies and three types of capital companies.
206
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 16.
207
Hamadalah, above n 199, 217.
208
The GPC is a commercial type of company recognised by the CL’65. There are also partnership
formations in KSA, are not types of companies, which are described and organised by Islamic Law. See,
Alghamdi and Hosni, above n 160, 127, 141.
209
Balhajj Al-Arabi Bin Ahmed, Ma‘alem Naz}aryat Asharikah Lda Fuqaha’ Ashari'a Alislamyah'
[Features of Corporation Theory for Islamic Law Scholars] (1998) 39 Majallat Albuhuth Alfiqhiyah
Almua's}irah 7, 82.
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Board of Grievances (Diwa>n Al-Maz{al> im / )ديوان المظالم210, and secondly, that these debts
have not been settled. If a partner joins the company after its formation, this partner will
be liable with the rest of the co-members of the company and with his/her entire fortune
for the company debts incurred before and after the date that the partner joined the
company. Any agreement to the contrary between the partners would have no effect in
respect to the claim of third parties, unless made public.211 Such agreement could be
valid only after its publication in any daily official newspaper that has to be distributed
at the company head office.212 If a shareholder / a partner withdraws from the company,
he/she will be liable for the company’s debts that existed before his/her withdrawal
from the company, but not for those accumulated following the declaration of his/her
withdrawal. If a partner has waived his/her interest/share213 in the company, that partner
will be absolved from liability only if the creditors agree.214

210

Board of Grievances is an independent administrative board in the KSA and serves as Saudi Arabia’s
principal and highest administrative tribunal. The [current] Law of the Board of Grievances 2007 (Niz}am
>
Diwa>n Almaz{a>lim / ( )نظام ديوان المظالمLBG’07) was enacted by Royal Decree No M/78 of 19 Ramad}an
1428 AH (1 October 2007). For more details on the Board of Grievances, see Ahmed A Al-Ghdyan, 'The
Judiciary in Saudi Arabia' (1998) 13(3) Arab Law Quarterly 253, 242, 243; Ayoub M Al-Jarbou, 'Judicial
Independence: Case Study of Saudi Arabia' (2004) 19(1) Arab Law Quarterly 5, 20, 24–30; Ayoub M AlJarbou, 'The Saudi Board of Grievances: Development and New Reforms' (2011) 25(2) Arab Law
Quarterly 177. Also, see section 6. 3. 1 of Chapter 6.
211
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 19.
212
Ibid s 21.
213
Section 19(2) of the CL’65 states that ‘If a partner withdraws from the company, he/she shall not be
liable for the company debts may arise after the month of his/her withdraw; and if one of the partners
relinquishes/waives his share, he/she shall not be acquitted from Company debts towards its creditors
unless they acknowledge such relinquishment.’
214
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 19(2).
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2)

Partners to acquire category of traders

A GPC is a commercial company. This implies that once a person is involved in a GPC,
this person acquires the status of trader.215 In order to acquire the status of a trader, the
partner should have the ability to practice trade.216
3)

Non-negotiability of shares

A partner may assign the partner’s interest/share only with the consent of all the rest; in
fact, this partner’s interest/quota may not be transferred to the partner’s heirs after
death.217 The company must be dissolved following the death of any of its partners.
However, partners may agree, while signing the MoA of a company, to insert a clause
that prevents mandatory dissolution under these circumstances.218
4)

Inclusion of a partner’s name in the name of the company

Third parties, who deal with the company, are able to recover the company’s debts from
the personal assets of the partners for a GPC. Section 17 of the CL’65 states that the
name of the company must contain the name of at least one of the partners. The CL’65
does not require that a certain number of the partners’ names be included, perhaps
because a single partner is liable for all debts of the company. The name of a person
who is not a partner should not be included. Any such inclusion would be considered
fraudulent in that third parties may regard the fraudulently included person as a partner
and feel assured that any credits being extended to the company will be paid off in due
215

Akram Yamalaky, Alqanwn Atijary Asharikaat Dirasah Muqaranah [Corporation Commercial Law: A
Comparative Study] (Dar Athaqafah Lianashr wa Atawzy‘, 2006) 62.
216
Trade is defined by section 1 of the Income Tax Law 2004 as ‘A commercial activity in all its forms,
or any vocational, professional or other similar activity for profit. This includes the use of movable and
immovable property.’
217
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 17.
218
Ibid s 35.
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course. In addition, the company’s name may differ from that of other partner/s.
However, if the name of a person who is not a partner is included in the company’s
name, and this person knows about the inclusion, he/she would be jointly held liable for
the debts of the company.219 The said person would be criminally responsible for the
fraud.220 The company may, however, retain the name of a retired or dead partner with
the company’s name provided that such partners and their heirs consent to such
retention.221
5)

Company’s capital and the number of partners

The CL’65 does not require a minimum or maximum amount of capital for this
company. As far as the number of the partners is concerned, the minimum number of
partners is two, whereas the maximum number of partners is not defined.222
2.3.1.2 Limited Partnership Company (Sharikat
Sharikat Ataws}yah Albas}yt}ah / شركة التوصية
( )البسيطةLPC)
Section 36 of the CL’65 defines an LPC as ‘a company which consists at least two
partners: 1) a general partner who is responsible, to the extent of his/her entire fortune,
for the company debts; and 2) a limited partner who is responsible only to the extent of
his/her interest/quota in the capital for the company’. The only difference between an
LPC and a GPC is the participation of a limited partner together with the general one in
the former;223 therefore, all the rules relating to a GPC also apply to an LPC.
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Ibid s 17.
Saied Yahya, Alwajyz fy Aniz}am
> Atijary Alsa‘udi [Brief in Saudi Commercial Law] (Almaktab
Al‘rabi Alh}dyth, 7th ed, 2004) 176.
221
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 17.
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Ibid s 16.
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Ahmed Abu Al-Rwus, Mawsu‘at Asharikaat Atijaryah [Encyclopaedia of Commercial Corporations]
(Almaktab Aljami‘y Alh}dith, 2002) 101.
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Characteristics of an LPC
There are specific provisions applicable to the partners. These include the following:
1)

Two categories of partners

This type of company comprises two categories of partners — whether individuals or
companies — the general partner and the limited partner. The general partners are
responsible with their entire fortune for the company’s debts, whereas the limited
partners are responsible only to the extent of the capital they have invested in the
company. The limited partners are not considered traders and are prohibited from
engaging in the company’s management.224 The CL’65 does not require the participation
of a certain number of partners; therefore, the only requirement in this regard is the
existence of at least one general and one limited partner.
2)

Name and address of the company

The name of the company consists of the names of one or more of the general partners
combined with the indication of the existence of a general corporation, such as Khalid
Ali Al Turki & Sons Company (Trading and Development Company).225 The name of
the limited partner should not be included in the name of the company. Furthermore, no
partner, whether general or limited, may transfer his/her shares to third parties unless all
partners agree.226

224

Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 39.
Section 37 of the CL’73 states: ‘The name of the limited partnership company shall be composed of
one name of the general partners or more, coupled with whatever indicates the existence of the company.
The name of the said company must not be composed of the name of one of the limited partners; and if
the company name includes a limited partner’s name with his knowledge of such, he shall be considered a
general partner in confrontation with others.’
226
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 39.
225
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3)

Trader category

The general partner acquires the status of a trader in this company, but the limited
partner does not.227 This is so perhaps because the limited partners bear only limited
liability of the company but they may bind the entity to an unlimited amount of debt if
they are allowed to be a trader.
2.3.1.3 Silent Partnership Company (Sharikat Almah}as}ah / ( )شركة المحاصةSPC)
An SPC is defined in section 40 of the CL’65 as ‘an association of which third parties
are not aware and which neither has a legal personality nor is subject to the declaration
formalities’. It is created through a contract between at least two persons, aiming to
carry out a particular and short-term commercial project, which does not have a long
completion time.228 It has neither a nationality nor an address. Furthermore, it does not
need an MoA in a written form.229 For example, two people agree to buy a certain
product, sell it and then distribute between them whatever profit or loss is realised. This
type of company describes participation of people in a company of shares. Third parties
may know the participants, who are acting on their behalf and under their liability,
without rendering liable the rest of the partners, thus, in this company each partner is
held liable individually.230 Participants’ agreements are private and although there are
neither company’s assets, nor rights and obligations, this type of company is considered
one of the company types of the CL’65.231 It should be noted that the CL’65 does not
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Alghamdi and Hosni, above n 160, 231.
Bin Ahmed, above n 209, 84, 85. It is worth mentioning that some scholars use joint venture and
others use silent partnership company, to (Sharikat Almah}as}ah / )شركة المحاصة. However, the thesis adapts
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mention if a company can be become a partner in the SPC or not. Thus, it could be said
that, partner may be a natural person or a legal entity.
Characteristics of an SPC
An SPC depends on the existence of the personal element and is characterised by the
fact that (as has been noted above) its existence is only known to its members.232
Without any legal personality (and, consequently, no name, address or nationality), no
registration with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry is required.233 The law maker
in the KSA, however, through this commercial type formation, allows for the
opportunistic participation of two of more people to commercial activities, for the
perusing of commercial purpose, without rendering them ‘merchants’.234
Figure 2.2: Types of Companies of Persons (Personal Companies) under the Companies
Law 1965 (CL’65) *
Companies of Persons
(Personal Companies)

General Partnership
Company

Limited Partnership
Company

Silent Partnership
Company

* The personal companies that are the concern of this thesis.

232

Hamza Ali Al-Madani, Alqanwn Atijary Alsa‘udi Ala‘maal Atijaryah–Atajir–Asharikaat Atijaryah–
Ala’wraq Atijaryah [Saudi Commercial Law, Business – Business Man – Commercial Corporations] (Dar

Almadani, 5th ed, 2001) 238.
233
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) ss 13, 14, 40.
234
That is, having the capacity to trade. Section 1 of the Commercial Court Law 1931 (Niz}am
>
Almah}kamah Atijary>ah / ( )نظام المحكمة التجاريةCCL’31, which was enacted by Royal Decree No M/32 of
15 Muh}arram 1350 AH (2 June 1931), defines a merchant as ‘Any person who undertakes commercial
activities as a profession’. See section 6.3.3.1 of Chapter 6.
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2.3.2

Capital Companies

The CL’65 distinguishes between the following types of capital companies: the JSC, the
LLC and the CLS. Each of these types of companies has specific characteristics that
will be addressed below.

Allmusahamh / ( )شركة المساھمةJSC)
2.3.2.1 A Joint Stock Company (Sharikat A
A JSC is considered to be one of the capital companies that are based on financial
elements.235 A JSC is a good example of a capital company. These companies constitute
a profitable avenue for their shareholders and may have a significant effect on the
country’s overall economy.236 In fact, the government gives special importance and
supervision to these companies during their incorporation.237 According to section 48 of
the CL’65, the JSC is a company whose capital is divided into shares of equal value,
which are freely transferable; and the shareholders are only liable to the extent of their
share value. There must be a minimum of five shareholders in this company.
Characteristics of a JSC
A JSC has specific characteristics related to the company’s capital, number of
shareholders as well as management board which will be discussed separately below.
1)

Company’s capital

235

Aziz Al-Aukili, Sharh} Alqanwn Atijary [Commercial Law Explanation] (Maktabat Dar Athaqafah
2002) 139.
236
Sadiq Mohammed Mohammed Al-Jubran, Majlis Idarat Asharikah Almusahimah fy Alqanwn

Alsa‘udi Dirasah Muqaranah Ma‘ Alqwani>n Kulinmin: Duwal Majlis Ata'awun Liduwal Alkhalyj Al'rabi
Libnan–Mas}ur–Swrya–Al'urdun wa Aliraq [Joint Stock Company’s Board in Saudi Law: A Comparative
Study with GCC, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq Laws] (Manshw>rat Alh}alaby Alh}qw>qyyah, 2006) 405.
Yuwa Wei, 'The Historical Development of the Corporation and Corporate Law in China' (2002) 14(3)
Australian Journal of Corporate Law 240, 242, 245.
237
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The company’s capital is divided into transferable shares of equal value.238 This capital
constitutes the safety deposit for company’s creditors.239 For this reason, section 49 of
the CL’65 states that the minimum capital requirement is SAR 10 million
(approximately USD 2.7 million) for a JSC which offers its stocks for public
subscription (a public JSC). There is, however, an exception to such a minimum capital
requirement. Where the company involved in a private JSC, company capital shall not
be less than SAR 2 million (approximately USD 0.53 million). From this writer’s
viewpoint, the capital requirements should be increased, given the economic progress
achieved in the KSA and abroad.240 High capital requirements may protect a company
from a financial crisis and prevent company failure. Capitalisation of SAR 10 million
(approximately USD 2.7 million) is considered insufficient for the increased costs of
successful projects and inadequate to withstand the international inflationary increases.
2)

Subscription to the company capital

There are two types of JSCs under the CL’65. The first type is the public company
(many scholars call this type of company an ‘open’ JSC)241. The public company offers
its stocks for public subscription. The second type is private company (sometimes called

238

Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 48.
Minkang Gu, 'The Joint Stock Cooperative Enterprise: A New Independent Legal Entity in China'
(1999) 23 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 125, 134.
240
For example, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry released commercial registers showing the
establishment of 2831 new companies as compared to 2274 in the preceding year. There was an increase
in the number and total capital of new companies by 24.5% and 36.3% respectively in 2008 as compared
with the preceding year. By the end of 2008, the total number of companies existing in the KSA had
increased by 13.2% over the preceding year. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry issued 68,400 new
commercial registrations of the establishment of new commercial proprietorship firms during 2008 in
different regions of the Kingdom, raising their total number by 9.6% to 763,600. See SAMA, Forty Fifth
Annual Report (2009), above n 15, 31: The number of intermediaries at the beginning of 2008 stood at 42,
with that number rising to 110 by the end of 2008: at 31, 93.
241
Ichiro Iwasaki, 'The Governance Mechanism of Russian Firms: Its Self-Enforcing Nature and
Limitations' (2003) 15(4) Post-Communist Economies 503, 504; Musa Essayyad and Haider Madani,
'Investigating Bank Structure of an Open Petroleum Economy: The Case of Saudi Arabia' (2003) 29(11)
Managerial Finance 73, 74.
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a ‘closed’ JSC).242 The founders243 in the private JSC reserve all the shares to
themselves. The words ‘open’ and ‘closed’ refer to the company’s ability to offer its
shares for public subscription. Public subscription shall include all company’s capital. It
should be noted that in the case of public JSC the capital is not only made up of public
subscription.244 Subscription shall remain open for a period of not less than ten days and
not exceeding ninety days.245 The subscriber or his/her representative shall sign the
subscription document. Any conditions such as mentioning of interests or losses in the
subscription added by the subscriber shall be deemed null and void.246
3)

Name of the company

The name of the company must not include the name of any natural persons involved.
However, the names of natural persons may be included if the company’s object is the
investment in a patent or an invention registered in the name of that person. For
example, if a person has a patent and a JSC invests in the patent its name may include
the name of the inventor.247
4)

Shareholders

242

Iwasaki, above n 241, 504; Essayyad and Madani, above n 241, 74.
Section 53 of the CL’65 provides that a founder is a person who has signed an MoA of a company, or
has applied for an authorisation to incorporate it, or has offered an in-kind share upon the incorporation of
the company, or has actually participated in its organisation. Hence a founder is one who actually
participates in incorporating a company with the intention of assuming the responsibility arising thereby,
signs the MoA, and applies to the concerned authority for a licence to organise the company. The Saudi
Law took great care to ensure that a founder who had an important role in organising the company is
subject to penalties when that person breaches the law’s requirements.
244
Section 45 of the CL’65 state: ‘If the founders do not reserve all stocks to themselves, they must,
within 30 days of the date of publication in the official Gazette of the Royal Decree or the Minister of
Commerce and Industry’s decision authorising the incorporation of the company, offer for public
subscription the stocks for which they did not subscribe. The Minister of Commerce and Industry may, if
necessary, authorise the extension of such period to not more than 90 days.’ For more details about the
subscription to the company capital, see section 5.2.1 of Chapter 5.
245
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 56.
246
Ibid s 57. For further discussion of subscription in the company capital, see crimes relating to
subscription in company shares or bonds, and their sanctions in section 4.3 of Chapter 4.
247
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 50. Note: As far as the present writer is aware, there is no JSC in the
KSA whose name includes a name of inventor.
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The minimum number of shareholders is five and should remain so during the lifetime
of the company.248 If it falls below five, then the company is dissolved upon lapse of one
year from the date on which the decrease in the number of shareholders occurred.249 A
shareholder is only responsible for the company’s debts to the extent of the value of
his/her shares.250 The shareholder does not acquire the status of a trader; hence, the
bankruptcy of the company does not lead by force to the bankruptcy of the
shareholder.251
5)

Management boards

All the shareholders cannot together manage the company without having specific
bodies with defined responsibilities, as is generally true for corporate management.
Therefore, they leave the management to the responsible bodies. In a JSC, these bodies
are the following (listed with their duties): (i) the board of directors252 manages the
company;253 (ii) the board of auditors supervises the company’s financial affairs and
accounting;254 and (iii) the Annual General Meeting (AGM) which oversees the board of
director’s reports and amends the company AoA.255

248

Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 48.
See dissolution of the JSC in section 2.6.2.4 of the present Chapter.
250
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 48.
251
Fawzi Mohammed Sami, Asharikaat Atijaryah Alah}kaam Al‘aamah wa Alkhas}ah [Commercial
Corporations, General and Private Roles] (Maktabat Dar Athaqafah, 1999) 143.
252
The Board of Directors may be identified as an executive body that manages a company’s affairs:
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 66. The Board of Directors usually includes a chairperson, members and a
secretary, who may be appointed from within the Board of Directors or from outside them: Companies
Law 1965 (KSA) s 79.
253
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 66.
254
Ibid s130.
255
Ibid s 84.
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2.3.2.2 A Limited Liability Company (Asharikah dhat Almasw’liah Almah}dudah /
( )الشركة ذات المسؤولية المحدودةLLC)
Section 157 of the CL’65 defines an LLC as a company ‘consisting of two or more
partners who are responsible for the debts of the company to the extent of their shares in
the capital and in which the number of partners shall not exceed fifty’. It has been
argued that an LLC is an appropriate form for small or medium-sized companies.256 It is,
further, considered to be the ideal type for companies that can be created by small
investors.257
Characteristics of an LLC
1)

The number and liability of partners

The minimum limit of partners is two and the maximum fifty. Their liability is limited
only to the extent of their shares in the company.258
2)

Management of the company

An LLC may have one or more managers.259 A manager may be a partner / shareholder
or otherwise (an external person). All managers must be designated by the partners
within the MoA of the company or in a separate contract for a specified or nonspecified, period and with or without recompense.260 If an LLC has more than 20

256

Baoshu Wang and Hui Huang, 'China’s New Company Law and Securities Law: An Overview and
Assessment' (2006) 19(2) Australian Journal of Corporate Law 229, 230.
257
Tan Lay Hong, 'Corporate Law Reform in the People’s Republic of China' (1999) 10 Australian
Journal of Corporate Law 238, 283.
258
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 157.
259
The term ‘the Manager of the Commercial Company’ is applicable to all managers, including the
overall manager, the related acting member (eg the managing director), and the Board of Directors and
auditing or inspection boards. See Samihah Al-Qlywby, Asharikaat Atijaryah [Commercial Corporations]
(Dar Anahd}ah Al‘rabiah, 4th ed, 2008) 982.
260
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 167.
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partners, it must have a supervisory board composed of at least three partners,261 which
must be designated by the partners within the MoA of the company.262 Under section
168 of the CL’65, the managers are jointly liable for compensating damages inflicted on
the partners, the company, or third parties because of any failure on their part. As a
consequence, in this case, there is no individual or several liability.
3)

Prohibition of public subscription

An LLC may not resort to public subscription for raising or increasing its capital or for
obtaining a loan.263 It is often said that the key reason for this prohibition is to safeguard
the personal element in these small companies and to prevent leverage by speculators
with limited capital.264
4)

Shareholder’s shares

A share could be transferred by a shareholder to another shareholder or to a third party
in accordance with the terms of the MoA of the company. Likewise, a shareholder’s
stake or holdings may be transferred to the heirs in the event of his/her death.265
5)

Capital of the company

The capital of this company should not be less than SAR 500,000 (approximately USD
133,300), while the maximum capital that can be invested is unlimited.266 It is divided

261

The CL’65 does not make any specific legal arrangement in cases where the number of shareholders is
two. In particular, the provision of Section 167 applies, according to which, ‘the company shall be
managed by one manager or more of the partners or otherwise, and the partner managers shall be
designated in the company MoA or in a separate contract’. As a consequence, and if not designated in the
MoA in a different way, the company will be managed either by one or by both of them.
262
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 170.
263
Ibid s 158.
264
Taha, Commercial Corporations 2007, above n 196, 386.
265
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 165.
266
Ibid s 158.
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into shares of equal value, which consist either of cash shares or shares in kind. The
CL’65 does set the maximum limit of the value of the cash share and the share in kind.
If the share is a share in kind, the AoA must clarify its subject and value along with the
name of the shareholders.267 The company cannot resort to public subscription in order
to create or raise its capital, nor obtain a loan.268
6)

Name of the company and its address

As far as the name of an LLC is concerned, according to section 160 of the CL’65, it
can be formed either based on the names of one or more of the partners,269 or on the
object of its activity.270 An LLC must have a real address, which is a physical location in
the KSA. The name and address of the company must include the phrase ‘limited
liability company’ ‘Sharikah dhat Masw’liah Mah}dudah / ’شركة ذات مسؤولية محدودة.271
7)

Prohibition of activities in insurance, savings, and banking

Pursuant to section 159 of the CL’65, this type of company may engage in any activity
except those of insurance, savings and banking. It could be argued that the reason
behind this restriction is the government’s lack of belief that an LLC holds adequate
capital for providing these services securely.272

267

Ibid s 162.
Ibid s 158.
269
For instance, Omar Kasim AlEsayi Marketing Co Ltd (OKAM). It is a Saudi limited liability
company, its name derived from the name of the partner, which is Omar Kasim AlEsayi. For more details,
see Omar Kasim AlEsayi Marketing Co Ltd (OKAM) at <http://www.okam.com.sa/profile.aspx>.
270
For example, ALWATANIA Gypsum Co Ltd. This company is an LLC, produces gypsum powder in
the KSA, and has two factories specialising in the production of gypsum powder. Thus, the name of the
company derived from its activity. For more information, see ALWATANIA Gypsum Co Ltd <http://wgypsum.com/en_default.aspx>.
271
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) ss 12, 161.
272
Atawi, above n 156, 400.
268
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2.3.2.3 A Company Limited by Shares (Sharikat Ataws}yah Bilashum / شركة التوصية
( )باألسھمCLS)
Section 149 of the CL’65 defines a CLS as a corporation consisting of two categories of
shareholders: (i) at least one general shareholder who is responsible to the extent of
his/her entire fortune for the debts of the corporation, and (ii) at least four shareholders
who are responsible for the debts of the corporation only to the extent of their
proportionate share in the capital. A CLS is the common form of a corporation.273
According to sections 37 and 154 of the CL’65, the name of this company shall consist
of one or more names of the general shareholders.
Characteristics of a CLS
1)

Categories of shareholders

The CL’65 requires the existence of at least one general partner and at least four limited
partners.274 The general partners in a CLS have the same legal status as those in a GPC,
whereas the legal regime that is applicable to the stockholders in this company is the
same as that applying to a JSC.275
2)

Capital of the company

According section 150 of the CL’65, the capital shall be divided into negotiable shares
of equal value which are not divisible. The value of each share shall not be less than
SAR 50 (approximately USD 13.30). The stockholder’s shares are freely transferable.
The CL’65 considers these shares as negotiable JSC shares. The capital of this company

273

Christopher Bevan, Corporations Law (Lawbook, 5th ed, 2002) 19.
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s149.
275
Ibid s 154.
274
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shall not be less than SAR 1 million (approximately USD 266,600) divided into shares
of equal value.276
3)

Management of the company

This company shall be managed by one or more general shareholders without any
specific position such as CEO or MD. Their powers, liability, and removal shall be
subject to the provisions governing managers in a GPC.277
4)

Company supervision

There are two main ways that internal supervision on company management takes
place: the supervisory council and an accounts supservisor. The supervisory council is
to contain at least three stockholders. It monitors the company business and expresses
its opinion on issues presented to it by the company manager. The Council shall call a
shareholders’ Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM) if it becomes evident that a
serious violation has taken place in the company management. The Council shall submit
to the AGM, at the end of fiscal year, a report on the outcome of its monitoring of the
company’s business operations.278 The other main method of internal supervision is the
accounts supervisor who independently reviews the company’s accounting.279
2.3.2.4 A

Company

with

Variable

Capital

(Asharikah

dhat

Ra’salmalalqabillitaghyyr / ( )الشركة ذات رأس المال القابل للتغييرCVC)
Section 181 of the CL’65 provides that every company can stipulate in its MoA or AoA
that its capital can be raised or decreased without being subject to any conditions (other
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Ibid s 150.
Ibid ss 152, 155.
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Ibid s 153.
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Ibid s 155.
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than that regarding the total maximum capital raising permitted, outlined below).
Additionally, section 182 of the CL’65 states that a CVC shall be subject to the
provisions stated in Part 8 of the CL’65280 and to whatsoever is not in conflict with such
of the general provisions prescribed for the type of the company. Thus, this company is
not a new type of company (as has been mentioned above).
The CL’65 does not give an explicit description of this company; however, it can be
described as a company whose MoA or AoA provides firstly, that its capital is subject
to being able to be raised by new payments or by the admission of new shareholders,
and secondly, that the company may decrease its capital by returning it back to its
shareholders.281
Characteristics of a CVC
1)

Capital of the company

This company’s capital is limited. There are limits as to the maximum amount of capital
in this company when incorporated. In particular, section 184 of the CL’65 states that
the company’s capital upon incorporation shall not exceed SAR 50,000 (approximately
USD 13,300. Nevertheless, the level of capital may be raised every following year,
provided that the amount by which it is raised does not exceed SAR 50,000 per year
(approximately USD 13,300). The capital of the company may be raised or decreased
without being subject to any conditions (other than that above in relation to capital
raising) unless the company’s MoA or AoA state otherwise.282

280

Part 8 of the CL’65 contains 8 sections, which regulate the CVC.
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 181.
282
Ibid s 183.
281
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2)

Number and liability of shareholders

The number of shareholders and the determination of their responsibility for the
company’s debts depend upon the type of a CVC it takes.283 For example, if the
company takes the form of a JSC, its shareholders will be subject to the provisions of a
JSC; if, on the contrary, it takes the form of an LLC, its shareholders will be subject to
the provisions of the LLC.
2.3.2.5 A Cooperative Company (Asharikah Ata
Ata‘‘wunyah / ( )الشركة التعاونيةCC)
Section 190 of the CL’65 states that, ‘with the exception of provisions stated in Part
9,284 the CC shall remain, according to its type, subject to provisions of the JSC or
provisions of [the] LLC.’ As a consequence, a CC does not constitute a new type of
company; rather, it takes either the form of a JSC or a LLC. The distinctive feature of
CC is that it aims to attain two particular objectives. They are: (i) a reduction of the
price of certain products or services; and (ii) an improvement of the quality of the
product, or the standard of services provided by the company.285
Characteristics of a CC
1)

Shareholders

The legal form of this company defines the minimum number of its shareholders: there
should be five if the company takes the form of a JSC, or two if it takes the form of a
LLC, and there is no limit on the maximum number of shareholders.286
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Hamadalah, above n 199, 368.
Part 9 of the CL’65 contains 21 sections, which regulate the CC.
285
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 189.
286
Ibid s 198.
284
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2)

Management boards

The CC shall be managed by the members of the Board of Directors who are initially
appointed in the MoA or AoA. However, there are certain conditions to be complied
with. The conditions include: (i) there must be at least three members, and (ii) the
members of the Board must not obtain remuneration for this function they perform. The
company’s MoA or AoA shall determine the period that shareholders shall be appointed
as members of the Board of Directors; however, such term shall not exceed five years.
A General Meeting (GM) may depose all members of the Board of Directors or some of
them.287
3)

Capital of the company

Irrespective of the form of the company, there is no maximum limitations for its capital,
be it a JSC or a LLC, while the minimum of its capital is subject to variation based on
the form that will be taken by the CC either a JSC or a LLC.288
The capital of the CC is divided into equal interests/quotas or equal value nominal
shares, and such quota or share is indivisible, that is each quota or share cannot be
divided between two or more persons.289 The value of the interest/quota or the share
cannot be less than SAR 10 (approximately USD 2.67) and not more than SAR 50
(approximately USD 13.30).290 Furthermore, according to section 193 of the CL’65, the
amount paid of the value of the interest/quota or the share during the company
incorporation cannot be less than one fourth of the value of the interest/quota or the

287

Ibid s 201.
Hamadalah, above n 199, 382.
289
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 193(1).
290
Ibid s 193(2).
288
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share. The balance shall be paid; further, within a period not exceeding three years from
the date of the company final incorporation.291

291

The date of the company’s final incorporation begins from the issuing decision of the Minister of
Commerce and Industry that permits the incorporation of the company, see section 2.4.2.8 of the present
Chapter.
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Figure 2.3: Types of Capital Companies under Companies Law 1965 (CL’65)*
Companies
of
persons
(Personal Companies)

Joint
Company

Stock

Limited Liability
Company

Company Limited
by Shares

* These being the capital companies that are the main concern of this thesis.

2. 4 Formation of Companies under the Companies Law 1965 (CL’65)
Companies in the KSA must comply with the provisions of the CL’65 that set not only
general but also specific legal requirements with regard to the formation of companies.
The general legal requirements are: the act of writing/drafting and of declaring the
MoA, while the application of the specific legal requirements depends on the type of
company and the business in which it is involved. All these requirements are discussed
below.
2.4.1

General Legal Requirements for the Formation of Companies

Generally, formation of company takes the following steps: i) submit an application to
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry to obtain an incorporation licence; ii) write and
sign the MoA of the company in front of a notary public; iii) publish the company name
and a summary of the MoA in the Government Official Gazette of the KSA;292 and iv)
register the company at the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. All these procedures
must be completed in order to incorporate the company.

292

The name of the official newspaper or gazette in the KSA, which is issued by the Ministry for Culture
and Information, is the Umm Al-Qura Newspaper / جريدة أم القرى. App available <http://itunes.apple.com/
sa/app/umm-alqura-newspaper/id495658763?mt=8>.
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The legal regime governing the formation of companies presupposes the following.
Section 10 of the CL’65 underlines that ‘with the exception of SPC, a MoA, and
whatever arises of amendment, shall be confirmed in writing before the notary public;
otherwise, neither the MoA nor the amendment shall be effective in confrontation with
the others.’ Further, section 11 of the CL’65 states that with the exception of SPC, the
managers and the Board of Directors shall declare an MoA of a company and whatever
amendments are rising thereto in accordance with the provisions of this law. If the MoA
is not declared as aforementioned, it shall not be valid or enforceable against third
parties.
In addition, section 13 of the CL’65 states that ‘with the exception of the SPC, all the
company shall be, as from the time of its incorporation, considered to be a body of
corporate personality, but such personality shall not be valid against third parties, until
such time as declaration procedures are completed.
Therefore, in order to be formed and registered, all companies (other than an SPC) must
first have signed an MoA. This MoA is regarded as the contract that forms the company
and is signed between the company and its members. To this end, it must satisfy all
elements (writing and declaration of the MoA) of a valid contract as laid down by the
law provisions in sections 10, 11 and 13 of the CL’65.293
Writing and notarisation of the MoA
The CL’65 states that the MoA must be written officially294 and must be in most cases
notarised. In particular, section 10 of the CL’65 provides that, with the exception of the

293

It should be noted that the CL’65 restricts the declaration of a company to its MoA.
‘Written officially’ means that the MoA must be drafted in written form in the presence of a notary
public. See Alghamdi and Hosni, above n 160, 163.
294
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case of an SPC (given its secret nature and the lack of judicial personality that
characterises this type of company), the MoA must be drafted in writing in the presence
of a notary, otherwise, it will not be valid against third parties. On the contrary, third
parties may use the failure to record the MoA against a shareholder or an officer. In
addition, managers or directors of a company shall be held jointly responsible for
damage or loss sustained by the company, its shareholders, or third parties as a result of
their failure to record the MoA295. The company’s MoA, as well as its amendments, has
to be declared by the managers or members of the board of directors according to the
requirements of the CL’65. If the MoA is not declared in the aforementioned manner, it
shall not be valid against third parties.296
Companies are subject to the declaration formalities in order to make third parties aware
of information, such as (in particular) that related to their formation, activities, duration
and the extent of the member’s liabilities. No company is exempt from the declaration
formalities, except an SPC, which is exempted, firstly, due to its secret nature and
secondly, due to the fact that its formation does not create any relations with third
parties. Thus, the SPC can be established without need to write or declare its MoA.297
Declaration procedures depend upon the type of company as will be shown below.
2.4.2

Specific Requirements for the Formation of Companies

All basic legal requirements with respect to the formation of companies, as discussed
above, must be satisfied when companies are established. Only an SPC is exempted,
given that it does not need to satisfy the two elements of writing and declaration of its

295

Abdul Aziz Izzat Al-Khayat, Asharikaat fy Ashari‘ah Alislamyah wa Alqanwn Alwad}‘y Aljuz’
Athany [Corporations in Islamic Law and the Rule of Law Part II] (Mu>’sasat Arisalah, 4th ed, 1994) 92.

296
297

Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 11.
Ibid ss 11, 40.
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MoA. Each type of company has to comply with certain special requirements as
discussed below.
2.4.2.1 Formation of a General Partnership Company (Sharikat Atad}amun / شركة
( ) التضامنGPC)
The CL’65 requires that the MoA for a GPC is publicised. Publicity is considered
necessary so that the public is aware of all important issues related to the GPC.298
The three main declaration requirements of a GPC are outlined in section 21 of the
CL’65. These are:
i.

Publication of the MoA of the GPC in a daily newspaper distributed in the vicinity
of the company’s headquarters.

ii.

Registration of the company with the Companies General Department (Al’idarah

Al‘aamah Liasharikaat / ( )اإلدارة العامة للشركاتCGD)299 in the Ministry of
Commerce and Industry, within 30 days following its establishment.
iii.

Registration of the company with the Commercial Register, based on the Law of
Commercial Register 1995.300

298

This requirement is found in the Companies Law 1965 (KSA) ss 21, 22.
This Department was created in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and is responsible for the
supervision of companies in the KSA.
300
Section 1 of the Law of Commercial Register 1995 (Niz}a>m Assijil Atijariyy / )نظام السجل التجاري. This
law was issued by Royal Decree No M/1 of 21 S}afar 1416 AH (17 July 1995). It states: ‘The Ministry of
Commerce shall create a Register in the cities specified by a decision issued by the Minister of Commerce
covering all the provinces of the Kingdom, in which the names of the merchants and companies and all
the data specified in this Law are registered.’ Section 3 of the same law states: ‘The managers of
companies formed in the Kingdom shall apply for registration in the Commercial Register within thirty
days of the date on which its articles of association are recorded by the notary public and shall apply to
register any branch within thirty days of the date on which it was formed. A copy of the company's
articles of association and its bylaws, if applicable, shall be enclosed therewith. The application shall also
include the following data:
i.
The type of the company and its trade name.
ii. The company's activity.
299
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Section 22 of the CL’65 requires that the MoA of such a company shall include an
abstract of the following:
i.

The name of the company, its object, its head office, as well as its branches, if
any;

ii.

Members’ names, residential addresses, occupations and nationalities;

iii.

Amount of the company’s capital with sufficient details concerning the
contribution that each member has undertaken to make as well as the date on
which it becomes payable;

iv.

Names of the managers and the people authorised to sign on behalf of the
company;

v.

Date of incorporation of the company as well as how long the company will exist;
and

vi.

Beginning and end of the company’s financial year.

iii.
iv.
v.

The company's capital.
The date of the company's incorporation and expiration.
The names of general partners in general or limited partnerships and the place and date of birth,
address and nationality of each of them.
vi. The names of the managers of the company and the signatories on its behalf and the place and date
of birth of each, his address, nationality and a specimen of his signature, and a statement specifying
the extent of their powers with respect to management and signature, and specifying the actions
which they are not authorized to take (if any).
vii. The addresses of the head office of the company and its branches and agencies, inside and outside
the Kingdom.’
See Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Commerce and Industry, The Law of Commercial Register
(2006) <http://www.mci.gov.sa/english/moci.aspx?Type=8&PageObjectId=745>.
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2.4.2.2 Formation of Limited Partnership Company (Sharikat Ataws}yah Albas}yt}ah
/ ( ) التوصية البسيطة شركةLPC)
All rules mentioned earlier about the formation of a GPC apply to an LPC, including the
necessity of writing and declaration of the company’s MoA. Furthermore, as stated in
section 39 of the CL’65, additional information has to be included in the MoA abstract,
namely:
i.

The names of the general partners, excluding the limited partners; and

ii.

The amount of capital that was or is to be collected from the limited partners,
because the limited partner’s liability is determined by the value of their shares.

2.4.2.3 Formation of a Silent Partnership Company (Sharikat Almah}as}ah / شركة

( )المحاصةSPC)
The formation of an SPC company has to comply with the requirements that apply to
the formation of companies in general, with the sole exception being that its MoA does
not have to be written or declared,301 as has been mentioned earlier.302 As such, the
existence of this company is established an appropriate evidence whether direct or
indirect as provided by section 45 of the CL’65.303
The approach is illustrated by a judgment of the Board of Grievances (Diwa>n Al-

Maz{al> im / )ديوان المظالم.304 The father of the plaintiffs and his brother (the defendant)305

301

Companies Law 1965 (KSA) ss 10, 11, 13.
See section 2.4.1 of the present Chapter.
303
Section 45 of the CL’65 states: ‘The partnership may be confirmed by all different types of evidence
such as a testimony, including circumstantial evidence.’
304
Judgment No 315/ D/ T/G of 1426 AH (2006). This judgment issued from the Board of Grievances
(Diwa>n Almaz{al> im /  – )ديوان المظالمbranch in the Eastern Region – Sixteenth Commercial Circuit. For
more details about the Board of Grievances (Diwa>n Almaz{a>lim / )ديوان المظالم, see section 6.3.1 of Chapter
6.
305
The father of the plaintiffs was partner with his brother (defendant) in the SPC. They are brothers and
partners at the same time.
302
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had entered into an SPC which was a factory. The father of the plaintiffs died and was
replaced by his heirs on a 50 per cent partnership basis [the heirs 50 per cent and
defendant 50 per cent]. The defendant denied the existence of any partnership, stating
that: ‘I established the company and my deceased brother (father of the plaintiffs) had
nothing in the company which is mine alone.’306 The court requested evidence that the
plaintiffs were partners in the company. The plaintiffs’ attorney produced a copy of a
declaration by the defendant in his own handwriting attested by a witness. The
defendant stated that: ‘[I]t was just a grant from me to the heirs of my brothers, but I
cancelled it later and tore up the original.’307
The witness attended the commercial circuit in the Board of Grievances, testified that
the defendant had revealed secretly to him that whatever he owned (factory,
establishments and even his car), which were registered under his name, were in fact
common property of himself and his deceased brother (father of the plaintiffs), who had
left his share to the plaintiffs (the heirs).308 The witness confirmed this, saying that the
defendant wrote a paper and signed it in his presence.309 Based on the above facts, the
commercial circuit ruled that a partnership (fifty: fifty) existed between the plaintiffs
and the defendant in the factory (SPC) due to the existence, besides the testimony of the
witness, of a copy of a document written by the defendant.310 This case demonstrates
that the court based its judgment on reasons derived from the document and witness,
sufficient to prove the existence of the SPC (in accordance with section 45 of the
CL’65).

306

Judgment No 315/ D/ T/G of 1426 AH (2006).
Ibid.
308
Ibid.
309
Ibid.
310
Ibid.
307
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However, despite the fact that partners are not obliged to draft the MoA in writing311, it
is suggested that parties should not rely on an oral agreement. Oral agreements very
often contain ambiguities and create disputes between the parties. For example, a
company’s MoA specifies the shareholders’ rights and duties312 and states the share of a
shareholder with respect to profits or losses.313 This important information should be in
writing in an MoA rather than have it be subject to the interpretation of a shareholders’
will. A dispute may otherwise emerge, consequent to the shareholders’ unwritten MoA.
Ownership of the shares among the shareholders is often organised as follows:
i.

Each partner retains ownership of his/her shares and invests it, according to the
company’s objective, and participates with other partners in the profit and loss.314

ii.

Each partner, if the other partner is declared bankrupt, has the right to retrieve the
bankrupt’s shares (if the shares are a specific asset) from the bankruptcy, after
having paid, however, the bankrupt’s part of the company losses.315

iii.

If a company’s MoA does not allow for a transfer of shares, then each partner
remains liable to contribute to the company’s debts according to the shares
individually owned.316

311

Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 10.
Ibid ss 10, 43.
313
Ibid s 9.
314
Alghamdi and Hosni, above n 160, 152.
315
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 42(2).
316
Ibid s 42(1).
312
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2.4.2.4 Formation of a Joint Stock Company (Sharikat Almusahamh / )شركة المساھمة
(JSC)
The CL’65 did not clearly provide for specific provisions that must be included in the
MoA of a JSC. Such provisions can nevertheless be inferred from section 65 of the
CL’65. This section states that when the decision of the Minister of Commerce and
Industry declares the incorporation of a company, then a copy of its MoA, and its AoA
should be published in the Government Official Gazette of the KSA. The members of
the Board of Directors shall, within 15 days of the aforementioned decision, lodge
registration of the company with the CGD. This registration must include important
information related to the company, such as its name, the amount of the paid capital,
methods of profit and loss distribution and so forth. A company must register with the
CGD in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. The company must hold a valid
commercial registration permitting it to be incorporated as a company in the KSA. The
registration must be lodged with the CGD at the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.317
According to section 52 of the CL’65, the following types of JSCs can be incorporated,
only when a Royal Decree is issued, which is based on the approval of the Council of
Ministers and presentation of the Minister of Commerce and Industry:

317

In particular, this information should include the following: (i) Names of founders, their place of
residence, occupations and nationalities; (ii) Name of the company, its object and real seat; (iii) Amount
of the paid capital, kind of stocks, their value and number, the amount offered for public subscription, the
number subscribed by the founders and the restrictions imposed on circulation of stocks along with
sufficient description (upon the difference of category of shares) of every kind of shares and the rights
pertaining to them; (iv) Method of profits and losses distribution; (v) Statement pertaining to the shares in
kind, the rights prescribed for them, the special privileges for the founders and third parties; (vi)
Information about the non-cash shares, all conditions relating to their contribution and the name of the
contributors; (vii) Duration of the company which starts from date of issuance of the Royal Decree
licensing the company’s establishment, or the date of registration in the Commercial Register, and its
publication as the case may be; and (viii) Approximate statement, at least about the amount of expenses,
wages and costs which the company undertakes to pay as a result of its incorporation irrespective of the
subject of these expenses, costs, or wages: see the Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 65.
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i.

Concessionary companies.318

ii.

Companies managing a public utility.

iii.

Companies receiving a subsidy from the Government.

iv.

Companies in which the Government or any other public authority participates as
a shareholder.

v.

Companies engaged in banking activities.

It is to be noted that the above provisions in section 52 of the CL’65 distinguish
between two groups of JSC in respect of an application for a licence. For the first group
(those mentioned in section 52 of the CL’65), the licence shall be issued according to a
Royal Decree based upon the approval of the Council of Ministers and offered by the
Minister of Commerce and Industry.319 As to the second group, which includes all JSCs
other than those mentioned above, the licence for incorporation shall be issued by the
Minister of Commerce and Industry. The application for a licence of incorporation is to
be submitted to the Minister of Commerce and Industry and shall be signed by at least
five of the promoters.
According to section 52 of the CL’65, the application for a licence of incorporation of a
JSC must contain the following statements:

318

A ‘concession’ is an agreement between a country and a company for a period of time, through which
the country offers incentives, such as reduced taxes to the company, as an exchange for investing in the
country. For example, the KSA government signed a concessionary agreement with ARAMCO allowing
it to explore oil in KSA: see José Manuel Vassallo, 'The Role of the Discount Rate in Tendering Highway
Concessions under the LPVR Approach' (2010) 44(10) Transportation Research Part A: Policy and
Practice 806, 806.
319
A licence is a step that precedes incorporation of a company. So, the company cannot be incorporated
except pursuant to the licence granted by a Royal Decree or the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. For
more details see section 4.2.2 of Chapter 4.
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i.

The manner of subscription in the company capital

ii.

The number of shares reserved by the founders to themselves and the amount
subscribed by each founder

iii.

A copy of the company MoA and AoA, both to be signed by all the founders and
attached to the application for licence.

As for other JSCs, they may be incorporated only by authorisation issued by the
Minister of Commerce and Industry.320
2.4.2.5 Formation of a Limited Liability Company (Asharikah dhat Almasw’liah

Almah}dudah / ( )الشركة ذات المسؤولية المحدودةLLC)
Section 161 of the CL’65 provides that a LLC shall be formed on the basis of an MoA
to be signed by all partners. This MoA shall contain information, the requirements for
which are imposed by the Minister of Commerce and Industry, and must include the
following:
i.

Kind, name, object and real seat of the company;

ii.

Names of the partners, their places of residence, occupations and nationalities;

iii.

The LLC could be managed either by partners or by external persons who must be
assigned by the partners. The managers can be named in the company’s MoA or
in a separate contract.321

iv.

320
321

Names of members of the supervisory board, if any;322

Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 52.
Ibid s 167.
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v.

The amount of the capital and the amount of contribution of the shareholders in
cash and kind as well as a detailed description of the contributions in-kind, their
value and names of the contributors in kind;

vi.

A statement by the partners that all the capital shares have been allotted and paid
up;

vii.

Method of distribution of profits;

viii. Dates of the commencement and expiration of the company;
ix.

Form of the notices to be served by the company on the parties.

According to section 164 of the CL’65, the declaration of the abstract/summary of the
MoA that must include the provisions of the MoA, as provided in section 161 of the
CL’65.323 This abstract/summary should be registered by the company with the CGD
and entered in the Commercial Register within 30 days from the establishment of the
company. The abstract of MoA of this company must include the words ‘limited
liability company’ (Sharikah dhat Masw’liah Mah}dudah / )شركة ذات مسؤولية محدودة. It is
not enough to mention only the acronym (LLC) of such a company.324
With regard to the name of this company, the CL’65 gave the LLC the following
choice: either to take a special name, derived from its object or to form a title composed
of the name of one or more partners.325

322

See section 2.3.2.2 of the present Chapter.
These provisions that provided in section 161 of the CL’65 have been mentioned in section 4.2.1.1 of
Chapter 4.
324
To indicate its kind as is sometimes done in respect of the JSC.
325
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 160.
323
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The abstract of the LLC’s MoA shall include a statement of its actual seat.326 The
company may be invalid where it violates such a procedure. Thus, interested third
parties can use the failure to comply with the procedure against founders. However, the
founders cannot use the failure against the third parties.
In addition, the MoA of an LLC must contain a statement about the amount of capital,
the amount of shares in cash and in kind, as well as a detailed description of the shares
in kind along with the value of such shares and the names of their contributors.
2.4.2.6 Formation of a Company Limited by Shares (Sharikat Ataws}yah Bilashum
/ ( )شركة التوصية باألسھمCLS)
Section 155 of the CL’65 mentions that the CLS shall comply with the requirements for
the formation of a JSC. The rules with respect to the process of declaration, as presented
above, apply also to the CLS, with the exception of the provisions contained in section
52 of the CL’65. These provisions concern the issuing of the Royal Decree in respect of
the formation of the JSCs, which have been outlined above.327
Section 151 of the CL’65 mentions the information that must be included in the MoA of
CLS. These include the following:
i.

The name of the company, consisting of the name of one or more of the general
partners coupled with statement that indicates the existence of a company, and not
the name of the limited partners

ii.

Names of general partners, their place of residence, and nationalities

326

But the parties may not invoke such invalidity against third parties. In this case whosoever has interest
may sue the company in the place of its directors: see the Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 163.
327
See section 2.4.2.4 of the present Chapter.
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iii.

Names of the general partners who were appointed as managers of the company

iv.

The amount of the company capital which is distinguished by variety of its
outward appearance where it takes the form of ‘quotas’ in respect of general
partners and the form, and ‘shares’ for shareholders.

v.

Determination of the object of the company and its duration and kind

vi.

The distribution of the shares between the shareholders — and the start and end of
the company fiscal year.

2.4.2.7 Formation of a Company with Variable Capital (Asharikah dhat

Ra’salmalalqabillitaghyyr / ( ) الشركة ذات رأس المال القابل للتغييرCVC)
As mentioned above, a CVC is not a new type of company. Thus, a CVC takes either
the form of a JSC with variable capital or of an LLC with variable capital. There are no
specific additional formation requirements for this company.328
2.4.2.8 Formation of Cooperative Company (Asharikah Ata
Ata‘‘wunyah / الشركة التعاونية
) (CC)
Section 199 of the CL’65 provides that in order establish a CC, the founders must file
an application for authorisation with the Minister of Commerce and Industry. The
application must be accompanied by a copy of the company’s MoA and AoA signed by
the partners and founders. The MoA and AoA have to contain the following
information:

328

See the Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 182, which states that: ‘The company with variable capital shall
be subject to provisions stated in this Part 8 and to whatsoever not in conflict with such of the general
provisions prescribed for the type of the company.’
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i.

The conditions for admission of new members, including withdrawal and
expulsion of parties

ii.

The extent of the additional liability of parties for the company’s debts in case of
its bankruptcy or insolvency

iii.

Determination of the percentage that would be distributed from the profit to the
partners and method of distributing the return on the transactions.

The members of the Board of Directors must lodge, within 15 days from the completion
date of the conditions stated above, an application with the Minister of Commerce and
Industry. The objective is to obtain incorporation of the company.329 The company shall
be considered duly formed as of the date the Minister issues the respective decision.330
The decision of the Minister together with a copy of the company’s MoA and AoA must
be published in the Official Gazette of the Government. Additionally, the Board of
Directors shall lodge an application for the registration of the company with the CGD
and enter in the Commercial Register within 15 days of the mentioned decision.331
In the light of the above discussion, it should be stated that all the above mentioned
criteria, which need to be met by all types of companies, were stated minimally and not
exhaustively. Therefore, the members of the company can add to the MoA of the
company any other specific information or conditions required by the nature and
activity of the company.

329

Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 199.
Ibid.
331
Ibid s 200.
330
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2. 5 Corporate Capital and Finance under the Companies Law 1965 (CL’65)
Access to capital is a prerequisite for the success of any enterprises, including
companies.332 A company’s capital includes share capital (gained through the issuance
of shares to the public) and debt capital (acquired through bond issuance or bank
loans).333 As indicated earlier, the capital of the company under the CL’65 may be
composed of cash shares or shares in kind, invested in the company so that the company
can achieve its goals.334 The share capital is explained below.
Cash shares
According to section 48 of the CL’65, there exist shares valued at the purchase price,
which are transferable335 and equal value.336 According to section 103 of the CL’65, the
two types of cash shares under Saudi law are the ordinary shares and preference
shares.337 Ordinary shares338 are shares of ownership in the company that entitle their
owners to a share in the profit or loss, whereas preference shares are the ones that give
shareholders a right or preference, such as priority payment of dividends over the
ordinary shares, as well as the right to receive distribution of residue before the ordinary
shareholder upon a liquidation.339 It should be mentioned that stocks owners generally
have the same rights to vote, unless the MoA provides otherwise.340

332

Robert Baxt, Keith Fletcher and Saul Fridman, Corporations and Associations: Cases and Materials
(LexisNexis Butterworths Australia, 10th ed, 2009) 734.
333
Ismail, above n 157, 51, 62.
334
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) ss 3, 162.
335
All shares are freely transferable.
336
All shares have the same price.
337
Preference shares will be analysed in section 4.5.1 of Chapter 4.
338
An ordinary share is also known as an equity share. Section 103 of the CL’65 states that an ordinary
share gives equal rights to, and imposes equal obligations on, its owner.
339
Liquidation may be defined as the process of winding up a company’s financial affairs to distribute its
assets among the creditors then distribute any funds left over to its members. A liquidation is also known
as a ‘winding up’. See Pamela Hanrahan, Ian Ramsay and Geof Stapledon, Commercial Applications of
Company Law (CCH Australia, 10th ed, 2009) 530.
340
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) ss 171, 103.

98

Ch 2: Definitions, Origins and Types of Commercial Companies in KSA

Shares in kind341
These are assets other than money, such as real estate, movable or immovable property,
intellectual property (such as a patent or trademark), or a choice of action (such as
claims against third parties), that are used as the consideration for the purchase of
shares.342
2.5.1

Raising or Reducing Capital in a Company

During the lifetime of a company, its capital may vary, either through more capital
being raised, or by its reduction through share buy-back.343 A company raises its capital
when it desires to expand its activities, or to increase the number of its shareholders, or
to re-evaluate its assets.344 Likewise, section 115 of the CL’65 allows a company to
reduce its capital in many ways, such through the cancellation of its shares after 10
years of issuing them (with fair compensation for share owners). Such a reduction is
often undertaken when the company has serious losses.345
Raising capital — Procedure to be followed
According to section 134 of the CL’65, a company may increase its capital if the
following two preconditions are met: firstly, if the decision to raise capital is approved
by an EGM; and secondly, if the original share capital of the company has been paid in
full. Various capital raisings are allowed under the preconditions laid down in section
135 of the CL’65. These include:
i.

Issue of new shares to be paid in cash

341

Shares in kind will be discussed in section 4.5.1 of Chapter 4.
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 3.
343
Ismail, above n 157, 173.
344
Ibid; Companies Law 1965 (KSA) ss 104, 105.
345
Phillip Lipton, Abe Herzberg and Michelle Welsh, Understanding Company Law (Lawbook, 15th ed,
2010) 185.
342
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ii.

Issue of new shares in consideration of in-kind shares

iii.

Issue of new shares in consideration of debts which fall due

iv.

Issue of new shares of equal value of free reserves, the decision for the issuing of
such shares to be decided by an EGM

v.

Increase of the par value of the circulated shares equal value of free reserves

vi.

Issue of new shares for founders’ shares as special privileges346 or as negotiable
bonds.

Under section 136 of the CL’65, the shareholders enjoy a priority right to subscribe to
new shares unless the said right is restricted by the company’s AoA. Likewise,
Ministers of Commerce and Industry and Finance may restrict or repeal that preference
with regard to companies which have ‘special character’. These include companies that
have concessions,347 companies that manage public utilities, companies whose rate of
profit is guaranteed by the state, companies that receive funds from the state, companies
in which the state participates, and banking companies. In these companies,
shareholders have no preference over new subscribers.
According to section 116 of the CL’65, raising capital may also take the form of an
increase through a bond issue. The process for this kind of increase, which is governed
by section 117 of the CL’65, takes place as follows:
i.

It should be authorised by the AoA of the company.

346

For further discussion of founders’ shares, see section 5.5.1 in Chapter 5.
For example, companies that operate in petroleum, natural gas sector and derivatives thereof, pearls,
corals and similar marine organic substances. See section 3 of Mining Investment Code 2004 of KSA,
which was issued by Royal Decree No M/47 of 20 Sha'ban 1425 AH (5 October 2004).
347
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ii.

It should be decided by the AGM.

iii.

Share capital of the company shall be paid in full.

iv.

The bond’s value shall not exceed the paid up share capital. The new bonds shall
not be issued until the old bonds have been paid in full. It should be noted,
however, that real estate companies, agricultural companies, industrial credit
banks, or any other company authorised by the Minister of Commerce and
Industry are exempted from this requirement under section 117 of the CL’65.

Reducing capital — Procedure to be followed
Sections 142 and 143 of the CL’65 introduce the method that a company has to follow
in order to reduce its capital. In particular, an EGM has the right to decide to reduce the
company’s share capital. As a next step, the EGM has to inform all company’s creditors
by publishing the decision in the Government’s Official Gazette. This publication
allows the creditors to object to this decision.348 As a consequence, the company has
either to reimburse them by direct payment, or to provide them with guarantees for
repayment of the debts. The decision on the reduction may take place when the capital
of the company is in excess of the company’s needs.349 However, any loss that justifies a
reduction shall be a loss which renders the capital of the company less than its
authorised minimum capital, as defined in section 49 of the CL’65.350 This minimum
amount cannot be for public companies less than SAR 10 million (approximately USD

348

The creditor must submit the objection within 60 days from date of the publication of decision.
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 143.
350
Section 49 of the CL’65 states: ‘The capital of the JSC, which offers its stocks for public subscription,
shall not be less than SAR 10 million [approximately USD 2.7 million]. With the exception of this case,
the company capital shall not be less than SAR 2 million [approximately USD 0.53 million]. The paid
capital upon incorporating the company shall not be less than half of the minimum limit, with observance
to what is ruled by section 58, and the value of the stock shall not be less than SAR 50 (approximately
USD 13.30).’
349

101

Ch 2: Definitions, Origins and Types of Commercial Companies in KSA

2.7 million) and for other types of companies (that is, non public companies) less than
SAR 2 million (approximately USD 0.53 million). Paid-up capital shall not be less than
one half of the minimum capital required by law. No reduction shall be adopted unless
the auditor’s report to the company shows: firstly, the reasons why the reduction was
necessary; and secondly, what the impact of this reduction would be on the creditors.
Based on section 144 of the CL’65 a company could reduce its capital through:
i.

Repayment of the nominal value of the shares to the shareholders or releasing
them from the obligation to pay for the unpaid portion, or

ii.

Reduction of the par value of shares equal to the loss sustained by the company,
or

iii.

Cancellation of the number of shares, or

iv.

Share buy-backs.

It should be noted that if the capital decrease is done through the cancellation of a
number of shares, such a reduction must be carried out in proportion to the shareholding
of each shareholder351 (thus equality among the shareholders is observed). Further, each
shareholder shall submit to the company, on the date specified, the shares that have been
decided to be cancelled, otherwise the company can be entitled to consider such shares
cancelled.352 In case the capital decrease takes place through reduction by share buy-

351

Section 144 of the CL’65 does not specify who is the shareholder (ordinary or preference) in the
section where it states that ‘If the capital decrease is to be done by cancellation of a number of stocks,
equality shall be observed amongst the shareholders....’. However, it seems that the said section means
ordinary shareholder.
352
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 145.
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backs, shareholders must be informed through the Official Gazette regarding the terms
of the buy-back program.353
Moreover, section 105 of the CL’65 states that a company can buy back its shares if the
reason for the buy-back is redemption of the ordinary shares, and/or for the reduction of
capital.354
It is noteworthy that the CL’65 contains provisions that threaten the interests/stakes of
the shareholders and the creditors. Section 183 of the CL’65, provides that capital
raising or decrease of a CVC shall not be subject to any special conditions, unless the
AoA or MoA provide otherwise. Thus, the appropriate remedy to protect shareholders
and creditors may be an amendment of this provision to assist shareholders and
creditors by creating resolutions protecting their shares in this type of company, for
example, by providing preconditions, such as shareholders’ approval, for raising and
reducing capital of a CVC.355
2. 6 Dissolution of Companies under the Companies Law 1965 (CL’65)
The term ‘dissolution’ of a company refers to the legal process which causes an end of
legal existence of a company. The dissolution of a company in the KSA takes place
either due to general / natural causes or a number of specific ones, as discussed below.

353

Ibid s 146.
The purposes for the buy-back are: (i) shares depreciation, (ii) reduction of the capital, and (iii) if the
stocks are part of assets of money purchased by the company inclusive of their dues and obligations. See
the Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 105.
355
For more requirements, see, provisions of sections 116, 117, 142, 143 and 144 of the CL’65, which
have been mentioned above.
354
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2.6.1

General Causes of Dissolution of Companies

Reasons that may lead to the dissolution of the company may include:356
i.

Expiration of the term fixed for the company.

ii.

Realisation of the purpose for which it was established, or the recognition of the
impossibility of realising such purpose.

iii.

Transfer of all interests/quotas or shares to one shareholder.

iv.

Loss of all company’s assets, or of the major part thereof, so that the remainder
cannot be effectively utilised (for example, when a company’s assets, such as
factories or ships, are destroyed by fire; however, this is not likely to happen,
given that almost all companies are insured).357

v.

Agreement of the partners to dissolve the company before the expiry of its term,
unless the MoA of a company stipulates otherwise.

vi.

Merger of one or two companies into another.

vii.

Judgment of the court at the request of one of the concerned shareholders for
serious reasons that justify such a step.

The causes that can lead to the dissolution of the companies may apply to all
companies, irrespective of their type. This implies that, for example, the loss of all
assets of a company may lead to its dissolution.

356

As defined in section 15 of the CL’65, due regard to the special causes of dissolution particular to each
type of company.
357
Al-Madani, above n 232, 193; Alghamdi and Hosni, above n 160, 190, 191.
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2.6.2

Specific Causes of Dissolution of Companies

In addition to the conditions of dissolution laid down by section 15 of the CL’65 that
apply to all types of companies, there are special reasons for the dissolution of each
specific type of company. These are discussed below.
2.6.2.1 Dissolution of a General Partnership Company (Sharikat Atad}amun / شركة
( )التضامنGPC) and a Limited Partnership Company (Sharikat Ataws}yah

Albas}yt}ah / ( )شركة التوصية البسيطةLPC)
There are special dissolution causes concerning a GPC and an LPC. These causes are
related to the individual partners, given that both types of companies are considered as
individual-based, depending strongly on the personal element developed among
partners.358 These causes are defined in section 35 of the CL’65 and comprise:
i.

Death of one of the general partners.

ii.

Declaration of legal incapacity of one of the partners, which can be due to any
ground, such as mental illness. So, if one of the partners loses his/her capacity to
determine his/her rights, duties and obligations, a GPC and an LPC shall be
dissolved.

iii.

Declaration of bankruptcy or insolvency of one of the partners

iv.

Withdrawal of any partner from the company, if its term is not specified.

358

See section 2.3.1 of the present Chapter.
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Nevertheless, the MoA of a company may provide that upon the death, declaration of
legal incapacity, bankruptcy, insolvency or withdrawal of any partner, the company
shall, nonetheless continue to exist among the surviving parties.359
The dissolution must be declared within 30 days following the actual date of the
dissolution by the liquidator.360 In addition, it must be mentioned in all documents of the
company which will be issued that the company is undergoing liquidation.361
2.6.2.2 Dissolution of Silent Partnership Company (Sharikat Almah}as}ah / شركة
( )المحاصةSPC)
Based on section 47 of the CL’65, all the provisions governing a GPC and an LPC
(mentioned above)362 shall apply to such an SPC as far as its dissolution is concerned.
However, when this company is dissolved, it will not be subject to the rules of
liquidation, given its lack of legal personality and hence the lack of its being an
independent financial entity. Partners are liable for the company debts, and any
remaining surplus will be distributed among its partners at dissolution.363
2.6.2.3 Dissolution of a Joint Stock Company (Sharikat Almusahamh / )شركة المساھمة
(JSC)
A JSC is dissolved in the following circumstances:

359

Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 35.
Ibid s 221; see also Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Application and
Procedures (2006) <http://www.mci.gov.sa/english/moci.aspx?Type=8&PageObjectId=815>.
361
Section 12 of the CL’65 provides that it shall be obligatory for all the contracts, quittances,
advertisement and otherwise of papers issued by the company to carry its name and a statement of its type
and head office, and during the liquidation procedure, the documents that emanate from the company
must mention it is in liquidation.
362
Section 2.6.2.1 of the present Chapter.
363
Al-Madani, above n 232, 241.
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i.

The transfer of all shares to one shareholder. In this case this single shareholder
shall be personally liable for the company’s debts; however, his/her liability is
limited to the company’s assets.364

ii.

Upon the elapse of one year from the date on which the number of the
stockholders becomes less than five, any interested person — even a person who
has no relation with the company — may request its dissolution.365

iii.

If it loses three quarters of its capital.366

It should also be noted, that when this type of company is dissolved, it enters the stage
of liquidation that will be discussed in section 2.6.3 of the present Chapter.
2.6.2.4 Dissolution of a Limited Liability Company (Asharikah dhat Almasw’liah

Almah}dudah / ( )الشركة ذات المسؤولية المحدودةLLC)
An LLC shall be dissolved for any of the following reasons:
i.

Transfer of ownership of all the company shares to a single shareholder. In this
case this single shareholder shall be personally liable for the company’s debts.
However, his/her liability is limited to the company’s assets.367

ii.

Loss of three quarters of the company capital, in which case the directors must,
within a period of no more than 30 days from the date of reaching that level of
loss, invite shareholders to an EGM, with a view to consider the continuation or
dissolution of the company.368

364

Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 147(1).
Ibid s 147(2).
366
Ibid s 148.
367
Ibid s 179.
368
Ibid s 180.
365
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2.6.2.5 Dissolution of a Company Limited by Shares (Sharikat Ataws}yah Bilashum
/ ( )شركة التوصية باألسھمCLS)
Based on section 156 of the CL’65, a CLS is dissolved in the following circumstances:
i.

Death of one of the partners.

ii.

Declaration of legal incapacity — for any reason — of one of the general partners.

iii.

Declaration of bankruptcy or insolvency of one of the general partners.

iv.

Withdrawal of any general partner from the company. Where this company has a
sole general partner, she/she shall be personally liable for the company’s debts in
all his assets.

Nevertheless, the MoA of the CLS may provide that upon the death, legal incapacity,
declaration of bankruptcy, insolvency or withdrawal of any general partner, the
company shall continue to exist among the surviving parties.
In addition to these causes, a CLS is dissolved due to any of reasons for dissolution of a
JSC cited above.369
2.6.2.6 Dissolution of a Company with Variable Capital (Asharikah dhat

Ra’salmalalqabillitaghyyr / ( )الشركة ذات رأس المال القابل للتغييرCVC)
Section 188 of the CL’65 provides that a CVC shall not be dissolved by the withdrawal,
expulsion, death, legal incapacity, declaration of bankruptcy or insolvency of any of the
shareholders, unless the company’s MoA or AoA provides otherwise. Therefore, the
dissolution of this type of company is regulated by what is contained in its
constitutional documents.
369

Ibid s 156.
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Ata‘‘wunyah /
2.6.2.7 Dissolution of a Cooperative Company (Asharikah Ata
( )الشركة التعاونيةCC)
As mentioned earlier,370 this company must take either the form of a JSC or an LLC.
Thus, a CC shall be dissolved for any of the particular causes for which those
companies (that is, a JSC or an LLC) is dissolved; however, after the dissolution of this
company any surplus is transferred upon the decision of an AGM to cooperative
companies or union, or appropriated to general social services, such as health care and
education services.371
2.6.3

Effects of Dissolution

The dissolution of a company has the following consequences:
i.

Liquidation of the company: The process of winding up must be carried out in
accordance with the provisions of sections 216–226 of the CL’65.372 A liquidator
may be assigned either by the partners, by an AGM or by a commercial circuit (a
commercial court).373

ii.

Distribution of company assets: A formal process during a company winding up,
undertaken by a liquidator. In this stage, a company’s assets are collected and
sold, then the surplus distributed among its creditors on a priority basis; and, if
any residue exists, it can be shared by its members.374

370

See section 2.3 and 2.3.2.5 of the present Chapter.
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 209.
372
Hamadalah, above n 199, 207. It is noteworthy that sections 216 to 226 of the CL’65 contain
provisions concerning the appointment and power of a liquidator. As pointed out in section 218, if a
company is wound up by a resolution of its members, a liquidator shall be appointed by the partners or an
AGM; whereas if a company wound up by a court, a liquidator shall be appointed by the court.
373
For more details concerning distinguishing between commercial circuit and commercial court in the
KSA, see section 6.3 of Chapter 6.
374
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 222.
371
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iii.

Ceasing existence: A company will cease to exist after the end of the liquidation
process. Thus, the company shall maintain its legal personality until liquidation is
completed.

iv.

Litigation: A lawsuit filed against the liquidators due to transactions during
liquidation shall not be heard after three years of declaration of completion of the
liquidation. Likewise, no lawsuit can be instituted against the company, its
founders, its members, Board of Directors nor the auditors due to their functions,
after three years have elapsed since such a declaration.375

2. 7 Conclusions
This chapter sketches the legal regime that governs the establishment, operation and
dissolution of companies in the KSA. The main law, the CL’65, was promulgated in
1965. Its numerous clauses delineate a number of company types and define them in
some detail. In particular, the CL’65 recognises eight types of companies based on the
nature of memberships, rights and obligations of their members, their legal personality,
life span and so on.
Furthermore, the CL’65 defines all requirements that should be met as far as their
operation, establishment and dissolution are concerned. However, besides the generic
requirements with which all companies must comply, there are specific legal
requirements for a particular type of company to comply with (as discussed earlier).
Therefore companies are subject to different legal requirements based on their specific
type.

375

Ibid s 226.
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In conclusion, the aim of this chapter is to give a better understanding of the types of
companies that may be established and operate in the KSA. In particular, the chapter has
presented how these companies are formed, how they increase and reduce their capital
as well as the way in which they can operate. The chapter also dealt with procedural
questions pertaining to their dissolution. This discussion is considered essential before
discussing and analysing issues that will be covered in the following chapter, because
the formation, operation and dissolution of companies are related to corporate criminal
liability, which is the main thrust of this research.
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Chapter 3
3 Corporate Crime
3. 1 Introduction
Four decades ago, Professor H L Packer underlined that ‘crime is a sociopolitical
artifact, not a natural phenomenon. We can have as much or as little of it as we please,
depending on what we choose to count as criminal.’376 Criminal law has been used by
States as the main instrument of control in order to regulate a variety of diverse
problems related to human behaviour, such as acts of violence, sexual immorality,
violations of privacy, the use of alcohol, and bribery.377
Subjects of these regulatory efforts have been ‘persons’ in the sense of natural persons,
that is, human beings. Increasingly, criminal law has been used to control various fields
of behaviour, including the economic activities and the actions of both individuals and
corporations.378 However, it is not easy to address issues of criminal liability when it
comes to corporate entities.379
Economic relations may influence the functioning of the markets in a positive or in a
negative way.380 In order to more effectively control corporate misconduct381 and deter

376

Herbert L Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford University Press, 1968), 364.
Larry J Siegel, Criminology (Cengage Learning, 10th ed, 2008) 20, 21. In certain countries, such as the
US, criminal law has been used as a major instrument for controlling corporate misconduct. The Sherman
Antitrust Act 1890 has been the main federal statute against corporate crime. See also Leonard Orland,
'Reflections on Corporate Crime: Law in Search of Theory and Scholarship' (1979) 17(1) American
Criminal Law Review 501, 501.
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Orland, above n 377, 502.
379
Erik Claes, Wouter Devroe and Bert Keirsbilck (eds), Facing the Limits of the Law (Springer, 2009)
113.
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potential violators from certain actions or omissions that can have severe consequences
on society,382 governments have not hesitated to apply criminal law to companies.
The recent spate of corporate scandals — such as the collapse of both Enron383 and
WorldCom384 (involving fraud related crimes) in the energy and communications
industries respectively, and the issues arising from the British Petroleum (BP)385 oil rig
disaster and consequent oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico — has triggered international
public concern about corporate crime and its negative effects.386 Corporate crime may
take a variety of forms such as fraud, bribery, public corruption, identity theft,
occupational crime and forgery.387 Corporate crime may have severe consequences, such
as an increased unemployment rate, declines in the stock market, loss of investor

382

For a thorough analysis, see Solaiman, ‘Investor Protection and Criminal Liabilities for Defective
Prospectuses’, above n 22, 469.
383
Houston Natural Gas merged with InterNorth to form Enron in 1985. The Enron scandal, revealed in
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Side of Shareholder Value' (2002) 67 Tulane Law Review 1275, 1277–88. Also, see Cathy Booth
Thomas, ‘Called to Account’, Time, 18 June 2002 <http://www.time.com/time/business/article/
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confidence.388 It can, thus, have such an economic impact that may cost a government
millions of dollars to cope with corporate crime’s consequences.389
Most countries have witnessed severe corporate crimes;390 the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
(KSA) is no exception. However, as already underlined, it is not the purpose of this
study to examine corporate criminality as a worldwide phenomenon. Still, it is
important to provide a general overview of corporate crime and its consequences in
order to further elaborate on the concept of corporate criminal liability. This chapter,
therefore, is an attempt to have a glance at corporate crime, its severity and attendant
costs, as a necessary prerequisite for the further analysis of corporate criminal liability
in the KSA.
To this end, the Chapter is divided into a number of sections. Section 3.1 provides an
introduction; section 3.2 defines the nature of corporate crime; section 3.3 attempts a
general discussion on corporate crime related to the policies of corporations and its
historical evolution; section 3.4 discusses elements of corporate criminal liability;
section 3.5 highlights corporate crime in the KSA; section 3.6 outlines the sanctions for
corporate crime; and section 3.7 presents conclusions.

388

Michael L Seigel, 'Corporate America Fights Back: The Battle over Waiver of the Attorney-Client
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3. 2 Criminal Corporations
3.2.1

Defining Corporate Crime

Human and corporate behaviour can be regulated by both civil law (including
administrative law) and criminal law. Through the process of criminalisation, the
legislator assesses which behaviour is sufficiently culpable to deserve the stigma of
being a ‘crime’.391 Corporate misconduct (‘criminal’ or otherwise) has become the
subject of extensive legal research, in the course of which scholars have striven for an
accurate definition of ‘corporate crime’. Researchers have variously arrived at narrower
or broader definitions.
A narrow definition admits only those actions committed by corporations or persons on
their behalf, when such actions are subject to criminal sanctions.392 Others view that a
corporate criminal offence is an illegal action committed by an individual working for a
corporation, with a view to obtaining an ultimate interest or advantage for the
organisation.393 Braithwaite, notably, has defined corporate crime as ‘the conduct of a
corporation, or of employees acting on behalf of a corporation, which is proscribed and
punishable by law’.394 Braithwaite justifies the inclusion of breaches of civil and
administrative law as well as of criminal law on the basis that the same action or
behaviour can be subject to civil and/or criminal law within a single jurisdiction, and
that there are also inconsistencies in treatment of the same action (as to whether it is
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subject to civil or criminal proceedings) between jurisdictions.395 A number of
researchers have agreed that, according to this quite broad definition, corporate crime
comprises not just violations of criminal law but also of civil law as well as of
administrative law.396
3.2.2

Sutherland’s Theoretical Approach

Sutherland noted that corporate crime as an example of ‘white collar crime’, that is,
such a crime does not involve physical violence nor is it perpetrated by ‘blue collar’ (or
working class) employees generally engaged in physical laboring or similar
employment. This type of ‘white collar’ crime takes place in characteristically higher
status occupations, with perpetrators often educated, privileged members of the middle
or upper class, and including ‘respectable businessmen’ or, at least, businessmen less
subject to suspicion.397
The objective of profit maximisation in a competitive market may lead to an ongoing
illegal practice.398 The probability, or at least the possibility, that corporations may
perform illegal actions is far higher due to competition in the market. As Box points out,
as long as the market is functioning under capitalistic regimes, corporations will
continue to act illegally.399 In this context, he concludes that the solution cannot be
found in the change of corporations alone, since their behaviour is based on the
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functionality of capitalistic market-based mechanisms.400 As a consequence,
corporations often adapt their behaviour according to the market conditions. For
instance, if a company, holding a monopoly in a certain market segment, commits a
financial crime and its board members are imprisoned for it, this does not signify that
the company will in the future demonstrate lawful behaviour.401
According to Sutherland, one big difference between someone who commits a white
collar crime and someone, for instance, who is a habitual thief, is to be found in the way
they see themselves.402 Sutherland believes that habitual thieves admit to themselves
that they are indeed thieves, contrary to those that commit white collar crimes, who
continue to consider themselves to be ‘decent people’.403 In addition, often those who
commit white collar crimes, not only come from a privileged social and family
background (in contrast to those that commit ‘street’ crimes), but they also continue to
believe that they are part of that social milieu. And, as Piquero and Benson point out,
despite the fact that they do not perhaps consider themselves to be ‘professional
criminals’, the careers of white collar criminals are often longer than those of habitual
street criminals.404 It may even be that fear of losing their position or wealth may drive
offending behaviour in some instances.405
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Big corporations, and their upper echelon employees and managers also become
accustomed to using illegal practices on a continuous basis. A corporate culture evolves
that increasingly tolerates breaches as routine, as ‘common business practice’, or even
‘necessary’ in particular circumstances. Managers come to often neglect not only the
law, but also government policy and regulations, and the regulatory authorities. As
Piquero and Benson note, ‘organizations create both the opportunities for white collar
crime and the pressure to take advantage of those opportunities’.406 One could argue that
the internal supervisory regime also contributes to the former and market forces to the
latter.
Sutherland’s study was criticised on the basis that it was limited to US corporations, but
his study did not increase interest in the topic even in the United States. After the
Watergate investigation, where governmental deviance was made public, scepticism
grew with regard to corporate criminality.407 Through his research into criminal
activities Sutherland, however, had wanted to draw the attention of social scientists
away from the lower socio-economic classes to the higher ones. He wanted to show that
the popular profile of criminals, as persons stemming from the working class, cannot
explain the criminal phenomenon holistically.408 It may be, rather, that the nature of the
corporate crime committed depends on the opportunities offered by the different
environments,409 and that the traditional abhorrence of crimes of violence against the
person as opposed to non-violent ‘economic’ white collar crimes, has contributed to
their being ‘overlooked’ (although some may say that even here ‘class’ played a part).410
However, as the faces of the victims of such crimes grow more visible, and numerous,
406
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and the effects of such crime revealed as wiping out people’s economic futures and their
enjoyment of life, white collar financial and other crimes are gaining more attention and
are becoming viewed more seriously.411 Sutherland also emphasised that ‘an illegal act
is not defined as crime because it is punished, but because it is unlawful and
punishable’.412
3.2.3

Definitions by Clinard and Yeager

Clinard and Yeager have defined ‘corporate crime’ as the crime that is punished by
civil, administrative or criminal law.413 In this way, they have limited Sutherland’s
definition, and at the same time broadened their research, by including cases where
corporate crimes do not fall within the category of criminally proscribed conduct, which
constitutes the majority of the offences. By studying crimes such as bribery, they
demonstrated that big corporations violated the generally accepted ethical standards of
corporations as well as the legislation in force more frequently than did smaller
enterprises.414 In particular, their 1980 investigation demonstrated that of the 582
biggest enterprises they studied over the two year period were responsible for 1553
crimes.415 The study showed, moreover, that the degree to which they tended to be liable
to prosecution depended upon the functionality of the market, the mentality under which
they operated, the individual attributes of persons involved as well as their corporate
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culture.416 This study triggered increased public interest with regards to crimes
committed by corporations.417
3.2.4

The Approach Developed by Kramer

Kramer rejected the traditional criminological viewpoint of corporate crime being only
that behaviour which is ‘in violation of the criminal law and liable for sanctioning by
criminal justice agencies under the political authority of the state’.418 He argued (from a
humanistic criminological perspective)419 that there is a need to ‘move beyond the
traditional legal definition of crime as used within the behavioural paradigm … [and] …
reformulate [it] … so that it includes all willful social harms’.420 Thus, it appears, acts of
omission and commission would be deemed ‘criminal’ on the basis of social harms
perpetrated, not simply on a simplistic ‘legal definition’ of a behaviour, where such a
definition has been developed over time within a certain social paradigm (generally by a
wealthier propertied class) and reflects its values.421 Kramer terms the ‘wilful social
harm’ centric approach as a necessary second order definition, and observes that within
the scope of the punishable acts must fall ‘those willful social acts that cause serious
harm — physical, economic, or psychological — to human beings’.422 The adoption of
this approach would then allow the redefinition of the acts to which the first order
‘criminal legal’ definition would apply — that is, the second order ‘harm’ would
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determine the criminality of a behaviour.423 Fink and Tálos quoted from Kramer’s
observation of the relationship between corporate behaviour deemed criminal and the
nature of corporations themselves.
By the concept of “corporate crime”, then, we wish to focus attention on
criminal acts (of omission or commission) which are the result of deliberate
decision making (or culpable negligence) of those who occupy structural
positions within the organisation as corporate executives or managers.
These decisions are … organizationally based — made in accordance with
the normative goals.424
Kramer is not trying to separate the criminal mind from the criminal act, and he includes
‘wilful’ and objective social harms.425 He covers both acts of omission or commission;
however, by demanding the criminality of the act, he limits the acts of the corporations
that can be considered as crimes and he is not, thus, covering acts that are punishable by
the state through administrative or civil law.
3.2.5

Theoretical Approach in the KSA

It is noteworthy that Shari‘ah law is a system of law applied to all societal activities in
the KSA. It is, further, not regarded as a merely ‘religious law’ applicable to a limited
number of somehow specifically ‘religious’ situations.426 Therefore, it is helpful to
briefly explore Shari‘ah theory in regard to corporate criminal liability.
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Shari‘ah scholars have two theories regarding corporate criminal liability. These are
outlined below.427
The first theory rejects corporate criminal liability. Its proponents argue that the
fundamental rules in Shari‘ah prohibit such a concept.428 They base their opinion on the
following arguments:
i.

Criminal liability applies to natural persons because they possess the power of
volition. In contrast, a corporation does not possess such qualities and hence is
unable to commit crimes by itself.429 Furthermore, as a company does not make a
decision, it cannot therefore be punished. Instead, its officers, those who do make
the decision, should be punished.430

ii.

Even though lawmakers have recognised the company’s legal capacity, this
capacity is limited to the company’s objective.431

iii.

The punishment applied to the company may extend to others who did not
participate in the commission of the crime, such as stockholders.432

iv.

Lawmakers have instituted various punishments, such as capital punishment and
imprisonment. These cannot be imagined to apply to a company.433
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The second theory accepts corporate criminal liability, based on the argument that

Shari‘ah authorises a legislature434 to take suitable measures where criminal liability for
any person is absent.435 Muslim jurists have determined conditions for the validity of
corporate criminal liability. These conditions are the following:436
i.

The crime must be committed by a person attached to the company, as expressed
in terms of subordination (that is, relevance must exist between a member and a
corporation).

ii.

The act that constitutes the crime should be within the domain of the company’s
member (convicted).

iii.

The act that constitutes the crime must be done in the interests of the company.

iv.

It must be possible to both attribute the act and apply the punishment to the
company.

It is quite reasonable to see that that the general meeting of a company cannot be an
offender as a whole, rather an individual member of a company can commit a crime
based on his/her responsibility in relation to the company. Given the fact that Shari‘ah
is the basic reference for all Saudi laws and regulations, the KSA has adopted the
principle of corporate criminal liability in accordance with the second theory discussed
above.
433
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3. 3 Rationale for Corporate Crimes
3.3.1

Can Corporations Commit Crimes?

The commission of an offence generally requires the offender to act voluntarily with the
requisite of mens rea for that conduct. To this end, that offender, by taking a decision is
acting or is omitting to act. A company as an artificial person is not able to take a
decision; however, the persons who participate in its activities can do so. To that end,
the Board may, for example, decide to act illegally or not. Decision taking procedures at
a high level in corporations have demonstrated that even if there are persons that do not
want to take the responsibility of making an illegal decision, others will not hesitate to
do so. One highly ranked executive, who through his acts violated antimonopoly law,
emphasised in a very characteristic way that ‘it was a way of doing business before we
even got into business’.437
It is not easy to have a company condemned for serious crimes, given that
responsibilities are divided within the company in such a way that it is often not
possible to find out who the guilty party really is in respect of a corporate crime. ‘I was
following the rules’ or similar is the most frequent excuse. This excuse reduces the
person’s responsibility by placing it within the company’s bureaucratic structure. At the
same time, it attributes the blame essentially to the structure in place or other nameless
persons also operating within the constraints of that structure. Every corporation is
composed by human beings. However, an enterprise, as a unit (an entity, in its entirety
or as a whole) is something more than the association of individuals. It comprises also a
sum of expectations, which are not only defined by the persons that compose this
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Michael L Benson, 'Denying the Guilty Mind: Accounting for Involvement in a White-Collar Crime'
(1985) 23(4) Criminology 583, 591.

125

Ch 3: Corporate Crime

enterprise, but are the product of mutual influence of these people with the company’s
‘personality’.438 This is how one considers the company’s policies, its way of
functioning, and its vision vis-à-vis its market share to be achieved.439
It may be useful to approach corporate crime by using elements from the theories of the
criminality of persons. For example, the ‘rational choice’ theory considers that a
criminal is acting rationally when committing a crime.440 According to this theory, the
criminal, before acting criminally, does a cost-benefit analysis of the effects of his
action.441 Given that corporations are rational entities, decisions taken emerge from
collective thinking and not due to any other emotional factor.442 Indeed, given that selfinterest or corporate self-interest often lies at the centre of corporate crime (maintenance
of profit), they might expect to act more rationally than most but certainly be more
likely to take into account factors such as perception of likelihood of detection.443
Emotional reactions, that an individual could demonstrate and would prevent him/her
from committing the crime, do not exist. On the contrary, emotions such as fear or
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hesitation are successfully rationalised (for example, ‘everyone is doing it’, ‘no-one will
get hurt’).444
Companies often find themselves ‘above the law’.445 The acts or omissions committed
by companies, that many (including this writer) would characterise as serious corporate
crimes, are often treated as ‘accidents’ or as acts of ‘negligence’.446 To ensure that
seriously harmful corporate behaviours are treated appropriately, it is often argued
whether or not a penal system, which has been designed for criminalising the illegal acts
of individuals, can be equally effective in penalising illegal acts conducted by entities
(or persons within them) generally aligned with higher societal classes.447 According to
this writer’s point of view, corporations may commit crimes, which can be very serious
and, as a consequence, states should have rules in force that can effectively combat such
forms of crimes. Therefore, definitions provided by law should be broad with a view to
encompassing all cases of possible crimes that can be committed.
3.3.2

Corporate Policies — Questions on Unethical and Illegal Behaviours

As pointed out, a company’s decision is the decision taken by its board of directors.
Studies have, to this end, demonstrated that persons, who would never commit
individually an unlawful act, are willing to do so if this decision will have beneficial
effects for the company’s policy (for example, increase sales).448 Thus a company’s
business may be mispresented as legitimate and obtain investment funds from
unsuspecting investors, or used as vehicle for crime (such as for credit card ‘bust outs’,
444
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purchasing fraud, and fraudulent loans). A representative example, would be corporate
practices related to the environment (for example, the illegal dumping of toxic e-waste,
dilution or contamination of products, or failure to maintain premises, all of which
courses of action are pursued to maximise income by minimising expenses).449 Health
and environmental effects may be immediate, and/or enduring.450
Corporate crimes can be associated with presidents, CEOs, managers, directors, sales
people, agents or any other persons connected with the company who have the authority
to act on behalf of the organisation. These individuals, acting on behalf of the company
are key players in a corporation’s decision taking process.451 Corporations may be
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entities with no physical presence, but when such persons demonstrate misconduct, the
law should enable their punishment.
3.3.3

A Brief History of Corporate Crime

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to recount a detailed history of corporate crime;
however, a brief history with an emphasis on the United States — an ‘engine room’ of
capitalism where corporate crime is popularly deemed to have flourished in its more
corporate friendly and ‘free’ environment — seems warranted.452
More than a hundred years ago, Judge Cicero J Lindley pointed out to the members of
the States Attorney’s Association of Illinois that the threat of corporate crime would
increase as commercial environment in the United States began to get more ‘mature’.
Concentrating wealth in a relatively few hands, the growth of huge conglomerates and
the prospect of transnational business transactions started posing serious challenges to
corporate law.453
As early as 1909, in the case of New York Central Railroad, regulatory failures were
revealed.454 The case dramatically showed how companies could undertake many
dubious activities in interstate commerce. It was pointed out that there is no reason for
corporations profiting from transactions not to be held accountable for transactions
‘performed by their agents’. The agents ‘knowledge and intent’ could, thus, be
‘attributed to the corporation’.455 Indeed, restricting the criminal law in the regulation of
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interstate commerce, the vast majority of which was undertaken by corporations, would
be:
to give them [companies] immunity from all punishment because of the old
and exploded doctrine that a corporation cannot commit a crime would
virtually take away the only means of effectually controlling the subject
matter and correcting the abuses aimed at it.456
With New York Central Railroad, attention was drawn to corporate criminal law and at
the same time the case demonstrated that existing regulatory policies and practices had
failed in the United States.457
At the same time, Edward Alsworth Ross was pointing out for the first time how
dangerous the behaviour of business organisations can be458 as they became increasingly
‘impersonal and non-moral’.459 Ross highlighted the disproportionately harsh attitude
towards and treatment of perpetrators of traditional crimes as compared to those of
perpetrators of the often far more damaging corporate equivalents,460 the opportunity for
which multiplied with each new fiduciary relationship.461 Ross further noted that the
only way to restrain corporations is to ‘tackle their anonymity … by fixing on directors
the responsibility for corporate sinning’.462
In Europe, the Dutch Marxist, Willem Bonger, in 1916 explained that both criminal
behaviour in the streets and ‘crime in suits’ were destined to increase due to the
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exploitative personal relationships tainted by greed that are caused by transformations
wrought by capitalism463 which, by its very nature, increases ‘egoism’ at the expense of
‘altruism’.464 As Bonger pointed out, as soon as a person can produce a surplus, able to
be exchanged for things he could not produce by himself, that person is no longer
willing to give others what they need, but, on the contrary, desires to keep this surplus
for himself.465
These individualistic, competitive, ‘selfish’ and far from community-oriented attitudes
favour antisocial instincts and behaviours.466 Indeed, it is true, that in nations with big
inequalities as far as wealth distribution is concerned, crime is high and criminal
subcultures are well-developed.467 Although such behaviours are manifested in all
classes, they differ in their nature due to the varying opportunities offered, and reflect a
deterioration in individual as well as collective social and ethical relations, as Ross
earlier pointed out.468
Over the years consumers have witnessed an increased corporatisation of the means of
food production and industrial products. This tendency has been coupled with the
increasing awareness of environmental and other effects of corporate activities in
agriculture and industry. An environment was created where damage was increasingly
perpetrated by a ‘faceless’ corporation rather than by an individual.469 The concept of
‘corporate culture’470 started slowly being used by scholars.471 By the 1960s, demands
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from consumer groups and environmentalists had increased and there was greater
discussion of the nature of corporate social responsibility, which began to be recognised
as important worldwide. As a consequence, governments started introducing legislation
so as to combat any illegal behaviour exhibited by many corporations around the
world.472
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Early examples of such legislation existed — such as the Sherman Antitrust Act which
had been in force since 1890 and the 1906 the Food and Drug Administration Act
(created with a view to protecting consumers from impure foods, drugs and
cosmetics),473 but it has only been in comparatively recent years that a sustained effort
has been made to address the concerns raised. The trend toward regulation has not been
steady or without its opponents.
During the past three decades, various disruptions to investor savings and the markets
resulted in an increased focus on ‘white collar’ financial crime. Economic
fundamentalism, a theory developed by the supporters of the free market doctrine474 had
become increasingly politically acceptable (particularly in the 1980s) and corporations
lobbied to not only maintain their power but increase it.475 Deregulation in trade and
financial markets would, it was promised, lead to a new era of prosperity as funds
flowed to the more efficient centres of economic operation and wealth then ‘trickle
473
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Corporations' (1992) 71 Nebraska Law Review 1049, 1056. See also Laufer and Geis, above n 452.
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down’ to the rest of the community. Capitalism, too, assumed a new dimension as
monetary policy became increasingly ‘hands off’ (non-interventionist) and banking
itself became ever more deregulated, particularly in the United States during the early
1980s onwards.476 In this context, this combination of market and institutional
liberalisation as well as the lack of regulatory supervision resulted in an ‘explosion’ of
the financial sector and its profits477 accompanied by an increasing number of scandals,
regulatory breaches and simple but innumerable foreclosures, threatened bankruptcies
and so forth as the unsustainable growth later imploded.478 The emergence of an
increasingly laissez-faire environment — so so ‘favourable’ to corporations —
facilitated the development by companies of various strategies that embodied both legal
and illegal practices.
Over the years, the public has become increasingly intolerant of crimes involving
corporations;479 however, despite the fact that a corporate crime can involve a very
serious offence (even causing the collapse of markets), as Mokhiber points out, people
still frequently associate ‘crime’ with actions such as ‘burglary’, ‘robbery’ or
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‘murder’,480 and do not generally think of the illegal acts of a corporation, although such
acts may involve high human or environmental health costs or even result in the loss of
thousands of lives.481 In 1972, Reiman tallied the relevative frequency of death caused
by murder and that caused by avoidable industrial diseases and accidents in the United
States. He noted that a murder was committed about every 26 minutes, while a death
during work hours (the workforce being just half the population) occurred every 4.5
minutes — in other words, one murder corresponded to the death of six workers, who
have died simply ‘trying to make a living’.482
However, putting the ‘human face’ on the victims of corporate crime is one strategy that
may assist in humanising the victim. It may also bring to account (or even demonise)
the perpetrators who, often separated from a victim by layers of bureaucracy or at a
physical distance from the victim, appear ‘less responsible’ or ‘directly related’ to the
victim.483 The often large number of persons involved and the diffusion of many and
diverse responsibilities, however, may make it difficult for the legal authorities to find
who bears the real guilt in a given situation, thus rendering the likelihood of conviction
remote.484
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3.3.4

Current Trends in the Treatment of Corporate Crime

Corporations have become part of everyday life. They are to be found everywhere, in
every aspect of human life. In the common law countries, courts have started to
sentence corporations, on the basis of tort law principles, for statutory offences since the
middle of last century.485 In this context, the existing regulations, the risk of shareholder
suits, the threat of personal liability of the directors, may create a risky environment for
the corporations. The threat of conviction should be daunting, as a conviction could be
devastating, as it might lead to huge lawyers’ fees, and damage reputation.486 However,
there are continental law countries that have up until now failed to successfully and
effectively integrate corporate criminal law into their legal system,487 thus showing a
certain degree of ignorance with regards to the following two very important elements.
First, there has been a shift, from the individual perpetrator to the tortuous behaviour of
corporations, in particular large scale corporations; and, second, these types of crimes
have become international, reaching far beyond national borders.488 Reasons for this
‘ignorance’ in Europe and elsewhere have been such countries’ upholding the tenet that
a corporation lacks a guilty mind (mens rea), moral blameworthiness, and physical
presence, as well as their application of the ultra vires doctrine.489 These remarks lead to
the following question: Can a company, as an artificial person, be held guilty of a crime
and, consequently, criminally liable?
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3. 4 Corporate Criminal Liability
An act or omission can constitute a crime.490 Belief, from a legal point of view, cannot
be characterised as a crime. However, an act, as an element of social demonstration,
cannot be only a self governed, self limited move, without any further societal
consequences. The criminal result or consequence of an act is the effect arising out of
the criminal conduct, an act which is caused by the defendant, and prohibited by law.491
The causation between the act — or the omission of an act — and its effect on the
external world is the actual relationship between the conduct of the offender and the
criminal result, that is, the cause and effect.492 The causal relationship is an essential
condition for the responsibility of the offender for the act. In this context, this societal
act consists of the following elements: a) a self governed physical move, b) which
changes (affects) external space (natural result), and c) the emergence of the natural
result to the creation of a new ‘social relationship’ between the person (offender) and
the lawful good affected (societal result). These three elements (externalisation, natural
result, societal result) match as a functional entity: the first element produces naturally
the second, which produces socially the third.493
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Corporate criminal liability does not concern the rights of the individuals in the
company (for example, directors), except for specified cases in law, such as crimes
relating to company constitutions and other documents494 and crimes relating to the
formation of company capital during the phase of its incorporation.495 As Bronitt points
out, penal law (in common and continental law) follows the axiom according to which
an act does not make the person guilty, his mind does so.496 As a consequence, a crime
in penal law requires three elements: a) actus reus, which is a criminal act or an illegal
omission of an act, b) mens rea, which refers to the mental elements involved, such as
the defendant’s intent; and c) the causality between the mind of the offender and the
result of the criminal act.497
Actus Reus –The Material Part of a Crime
The ‘material’ part of the crime — that is, the physical act or omission, which affects
the external world — constitutes the starting point of the act with which penal law is
concerned.498 As a consequence, when the wrongdoer fulfils, through a physical act or
omission, one of the standardised descriptions of violations in the penal code, this
violation constitutes the basic indication that he or she has committed a crime and
consequently, the act is condemned by law as initially ‘wrong’.499
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Mens Rea – The Subjective Status of a Crime
Since the illegal act is created by human will, its description in the penal code should
contain not only the physical or omission, but the subjective element (belief) as well.500
In an objective system of penal law, the interest of penal law is initiated by the result of
human acts, the crime, however, cannot be structured only on this. To do so would
result in a penal system of objective penal responsibility. In this context and in order to
have penal responsibility, the harmful result alone is insufficient.501 This result must be
not only objectively human work (actus reus), but in addition, it has to be work also
connected subjectively to the person that has objectively caused it (subjective causality).
As a consequence, a basic principle of penal law has become ‘nulla poena sine culpa’.
It means that the conjunction of act-result that objectively structures the act should be
covered subjectively by the knowledge as well as the will or at least culpable ignorance
for the wrongdoer’s socially rejected act.502 This subjective conjunction of the
wrongdoer’s psycho-intellectual world with the result that brought to the external world
his/her act or omission constitutes the element of mens rea.503
The majority of countries (such as Australia,504 the United Arab Emirates,505 Yemen506
and the United States) impose criminal liability on companies, while others (such as
Germany) have refused to penalise companies’ criminal behaviour on the basis of
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‘societas delinquere non potest’, that is, ‘a legal entity cannot be blameworthy’.507 Such
countries have opted to regulate corporate actions through civil and administrative
laws.508 Some scholars argue that criminal law is the most viable and effective way of
influencing behaviour by rational actors; therefore, criminal prosecution is the most
effective manner of influencing corporate actors.509
3.4.1

Legal Doctrines with Regard to Corporate Criminal Liability

Corporate liability is a matter of great importance, due to the impact that such social
misconduct might have. It may involve a great variety of areas, such as economic crime,
price fixing, environmental safety, and so on. Corporate misconduct may have a
localised or a large scale effect.510 However, the idea of a separate legal entity with the
concept of legal liability is difficult to match. Two legal doctrines have been developed
as to how legal capacity should be attributed to non physically existing corporations.511
3.4.1.1 The Doctrine of Indirect Liability
This doctrine supports the idea that the corporation is held indirectly liable for the acts
or omissions of its agents. It has been developed by common law, based on civil law.512
According to this theory, the employer can be held liable for the offending conduct of
its employees, acting within the scope of their employment. The indirect (vicarious)
criminal liability is established by reference to the wrongdoer’s blameworthiness,
507
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irrespective to his/her position, on the basis of the following three characteristics.513
Firstly, the defendant must be in a legal relationship which gives rise to vicarious
liability (for example, principal–agent relationship); secondly, the commission or
omission of an act must have been committed during the course of their employment or
within the scope of their authority; and thirdly, it must be shown that the agent had to
have the state of mind capable of committing the tortuous action or omission.514 This
approach, for example, has been followed in Australia by the High Court in R v
Australasian Films Limited and Anor (1921) 29 CLR 195, where the corporation was
charged with offences under the Customs Act of 1901 (Cth) and was imposed a fine of
£100 for wrongful misconduct by one of its employees. The court upheld that the
corporation should be responsible for the acts done by its agents in the course of their
employment.515 This approach is illustrated in the KSA by the criminal judgment of the
Board of Grievance (Diwa>n Al-Maz{al> im / )ديوان المظالم.516
3.4.1.2 The Legal Doctrine of Direct or Primary Responsibility
According to this doctrine, the corporation is held criminally liable directly, rather than
being held responsible for the acts of its employees. As a consequence, the acts or
conduct constituting an offence are considered as acts of the corporation, in accordance
with the principles laid down in Tesco Ltd v Nattrass [1972] AC 153, as part of the
‘directing mind’ of the corporation. Although a corporation is not considered as a
human being, academics and the courts (as confirmed by court decisions) have
513
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considered that it could be held liable for committing a wide range of offences such as
violations of consumer protection laws and manslaughter crimes.517
The famous English case that adopted the direct liability approach was the 1915
Lenard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd case.518 The cargo on a steamship
was destroyed due to a fire caused by a vessel defect. The owner of the corporation,
Lenard, was held responsible for the management of the ship, and considered to be ‘the
brain’ of the corporation, although he did not know anything about the defectiveness of
the ship. The House of Lords upheld that the corporation was directly responsible.519
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Corporations have emerged as key players in various economic sectors.520 With the
rapid development of technology and the increasing liberalisation of trade, it has
become possible for corporations to violate directly or indirectly many of the provisions
of criminal, civil, or administrative laws.521 As a consequence, there was a growing
trend in both criminal and civil law, which has ‘forced’ them since 1897522 to recognise
corporations as legal persons and thus hold them criminally liable for their
misconduct.523
3. 5 Corporate Crime in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA)
3.5.1

Brief History of Corporate Crimes in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

The rapid industrial expansion of the KSA has been the result of oil exploitation, as well
as growth in the sectors of agriculture, tourism, and urbanism.524 Given, however, the
existing autocracy, which has been the traditional form of rule in the KSA, many
opportunities for corruption and corporate crime arose.525 Leaders in the KSA have been
taking advice from councils, consisting of various elders and advisers, many of them
from among the leader’s family. As a consequence, decision taking procedures have not
been transparent, not only in the public, but also in the private sector, where connections
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have played a most important role.526 As a consequence, high ranking members of the
hierarchy have been unwilling to be held accountable for business decisions.
As underlined above, provisions of sections 229, 230 and 231 of Companies Law 1965
(Niz}am
> Asharaikaat / ( )نظام الشركاتCL’65)527 deal with certain types of corporate
misconduct.528 Moreover, there are other set of rules dealing with such cases. For

> Mukafah}at Arashwah / )نظام مكافحة الرشوة
instance, Anti Bribery Law 1992 (Niz}am
(ABL’92).529
Although the KSA has not, to date, had a written penal code, companies can be held
liable for wrongful misconduct, under criminal laws and regulations such as the
ABL’92.
Sections 19, 20 and 21 of the ABL’92 provide for a fine of an amount 10 times the
value of the bribe for any company or artificial person, where employees are found
guilty and where it is proven that the crime was committed in the interest of the
corporation. There are also some consequential penalties that may be applied to the
corporation under sections 19 and 21, as follows:
i.

The company will be deprived of government procurement contracts, if its
directors or any of its representatives are convicted of bribery.

ii.

The Cabinet may take any further appropriate measure regarding the company.

iii.

The conviction shall be made public in a daily newspaper.

526

Shahid N Bhuian, 'An Empirical Examination of Market Orientation in Saudi Arabian Manufacturing
Companies' (1998) 43(1) Journal of Business Research 13, 15.
527
The Companies Law 1965 (Niz}am
> Asharaikaat / ( )نظام الشركاتCL’65) was enacted by Royal Decree
No M/6 issued on 22 Rabi>‘ al-awwal 1385 AH (21 July 1965).
528
For more analysis of corporate misconduct under the CL’65, see Chapters 4 and 5.
529
Anti Bribery Law 1992 (ABL’92) was issued by Royal Decree No M/36 of 29 Dhul-h}ijjah 1412 AH
(30 June 1992).

144

Ch 3: Corporate Crime

This approach is illustrated at the criminal judgment of the Board of Grievance (Diwa>n

Al-Maz{al> im / )ديوان المظالم:530 the financial and administrative manager in a company
offered an amount of SAR 150,000 (approximately USD 40,000)531 to a public official
in one of the Ministries. The objective was to induce him to issue an illegal permit to
operate a business to the said company. The public official refused to accept this bribe
and informed the authority concerned of the matter. The accused, who appeared before
the Board of Grievance, confessed that he had offered this amount to the public official
in accordance with a verbal order from the manager of the said company. The Board of
Grievance convicted him and passed its judgment based on sections 9, 15 and 19 of the
ABL’92 as follows.
First, the financial and administrative manager of the company involved was found
guilty of the charge filed against him, and sentenced to one year’s imprisonment in
addition to a fine of SAR 50,000 (approximately USD 13,000). Second, the amount of
the bribe was to be confiscated. Third, the company was fined SAR 300,000
(approximately USD 80,000), because the employee who offered the bribe was acting in
the interest of the company, since his aim was to obtain the permit requested by the
company. The employee involved was also a member and representative of the
company. This case demonstrates that the court held the company— as a legal person in
the KSA — vicariously liable under the ABL’92 for the commission of a criminal
offence, for the following reasons: (i) the company had an interest in obtaining the
certificate requested; (ii) the said employee was a mere representative of the company
and executing its will in offering the bribe to obtain the said certificate; and (iii) the said
employee had no personal interest in the matter and that the sole party who had an
530
531
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interest was the company. Therefore, the company deserved to be punished by
application of the ABL’92. Thus, this case proves that a company in the KSA can be
held responsible for a criminal act by one of its employees, if this act took place within
the scope of his/her employment, and if the company stood to gain from the employee’s
actions.
Further offending conducts may be punished, if they fall under the regulatory field of
laws that regulate environment, such as the General Environmental Law 2001532 and the
Labour Law 2005.533
3.5.2

Corporate Crime Rate in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA)

There are no exact statistics that reflect corporate crimes rate in the KSA. Even without
exact statistics, however, corporate crime (such as embezzlement of funds, drug
trafficking, business fraud and bribery) is of serious concern to the KSA.534 In addition,
the country faces a problem difficult to combat with regards to money-laundering used
to finance terrorism, and other corporate crimes.535 The KSA itself has, moreover,
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the causes and impacts of the offence, and the entity involved (a company) may be closed permanently or
temporarily. General Environmental Law 2002 was enacted by Royal Decree No M/34 of 28 Rajab 1422
AH (16 October 2001).
533
Section 222 of the said law, states that ‘no case shall be accepted by the commissions provided for in
this law, involving a claim of the rights provided for in this law, or arising from a work contract after
twelve months following termination of the work relation’. With regards to Labour Law 2005, related
claims are lapsed (will be time-barred) after 12 months from the date of violation as provided in section
222. In addition, the said section states that any right provided in Labour Law 2005 will be time-barred
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acknowledged that the country has also become a transit centre for organised arms
smuggling.536
It is important to point out that there are companies in the KSA that commit corporate
crimes. For example, Saudi Arabia-based Tamimi Global Company Ltd (TAFGA) paid
a fine on account of its corporate criminal activity.537 As result of corporate crimes, the
KSA has closely worked with many countries to combat them. Furthermore, the country
established programs to deal with the problems associated with organised crime.
Therefore, there seem to be a tentative acceptance of corporate criminal liability for
illegal act such as money-laundering and bribery in the KSA. With a view to better
combating forms of corporate crime, according to this writer’s view, there is a need for
strict liability offences.538
3. 6 Punishing Corporate Crime
Is a Penalty Justifiable for Corporate Crime?
The criminal sanctions for a corporate crime can be on both individuals and corporate
entities. The penalties include imprisonment, fines and denial of certain legal privileges
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Salinger, above n 525, 46.
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(such as a licence) and so forth.539 Hence legal sanctions may terminate the business.540
However, the penalties should depend on the type of illicit activity committed.541
Many corporations like Costain Coal Inc, C R Bard Inc and Odwalla Inc have caused
deaths, yet the penalties that have been imposed on them were limited to a fine.542
Although corporate crime has continuously been increasing, governments have not been
taking drastic steps to combat such crimes.543
Instead of complying with the relevant laws and supporting the legislators and
governments recommendations, policies and solutions that attempt to ensure the support
and protection of people’s rights,544 many companies either in the KSA or overseas have
committed corporate crimes such as bribery, false advertising, fraud, use of unsafe
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manufacturing processes and adopted practices that comprise an abuse of human
rights.545
In order to protect their own advantage around the world, governments may ignore
human rights, preferring instead to maintain trade advantages. This naturally means the
presence of less government support to address corporate crime.546 It is evidenced that
many corporate crimes are compensated by fines alone, depending on many factors such
as strength of evidence, seriousness of the crime, and the availability of other types of
penalties, while criminal sanctions may be last resort for serious violations of corporate
regulations.547
3. 7 Conclusions
Within the context of better enhancing growth and competitiveness in the market,
corporate law plays a very important role. It provides, in particular, the means whereby
companies can develop their functional role with a view to forming the conditions and
the rules for economic transactions in the market. This objective should be specified by
a coherent and solid legal framework for corporate criminal liability.
Corporate crimes occur at high frequency across the globe. High level personnel often
take decisions, driven by their will to achieve for their company the best results in terms
of market dominance or profit maximisation. In this context, the question of discerning
‘who to blame’ becomes a difficult task. Employees claim that ‘I was following the
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rules’ with a view to reducing the individual’s responsibility within the corporate
institution.
The provisions of the legislation, such as that in force in the United States, impose
penalties on the companies for the corporate crimes they commit.548 These penalties
may be fines and/or an imprisonment. During the past decades, however, praxis has
demonstrated the strength of penalties that may be needed to create a truly effective
deterrent preventative system, such as in the UK system.549 Corporate lobbying and their
ability to influence legislative frameworks are so well developed that such entities are
still able to commit severe crimes and often escape with relatively small fines.550
There exist countries and parts of countries which have become politically sensitive to
such kind of crimes. In Australia, for instance, the Law Reform Commission of New
South Wales has pointed out that:
Corporate crime poses a significant threat to the welfare of the community.
Given the pervasive presence of corporations in a wide range of activities in
our society, and the impact of their actions on a much wider group of people
than are affected by individual action, the potential for both economic and
physical harm caused by a corporation is great.551
Other countries, however, such as continental law countries, have failed to integrate
corporate criminal law into their legal system.552

548

Daniel Huynh, 'Preemption v. Punishment: A Comparative Study of White Collar Crime Prosecution
in the United States and the United Kingdom' (2010) 9(1) Journal of International Business and Law 105,
133.
549
Ibid 133–5.
550
For a very interesting article on the lobbying power of multinational corporations, see Mokhiber,
‘Twenty Things You Should Know about Corporate Crime’ [Paper], above n 479.
551
See Law Reform Commission of New South Wales, Sentencing: Corporate Offenders, Issues Paper 20
(2001) <http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lrc.nsf/pages/ip20chp01>.
552
Manfred Möhrenschlager, 'Development on an International Level' (Paper presented at the
International Colloquium on Criminal Responsibility of Legal and Collective Entities, Berlin, Germany,
4–6 May 1998) 1.

150

Ch 3: Corporate Crime

With regards to the implementation of legal schema for corporate criminal liability, the
KSA has included provisions related to corporate criminal liability in their legal system.
There are many provisions related to criminal liability in the KSA; however, they are
not confined to general criminal law but are scattered over a plethora of statutes with
specific provisions, such as the CL’65 and the ABL’92.
Corporations can commit the same offences as natural persons. Given, however, the fact
that governments rely on them for the economic development of their countries, the
question of how to regulate corporate behaviour becomes highly complicated due to
intrigues and conspiracies elaborated by the elite networks of strong multinational
corporations.553 As a result, many perpetrators of corporate crimes often believe they
will not be detected.554
In legal terms, corporate crime is under prosecuted in many countries, such as Australia,
the United States, the United Kingdom, China555 and the KSA. The companies that are
finally prosecuted are just ‘the small tip of the big iceberg of corporate wrongdoing’.556
Prosecutors, however, should be strict, and corporations should be prosecuted and
convicted for the same general offences as individuals and subject to the same general
rules of criminal liability. Only severe penalties, together with media attention may
compel corporations to improve their practices.557
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Corporate criminal liability is one of the significant tools governments can use to
prevent corporate crimes.558 By imposing corporate criminal liability by adopting
legislative, judicial, administrative or other effective measures, each government can
tackle this growing problem. International cooperation should be enhanced to ensure
that an integrated and concerted effort is made by States to eradicate this crime.
Corporate crime is still an obscure subject, especially in the KSA. Moreover, there are
neither exact statistics that reflect corporate crime rates, nor official data that has been
gathered in the KSA on the harm and cost caused by corporate crime. Thus, more
qualitative and quantitative analyses of corporate crime are needed in the KSA. The
efforts of the KSA’s government to combat corporate crime (specifically during the
phase of incorporation of a corporation in the KSA) will be analysed through the two
following chapters.
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Chapter 4
4 Crimes Relating to the Company Constitution and other Documents
during the Incorporation Phase
4. 1 Introduction
Corporate crimes might take forms which render them difficult to combat or control.559
They may not even be considered as ‘crimes’ under the provisions of traditional penal
laws, a fact which makes it incumbent upon the country’s lawmakers to create relevant,
accurate legal rules with a view to better governing the work of companies.560 Crimes,
such as the ones committed at the initial stage of a company’s incorporation phase, may
have detrimental consequences for domestic investment as far as the presence of this
company in the market is concerned. For example, they can damage investor
confidence, destroy the company’s reputation and, as a consequence, lead to a rather
reduced capital investment and clientele.561
Corporate crimes are regulated in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) by the
Companies Law 1965 (Niz}am
> Asharikaat / ( )نظام الشركاتCL’65), which is concerned
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with the procedures for the incorporation, operation, termination or dissolution of these
companies. However, despite the development of capital markets, and the shrinking of
state intervention in the functioning of the market, the establishment of rules governing
economic activities, as well as the establishment of rational and efficient criminal law
provisions, remains a desideratum.
Corporate crimes committed during the phase of incorporation of a company may be
related either to its constitution or to any other documents issued by a company.
Generally, the so called ‘constitutional documents’ of the company are the fundamental
documents which govern its internal structure and organisation as well as its interaction
with the outside world.562 They comprise the company’s Memorandum of Association
(MoA) and its Articles of Association (AoA).563 Company laws in the Arab countries,
including the KSA, have not used the terms ‘constitution’ or ‘constitutional documents’
of the company as has been the practice in legislation in common law countries, such as
the Corporations Act 2001 of Australia564 and the Companies Act 2006 of the United
Kingdom.565
Accordingly, the CL’65 does not mention the terms ‘constitution’ or ‘constitutional
documents’ within its provisions. However, many of its provisions refer to an MoA and
an AoA and prohibit various forms of crimes related to them. Therefore, it could be
argued that the CL’65 demonstrates a great concern for the MoA and the AoA as
constitutional documents.
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To this end, the MoA and AoA of a company are legal documents which are prepared
and published by a company with a view to better govern the internal and external
affairs as well as the activities of a company.566 The company may also issue other
important documents during the phase of its incorporation.567 Despite, however, the
interest that the CL’65 has shown in these documents, the existing legal provisions
appear to be inadequate, calling the effectiveness of the sanctions provided into
question.
This chapter has a twofold approach. Firstly, it examines the nature of corporate crimes
committed during the initial stage of setting up a company as far as the two company
documents of a ‘constitutional’ nature are concerned, that is, the MoA and AoA.
Secondly, any document issued or submitted by the company during the same stage of
incorporation (such as the application for incorporation of a company) will be
highlighted. In particular, it analyses which actions constitute violations of the CL’65,
as well as which persons can commit them. It describes, further, the sanctions that can
be imposed by the CL’65, and concludes with an overview of the effectiveness of the
judicial system in dealing with corporate crimes committed at the initial phase of the
company’s incorporation with regard to the said documents.
The analysis that follows in this chapter is divided into six sections. Section 4.1
introduces the chapter; section 4.2 highlights crimes relating to the incorporation of a
company; section 4.3 sketches the forms of crimes related to company constitution and
other documents during the phase of its incorporation; section 4.4 identifies the persons
responsible for crimes related to company constitution and other documents committed
566
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during the phase of incorporation of a company; section 4.5 discusses the penalties for
corporate crimes during the phase of incorporation of a company that are related to
company constitution or any other documents under the CL’65; and the chapter’s
conclusions are drawn in section 4.6.
4. 2 Crimes Relating to the Incorporation of a Company
Corporate crimes committed during the phase of incorporation of a company may be
related either to the documents of a constitutional nature, or to other relevant
documents, issued during such phase. These documents, as subjects of crime as
provided under the CL’65, are discussed below.
4.2.1

Company Constitution as Subject of Crimes Relating to the Incorporation
of a Company

The extent of possible crimes related to such company constitutions depends, amongst
other things, on what was requested for delivery and by whom, as they may be
requested either by company members or by third parties involved in commercial
transactions with the company.568 These constitutions are addressed below.
4.2.1.1 The Memorandum of Association (MoA) of a Company
The term ‘contract’, contained in section 229(1) of the CL’65, refers to the MoA of the
company, which is submitted by the founders569 (promoters) to a notary with a view to
completing the required process of its incorporation.570
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Crimes relating to company incorporation will be analysed in Chapter 5.
See section 2.3.2.1 of Chapter 2 concerning the identification of ‘founder’.
570
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SPC, the managers and the Board of Directors shall declare an MoA of a company and whatever
569

156

Ch 4: Crimes during Incorporation – Company Constitution and Other Documents

The CL’65 provides that the MoA of a company must contain an accurate presentation
of a number of standard pieces of information. The aim of the CL’65 is to ensure that a
third party571 interested in the company is given information related to the company’s
profile. The information contained demonstrates, firstly, that the company exists as a
legal person and, secondly, that the company’s managers572 and the Board of
Directors573 can be held criminally liable.574 It is to be noted that the particulars that the
CL’65 requires to be satisfied for the incorporation of every kind of company are the
minimum and not exhaustive. Therefore, parties may add to the MoA of the company
any other particulars required by the nature and activity of the company. Hence, the
scope of criminal liability for the MoA of the company as a document is extended to all
particulars, be they the minimum ones, as provided by the CL’65, or those added by the
parties. The content varies depending on the type of company, as follows.
General Partnership Company (Sharikat Atad}amun / ( ) شركة التضامنGPC)
Section 22 of the CL’65 requires that the MoA of such a company shall include an
abstract of the following:
i.

The name of the company, its object, its head office, as well as its branches, if
any;

ii.

Members’ names, residential addresses, occupations and nationalities;

amendments are rising thereto in accordance with the provisions of this law. If the MoA is not declared as
aforementioned, it shall not be valid against third parties’. See also Kouman and Hamid, above n 104, 20.
The rationale behind the precondition of ‘writing’ is to force parties to formulate their plans before
starting the formation of a company, In this way, parties may retain the rights (such as relative rights of
any class of shares, the number of shares of each class and profit and loss distribution) existing prior to
incorporation.
571
See section 2.2.1 of Chapter 2 concerning the identification of third party.
572
See section 2.3.2.2 of Chapter 2 concerning the identification of manager.
573
See section 2.3.2.1 of Chapter 2 concerning the identification of a member of Board of Directors.
574
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 11.
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iii.

Amount of the company’s capital with sufficient details concerning the
contribution that each member has undertaken to make as well as the date on
which it becomes payable;

iv.

Names of the managers and the people authorised to sign on behalf of the
company;

v.

Date of commencement of the company as well as how long the company will
exist; and

vi.

Beginning and end of the company’s financial year.

Limited

Partnership

Company

(Sharikat

Ataws}yah

Albas}yt}ah

/

( )شركة التوصية البسيطةLPC)
Section 39 of the CL’65 states that the MoA of the LPC has to have an abstract that
includes the information stated in section 22 of the CL’65, as prescribed above. In
addition, it requires the following information to be included:
i.

The names of the general partners, excluding the limited partners; and

ii.

The amount of capital that was or is to be collected from the limited partners,
because the limited partner’s liability is determined by the value of their shares in
the capital.

Silent Partnership Company (Sharikat Almah}as}ah / ( )شركة المحاصةSPC)
According to sections 10, 11 and 13 of the CL’65, the MoA of such company does not
have to be written or declared. Therefore, it could be argued that there is no particular
information prescribed for inclusion in the MoA of such a company.
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Joint Stock Company (Sharikat Almusahamh / ( )شركة المساھمةJSC)
The CL’65 does not state the information that must be included in the MoA of a JSC.
However, according to the information that is mentioned in relation to the MoAs of all
companies other than JSCs, and in accordance with sections 55 and 65 of the CL’65, the
information that must be included in the MoA of a JSC can be restricted to the
following:
i.

Names of founders, their place of residence, occupations and nationalities;

ii.

Name of the company, its object and head office;

iii.

Amount of the paid capital, kind of stocks, their value and number, the amount
offered for public subscription, the number subscribed by the founders and the
restrictions imposed on transfer of stocks along with sufficient description
(depending upon the category of shares involved) of every kind of shares and the
rights pertaining to them;

iv.

Method of profits and losses distribution;

v.

Statement pertaining to the shares in kind, the rights prescribed for them, the
special privileges for the founders and third parties;

vi.

Information about the non-cash shares, all conditions relating to their contribution
and the name of the contributors;

vii.

Duration of the company (which starts from date of issuance of the Royal Decree
licensing the company’s establishment, or the date of registration in the
Commercial Register, and its publication, as the case may be); and
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viii. A statement of at least the approximate amount of expenses, wages and costs
which the company undertakes to pay as a result of its incorporation, irrespective
of the subject of these expenses, costs, or wages.
Limited Liability Company (Asharikah dhat Almasw’liah Almah}dudah / الشركة ذات
( )المسؤولية المحدودةLLC)
According to section 161 of the CL’65, the MoA of such companies must include the
following information:
i.

Kind, name, object and real seat of the company;

ii.

Names of the partners, their places of residence, occupations and nationalities;

iii.

Names of managers, whether they are partners or non partners, if they are named
in the company MoA;

iv.

Names of members of the supervisory board,575 if any;

v.

The amount of the capital and the amount of contribution of the shareholders in
cash and kind as well as a detailed description of the contributions in-kind, their
value and names of the contributors in kind;

vi.

A statement by the partners that all the capital shares have been allotted and paid
up;

vii.

Method of distribution of profits;

viii. Dates of the commencement and expiration of the company; and

575

See design of supervisory board in section 2.3.2.2 in Chapter 2.
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ix.

Form of the notices to be served by the company on the parties.

Company Limited by Shares (Sharikat Ataws}yah Bilashum / )شركة التوصية باألسھم
(CLS)
Section 151 of the CL’65 states that the information that must be included in the MoA
of a CLS. This includes the following:
i.

The name of the company, consisting of the name of one or more of the general
partners coupled with a statement that indicates the existence of a company, and
not the name of the limited partners;

ii.

Names of general partners, their place of residence, and nationalities;

iii.

Names of the general partners who were appointed as managers of the company;

iv.

The amount of the company capital, which is distinguished by its type, namely
whether it takes the form of ‘quotas’ in respect of general partners and the form,
and ‘shares’ for shareholders;

v.

Determination of the object of the company and its duration and kind; and

vi.

The distribution of the shares between the shareholders — and the start and end of
the company’s fiscal year.

Company with Variable Capital (Asharikah dhat Ra’salmalalqabillitaghyyr / الشركة
( )ذات رأس المال القابل للتغييرCVC)
As stated in section 183 of the CL’65, a company can be considered as a CVC only if its
MoA or AoA provides that its capital can be increased or decreased without any further
conditions. Therefore, it cannot be argued that there are specific particulars to be
covered by the MoA of a company with variable capital.
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Ata‘‘wunyah / ( )الشركة التعاونيةCC)
Cooperative Company (Asharikah Ata
Section 199 of the CL’65 states that the MoA or AoA of a CC has to contain the
following information:
i.

The conditions for admission of new members, including withdrawal and
expulsion of parties;

ii.

The extent of the additional liability of parties for the company’s debts in case of
its bankruptcy or insolvency; and

iii.

Determination of the percentage that would be distributed from the profit to the
parties and method of distributing the return on the transactions.

4.2.1.2 The Articles of Association (AoA) of a Company
The AoA regulates all aspects of the corporation’s intra company relationships,576 and
must be signed by the founders.577 It contains a variety of topics, among them issues
related to: (i) different rights attached to different classes of shares, (ii) the appointment
of directors, (iii) the quorum and percentage of vote,578 (iv) management decisions, (v)
assignment rights of the founders or other members of the company, (vi) the procedures
regulating the composition of General Meetings (GMs), (vii) the conditions of the
validity of the session to take decisions, all the particulars about the company fiscal
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year, stocktaking / inventory, budget, reserve funds, and the distribution of profits and
losses to shareholders and those with founders’ shares.579
Both an MoA and an AoA are written and signed by the founders/promoters who
present them to the public when offering the opportunity for subscription to the
company’s capital.580
Two Particular Types of Companies Regarding the Articles of Association (AoA):
Joint Stocks Company (Sharikat Almusahamh / ( )شركة المساھمةJSC) and Company
Limited by Shares (Sharikat Ataws}yah Bilashum / ( )شركة التوصية باألسھمCLS)
The CL’65 attains particular importance for two types of companies as far as the form
of their AoA is concerned. In particular, section 51 of the CL’65 provides that the
Minister of Commerce and Industry shall issue a decree incorporating a standard form
for the AoA of a JSC and no departure from such form shall be allowed except for
reasons acceptable to the said Minister. Also, section 51(2) of the CL’65 provides that
the Minister of Commerce and Industry shall issue a decree incorporating a standard
form for the AoA of a CLS, and no departure from such form will be allowed except for
reasons acceptable to the said Minister.
The obligations imposed by such fixed forms demonstrate the importance that the
lawmaker in the KSA attributes to these two types of companies, given that their
structure and their responsibility limited through shares make these two company types
suitable for significant investment. As a consequence, the founders shall not be entitled
to introduce any amendments to the AoA in the interval between the subscription and
the convening of the Constituent Meeting which is responsible for confirming the
579

See Al-Qlywby, above n 259, 537; Alghamdi and Hosni, above n 160, 256 and 257.
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) ss 52, 151, 155. For more, see Taha, Commercial Corporations 2007,
above n 196, 170.
580
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validity of the establishment procedures and approval of the AoA. If it is necessary to
introduce amendments to the company’s AoA, so as to ensure that it corresponds to the
provisions of the CL’65, or to the standard form issued by the Minister of Commerce
and Industry in accordance with sections 51 and 151(2) of the CL’65, the founders must
wait for the convening of the Constituent Meeting. During this meeting, they can
present the matter and request the Companies General Department (Al’idarah Al‘aamah

Liasharikaat / (( اإلدارة العامة للشركاتCGD) in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry to
introduce the amendments that the CGD will approve according to the power granted to
it by the CL’65.581
4.2.2

Other Documents as Subjects of Crimes Relating to the Incorporation of a
Company

In order to further comprehend the rationale of the provisions establishing criminal
liability, the notion of ‘document’ attains particular importance. A ‘document’ is
generally considered to be: (i) every written means having the aim of proving a fact that
has legal signification, or every photocopy of that written means, (ii) every means used
by computer in order to save, produce or reproduce means that cannot be directly read,
(iii) every magnetic, electronic or other means, in which any kind of information,
picture, symbol or sound is written, individually or in combination, since the said means
aim prove facts that have legal signification.582 As a consequence, objects that do not
integrate human thinking are not considered ‘documents’. In addition, the ‘documents’
should fulfill the following three functions. First, a document must provide continuity,

581

Section 62(2) of the CL’65 states that the Constituent Meeting has competence to draw up final
stipulations of the AoA, however, the Constituent Meeting may not introduce essential amendments to
such AoA presented before it, save with the approval of all underwriters represented in it.
582
Ross Wilkinson, Document Computing: Technologies for Managing Electronic Document Collections
(Springer, 1998) 3, 4; Bruce Duyshart, The Digital Document: A Reference for Architects, Engineers, and
Design Professionals (Architectural Press, 1997) 8–20.
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which means that the human thinking in a written form may be able to be reproduced at
any time, with a view to using it as a proof. Second, it must act as a guarantee, which
assures the existence of an ‘editor’ (‘creator’), that is, a person bound by what is
‘engraved’ on the material carrier.583 A document that has no ‘editor’ cannot be
recognised as something that can have legal consequences. Third, it must function as a
proof, which means that the material means aims to prove a fact, which has legal
importance. Documents may be in hard paper/copy form, and they can, also, be in soft
or electronic form (via email, pdf, web-based materials, and so forth).584
According to section 229(1) of the CL’65, the documents mentioned in this section
constitute only a minimum, as demonstrated by the section itself, which ends with the
phrase ‘or in other company documents’. In this way, ‘any other documents’ could
comprise documents resulting from business transactions in their many and various
current forms or any product of further future development in technology and
communication systems, such as new forms of technologically produced documents or
document equivalents. Therefore, other documents — such as receipts, invoices,
vouchers, or books that have the company within their subject matter (‘commercial
books’) and documents of propaganda (such as advertising, media releases) that
announce anticipated or fictitious profits — issued by a company during its
incorporation shall fall within the provisions of section 229 of the CL’65. Thus, it can
be argued that, any crime related to such documents (as detailed above) shall be subject
to the application of the provisions of section 229(1) and the offender who commits
such crimes will be penalised under section 229 of the CL’65.

583

David Austerberry, Digital Asset Management (Focal Press, 2004) 24.
Association for Educational Communications and Technology, Quarterly Review of Distance
Education (Information Age Publishing, 2002) 276; Duyshart, above n 582, 8–20.
584
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Two Particular Types of Other Documents Issued by a Company during its
Incorporation: Joint Stocks Company (Sharikat Almusahamh / ( )شركة المساھمةJSC)
and Company Limited by Shares (Sharikat Ataws}yah Bilashum / )شركة التوصية باألسھم
(CLS)
Corporate crimes committed during the phase of the incorporation of a company may
involve one of the company documents, other than its constitution, that may be issued
by a company during that stage. Although the CL’65 does not contain provisions
outlining the formulation of other company documents, it does give two examples.
These are (i) the application for incorporation a company and (ii) the prospectus for
incorporation of a company, as presented below.
i.

The Application for Incorporation of a Company

The founders of a company must lodge an application with the Ministry of Commerce
and Industry in order to obtain a licence585 for the company’s incorporation. It should be
noted that the application for company incorporation is required only for JSCs and
CLSs.586 Such a company can therefore only be incorporated in accordance with a
government licence.587
Section 52 of the CL’65 restricts incorporation of some JSCs (as mentioned in Chapter
2), however, to an authorisation that derives from a Royal Decree based on the approval
of the Council of Ministers and the recommendation of the Minister of Commerce and
Industry with due regard to the provisions of the laws, while other JSCs can be
585

In general, the type of licence depends on a number of factors, such as the company type, the duration
of the involvement, and the nature of the transactions. A licence is a step that precedes incorporation of a
company. So, the company cannot be incorporated except pursuant to the licence granted by a Royal
Decree or the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. See Companies Law 1965 (KSA) ss 52, 155. Also,
see Embassy of Swizerland, ‘Saudi Arabia: Legal Provision’ OSEC Business Network Switzerland
September 2010 <http://www.osec.ch/internet/osec/de/home/export/countries/sa/export.-ContentSlot66770-ItemList-11817-File.File.pdf/GB_1009_E_LegalProvision_KSA.pdf>.
586
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) ss 52, 155.
587
After the government licence is issued.
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established only by a licence issued by the Minister of Commerce and Industry, as has
been mentioned earlier.588 In this regard, the provisions of the JSC apply to the CLS in
relation to the incorporation, except for the provisions stated in section 52 of the CL’65
on licensing JSCs by Royal Decree.589
It can be argued that the requirement for obtaining an approval from the Ministry of
Commerce and Industry before the incorporation of a company is a positive step, and
reflects the government’s awareness with regards to the role the Ministry plays in the
Saudi Arabian economy: its fast response times and limited bureaucracy constitute an
advantage for all companies that want to invest. This condition achieves a good level of
control over the procedures of incorporation and prevents the incorporation of
fraudulent companies, thereby protecting the public and saving them from some forms
of fraud that vitiate the incorporation of companies.
Consequently, the application for incorporation of the company is one of the important
documents covered by the criminal liability provisions under section 229(1) of the
CL’65, which provides a penal sanction if false information is supplied in the company
documents.
ii.

The Prospectus for Incorporation of a Company

According to section 56 of the CL’65, subscription in the capital of a JSC should remain
open for a period of not less than 10 days and not exceeding 90 days, and the company
shall not be incorporated unless the whole of the capital is subscribed. If the full amount
of capital is not subscribed within this period, it is the responsibility of the Minister of

588

For more details about the basis of the distinction among JSCs in the KSA, see section 2.4.2.4 in
Chapter 2.
589
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 155.
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the Commerce and Industry to extend the period of the subscription for not more than a
further 90 days. Based on section 155 of the CL’65, this provision also applies to a
CLS. The main consideration of section 155 is that no public company may be formed
until the whole of its capital has been subscribed by the public.590 Therefore, it can be
said that, as a matter of fact, the prospectus is the most important and serious document
issued by a company during the phase of incorporation, as it constitutes an offer
addressed by the company to the public, inviting them to become shareholders and hand
over their savings with a view to obtaining a certain percentage of its shares or
ownership.591 According to section 55 of the CL’65, a company’s prospectus shall be
published in a daily newspaper distributed in the city where the company’s head office
is located at least five days prior to the date of commencement of the subscription.
Thus, no company securities may be offered for subscription except upon a prospectus
signed by the founders who had signed the application for the licence.592
It could be said that that a prospectus is a significant legal and binding agreement
between a company and its investors. It serves two purposes. First, it aims to protect
investors from untrustworthy, fraudulent or misleading statements. Second, it protects
the company itself from dishonest investors, who claim that they were not informed
about the investment, or misusing such prospectus during the investment. So, a
prospectus is one of the significant documents covered by the criminal liability
provisions under the CL’65, given that the document’s objectives are: firstly, to notify
the public of the basic terms and conditions upon which the company is operating, and
secondly, to prevent any type of fraud that may be perpetrated by the founders to

590

Formation of a company will be analysed in greater detail in Chapter 5.
Kouman and Hamid, above n 104, 21.
592
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 55.
591
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persuade the public to subscribe.593 In addition, the prospectus should achieve the
necessary transparency in order to inform the potential public subscribers about the
details of the project to be established, so that their participation can be based on a full
knowledge of the matter.594 Therefore, any person can be liable to the criminal sanctions
provided in section 229 of the CL’65 if he or she deliberately makes false statements or
statements contrary to the provisions of the CL’65.595 This includes, for example, if the
prospectus contains names of persons who are not promoters. The other information
being issued may be correct; however, its publication is contrary to section 55 of the
CL’65 if the names of those appended to it, even if real, are not those of the promotors.
Given its unlawful nature, it attracts the criminal liability.
The CL’65 took great interest in protecting subscribers through the imposition of strict
control over the marketing campaigns (or ‘propaganda’) that accompany the
establishment of companies and which do not correspond to the size of the company’s
activities, or its economic strength.596 Therefore, the CL’65 stipulates that a prospectus
shall contain the specific information as follows:597
i.

Founders’ names, occupations, nationalities and their place of residence;

ii.

Company’s name, activity and headquarters;

593

Mustafa Kamal Taha, Asharikaat Atijaryah [Commercial Corporations] (Dar Aljami‘ah Aljadydah
Lianashr, 1998) 165.
594
Mohammed Farid Al-‘urayny, Alqanwn Atijary Sharikaat Ala’mwaal [Commercial Law for Financial
Corporations] (Dar Almat}bw‘aat Aljami‘i>ah, 2001) 226.
595
For cases of untrue statements in prospectuses see R v Moses HC Auckland CRI 2009-004-1388 [2011]
NZHC 646 and R v Steigrad [2011] NZCA 304.
596
Abu Zayd Radwan, Asharikaat Atijaryah, Aljuz’ Ala’wal, Sharikaat Alashkhas} wa Dhat Almas'wlyah
Almah}dwdah [Commercial Corporations, First Part, Companies of Persons and Limited Liability
Companies] (Dar Alfikr Al‘rabi, 1988) 88.
597
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 55.
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iii.

Amount of the paid capital, class of stocks, their value, number, the amount
offered for public subscription, the number subscribed by the founders and the
restrictions imposed on negotiation of stocks;

iv.

Information concerning contributions in-kind and the rights attached to them;

v.

Special privileges granted to the founders or to others;

vi.

Manner of distribution of profits;

vii.

Estimate of the company incorporation expenses;

viii. Beginning, end, place and terms of subscription;
ix.

Manner of distribution of stocks to subscribers if the number of the subscribed
stocks exceed the number offered for subscription; and

x.

Date of issuance of the Royal Decree licensing the company’s incorporation,
number of the issue of the Official Gazette wherein it was published, this
prospectus having been signed by the founders who signed the application for the
licence.

4. 3 Forms of Crimes Relating to the Company Constitution and Other
Documents during the Phase of Its Incorporation
The legal scheme of the KSA in regards to corporate criminal liability is sketched out in
section 229 of the CL’65.598 Paragraph 1 of the said section describes the types of acts

598

The Report prepared by the United Nations on the implementation of the United Nations Declaration
against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions sketches out the brief
comparative overview of the various legal systems, including the legal system of the KSA. For example,
as the Report points out ‘in Algeria, according to section 5 of Order No. 22–96 of 9 July 1996, companies
committing breaches, such as making false statements or failing to obtain the required licences, were
penalised by fines up to fivefold the value of the damages together with the confiscation of the site of the
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or omissions that qualify as crimes relating to company constitution and other
documents, committed at the time of the company’s incorporation. In particular, section
229(1) of the CL’65 states that:
Whosoever deliberately inscribes in the company’s MoA or its AoA or in
the underwriting circulars, or in otherwise of the company documents, or in
the license application for the company incorporation, false statements or
contradictory to the provisions of the law; and whoever signs or distributes
such documents while knowing of such, shall be liable for imprisonment for
a term of not less than three months and not exceeding one year and a fine
of not less than 5000 Saudi Riyals (SAR) [approximately USD 1330] and
not exceeding SAR 20,000 [approximately USD 5330] or either or both of
these two penalties.599
According to this section, the crimes related to company constitution and other
documents can be divided into four types, which may attract two kinds of penalties and
they can be committed by any person acting on behalf of the company, as shown in
Table 4.1 (overleaf).

offence. Austrian criminal law recognized only a very limited criminal responsibility of legal persons,
since it was only possible to confiscate the proceeds of crime directly from a legal person if the legal
person had been illegally enriched (see section 20, paragraph 4, of the Penal Code). Austria also indicated
that it would shortly introduce into its legal system the responsibility of legal persons, in accordance with
the Second Protocol to the Convention on the Protection of the European Communities’ Financial
Interests of the European Union. In Cameroon, corporate managers and other employees who infringe the
penal law were liable to criminal prosecution and the corporate entity might also be held liable under civil
law. In Canada, the offence of bribing a foreign public official could be committed by any person within
the full meaning of “persons” as defined in section 2 of the Criminal Code.’ See United Nation’s
Economic and Social Council, Implementation of the United Nations Declaration against Corruption and
Bribery in International Commercial Transactions. Report of the Secretary General, UN Doc
E/CN.15/2002/6 (15 February 2002) <http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/commissions/11comm/6e.pdf>.
599
Note: all USD approximations are to the nearest dollar.
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Table 4.1: Penalties in Regard to Crimes Related to Company Constitution and Other
Documents during the Incorporation Phase of a Company: Section 229(1) of the CL’65
Crime*

Imprisonment

Crime of deliberately 3 months – 1 year
entering a false statement
in
a
company’s
constitution or any other
documents.
(statement
must
be
false
or
misleading)
Crime of deliberately 3 months – 1 year
entering statements in a
company’s constitution
or any other documents
contrary to the provisions
of the CL’65. (statement
must be contrary to the
CL’65, even though true
information)
Crime of signing a 3 months – 1 year
company’s constitution
or any other documents
that
contain
false
statements or statements
contrary to the provisions
of the CL’65
Crime of distributing a 3 months – 1 year
company’s constitution
or any other documents
containing
false
statements or statements
contrary to the provisions
of the CL’65.

Fine
SAR 5000 – SAR 20,000

Offender
Any person

(approximately
USD 1330 – USD 5330)

SAR 5000– SAR 20,000

Any person

(approximately
USD 1330 – USD 5330)

SAR 5000 – SAR 20,000

Any person

(approximately
USD 1330 – USD 5330)

SAR 5000 – SAR 20,000

Any person

(approximately
USD 1330 – USD5330)

* Crimes relating to company constitution and other documents during the phase of its incorporation
under section 229(1) of the CL’65 that are related to any person concerned. The information that has been
summarised in Table 4.1 is further discussed below.
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4.3.1

Crime of Deliberately Entering a False Statement in a Company’s
Constitution or any Other Documents

Actus Reus
This type of crime can be committed only if a person, acting on behalf of the company,
either writes down false or misleading information in the company’s constitution and/or
any other documents, that is, information that does not correspond to real facts600 or
omits to mention information that is true.
False or Misleading Information
The CL’65 punishes the issuing of documents which refer to information that does not
correspond to reality. Such documents are written lies. The legal rationale, however, as
sketched out in section 229(1) of the CL’65, is not related to the lies, which instead of
being spoken are written down, but to the fact that their content has a particular value.
According to this writer’s view, the reference to false information is not per se of penal
interest. It acquires, however, in this case a particular importance, given their content as
well as the intended result, that the fact that third parties do not obtain true and accurate
statements as far as vital information related to the company are concerned.
Mens Rea
At the same time, the entering such false statements must be done ‘deliberately’.
‘Deliberately’ indicates the knowledge as well as the desire of the wrongdoer to do or
not do something thus causing a ‘punishable by the law’ result. According to this

600

For the meaning of ‘false statement’, see the Egyptian Economic Court ruling against the chairman
of Ajwa for Food Industries Company (Mohamed Bin Issa Jaber Al Jaber), whose penalty was two
years in jail, and a fine of 2 million Egyptian pounds (approximately USD 344,600) for entering false
statements in his company's documents and using his position to announce false information. Reuters,
‘Ajwa For Food Industries Co’s Chairman to Receive Preminary Court Ruling Verdict’ 1 January 2011
<http://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/AJWA.CA/key-developments/article/2056197>.
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writer’s view, ‘deliberately’ implies that the wrongdoer, who is inserting false or
misleading information is predicting the fact or the possibility with regards to the
realisation of the wrongful result and is trying to achieve it.601 The wrongdoer is, thus,
acting deliberately when he or she seeks, through the physical act/omission, the result in
the external world, such result being liable to prosecution. At the same time, the
wrongdoer is aware of the causal relationship that exists between his/her physical act or
lack of action and the result sought. For example, one of the founders of a JSC wants to
mislead public investors. He writes, consequently, in the prospectus false information
with regards to the number of the shares issued.
If a person (‘whosoever’) fulfils the actus reus of the said section (that is, inscribes in
the AoA false information), without, however, the ‘deliberate’ element of mens rea(that
is, involving knowledge and intent), then this person cannot be held criminally liable for
the said crime The crime of deliberately entering false statements in any documents of a
company can occur by way of an wilful action; the same crime may be committed by an
deliberate omission, that is, by not entering necessary statements in the company’s MoA
or AoA or any other documents, resulting in the alteration of the facts, especially if the
omitted statements are statements required by law.
As a consequence, the important element of ‘deliberately’ requires the existence of both
the will as well as the knowledge of the objective causality. They should both
‘accompany’ the physical act or omission as well the result brought by it in the external
world. The element of intention indicates foresight of particular consequences and of a

601

The KSA does not a written penal code. Criminal offences and punishments are determined by judicial
interpretation of Shari‘ah Law, rather than written law. Judges can be issuing death sentences for offences
against Allah [God], offences against people as defined under Shari‘ah and on a ‘discretionary’ basis for
all acts for which the judges believe that the accused should receive the death penalty.
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desire to act or not to act so that these consequences occur.602 Punishing a conduct,
without reference to an actor’s state of mind, would be unjust, since the person would
be subject to conviction without being morally blameworthy, that is, without acting with
a criminal intent. Matthew Lippman underlines that the offender who lacks criminal
intent ‘neither needs to be punished in order to be deterred from future criminal activity,
nor incapacitated or reformed in order to remove a threat to society’.603
It is noteworthy that the CL’65, according to this writer’s view, does not recognise that
corporate crimes related to company constitution or any other documents committed
during the phase of incorporation of a company (a crime of intent) can be committed
negligently. No case law, in this respect, has up to now been made public.
4.3.2

Crime of Deliberately Entering Statements in a Company’s Constitution or
any Other Documents Contrary to the Provisions of the Companies Law
1965 (CL’65)

Section 229(1)(1) of the CL’65 does not only punish the inscription of false or
misleading statements. The inscription of true statements can also be punishable,
provided that these statements are contrary to the provisions of the CL’65. In this way,
the law draws a clear distinction between the forms of crimes as described in the first
subparagraphs of section 229 of the CL’65.

602

On a pragmatic basis, the problem has always been the extent to which the court can impute sufficient
desire to convert ‘recklessness’ into ‘intention’. The original rule was objective. In DPP v Smith (1961)
AC 290, the test was that a person would have foreseen as the natural and probable the results of the
defendant’s unlawful conduct.
603
Matthew Ross Lippman, Contemporary Criminal Law: Concepts, Cases, and Controversies (SAGE,
2nd ed, 2009) 341.
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Actus Reus
The actus reus of this crime is fulfilled when the statements entered by a person
(‘whosoever’), be they true of false, are related to statements in the company’s AoA or
MoA or in the application for its incorporation, and are contrary to the provisions of the
CL’65. For example, when a company’s AoA or MoA states that a certain activity is
undertaken by the company, where such an activity is indeed undertaken by the
company but without the necessary licence. In this case, the company may, indeed,
undertake the stated activity, but it does so contrary to the provisions of the Law.
Mens Rea
Again, the entering of statements that are contrary to the provisions of the law have to
be done ‘deliberately’, that is, the ‘wrongdoer’ seeks, through the physical act/omission,
the result in the external world, such result being liable to prosecution.
Offenders
Section 229(1) of the CL’65 does not mention particular persons who are liable. Rather,
it imposes liability on any person — ‘whosoever’ — irrespective of the person’s
function in the company, provided that person is involved in the criminal acts as
described in the said paragraph.
In general, the CL’65 does not identify the status of the wrongdoer, but makes a general
reference to ‘whosoever’. In this way, the CL’65 is trying to also encompass people that
are acting ‘deliberately’, although without holding one of the company’s key positions
that would give them the authority to act on its behalf (that is, these persons are not
founders, members of board, directors). In these crimes, the cause of certain damage to
the company’s fortune is not penalised as such, rather the CL’65 considers in advance a
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certain type of behaviour as ‘dangerous’. The punishment depends neither on the
damage caused by the entering of such information, nor by signing or distributing
documents containing false statements or statements contrary to the provisions of the
CL’65. What the law cares about is the activity (entering, signing, distributing),
irrespective of the result. So, what is penalised is the act, not the result on the assets. As
a consequence, the penalty depends on the actus reus (entering, signing, distributing)
and the mens rea (deliberation) whether the result is obtained or not. Moreover, it
constitutes a crime of ‘externalisation’, given that the entering of the false statements
has to come to the knowledge of a third party. Such false or misleading information
may refer to the granting of the licence, the subscription, the capital, and/or the price of
issuing of the shares.
According to this writer’s view, the CL’65 focuses not on the function of the persons in
the corporation, that is, his/her position, but on his/her criminal act (inscription, signing
and distribution). Thus, crimes related company constitution and other documents
committed during the phase of incorporation of a company are committed by:
i.

‘Whosoever’ for the crimes described in section 229(1)(1) of the CL’65, and

ii.

‘Whosoever’ for the crimes described in section 229(1)(2) of the CL’65.
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4.3.3

Crime of Signing a Company’s Constitution or any Other Documents that
Contains False Statements or Statements Contrary to the Provisions of the
Companies Law 1965 (CL’65)

Actus Reus

>
According to section 141 of Law of Procedure before Shari‘ah Courts 2000 (Niz}am
Almura>fa‘a>t Ashar‘iyah / ( )نظام المرافعات الشرعيةLPBSC’00),604 a ‘signature’ can be by
thumb-print, or stamp. Moreover, the section allows for the validity of the handwriting
or signature of the document to be tested on the basis of a handwriting comparison test
of the person to whom the document is ascribed in instances where the person to whom
the contents of a document is ascribed (or his successor) denies that the handwriting or
signature is that of the person purported, and the facts and documents are insufficient to
convince the Court of their validity. Thus, on the basis of such a comparison test, the
content of a document containing false statements or statements contrary to the law can
be ascribed to the persons who wrote and signed them even if it is later denied that they
did so.
With regards to the writing of the MoA or AoA or any other documents of a company
using the handwriting of one of the partner — without it being signed by him/her — it
will suffice for a comparison to be made of that document with established (verified)

604

The LPBSC’00 was issued by Royal Decree No M/21 of 3 Juma>da al-awwal 1421 AH (19 August
2000). Section 141 of the LPBSC’003provides that if the person to whom the contents of a document are
ascribed denies it is in his handwriting, or has his signature, thumb-print, or stamp, or such is denied by
his successor or deputy, while the document is material to the dispute and the facts and documents of the
case are not sufficient to convince the court of the validity of the handwriting or signature, then the court
may conduct a comparison under its supervision, that comparison to be made by one or more experts to
be named in the comparison decision.
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examples of handwriting of its author in order to ascribe to him or her the false
statements or statements contrary to the law contained within the document.605
However, committing the said illegal act (actus reus) is insufficient to convict the
potential offender of such crime. This crime involves a mens rea and requires the
offender’s intention to commit the crime. Therefore, where the offender knows that the
constitution or any other documents that he/she has signed contain false statements or
statements contrary the CL’65, the dishonest act is done ‘knowingly’ and ‘wilfully’
under section 229(1) of the CL’65, which meet the mens rea standard for this crime.
It could be argued that any person who signs an MoA or AoA, or any company
documents required by the CL’65 to be signed, or any documents related to any fact of
which such constitution and documents are by the CL’65 deemed to be admissible in
evidence, while knowing or believing that such constitution and documents are false in
any material point, shall be held liable for intentional criminal conduct and penalised in
the same manner as if he/she gave false evidence.606
Mens Rea
The crime is fulfilled only when the wrongdoer is acting while knowing that he/she
signs of distributes documents containing either false statements or statements that may
be true and correct, but are contrary to the law. In this case, and according to this
writer’s view, the mens rea element of ‘knowing’ is fulfilled when (i) the wrongdoer
believes that the wrongful result can be achieved and accepts it, as a result of his
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Section 142 of the LPBSC’00 provides that where the authenticity of such handwriting, thumb-print,
signature, or stamp is so denied, it shall be compared with the established handwriting, signature, thumbprint, or stamp of the person to whom the document is ascribed.
606
Kouman and Hamid, above n 104, 50, 52.
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wrongful act or (ii) the wrongdoer foresees and accepts and possible result of this
wrongful act.
Offenders
‘Whosoever’ can act ‘deliberately’. As analysed above, it can be any person acting on
behalf of the company, without further specification as to his or her function. What the
CL’65 is interested in is the act per se and not the person’s capacity in the company.
4.3.4

Crime of Distributing a Company’s Constitution or any Other Documents
Containing False Statements or Statements Contrary to the Provisions of
the Companies Law 1965 (CL’65)

Actus Reus
In addition to the above forms of corporate crimes committed during the initial stage of
setting up a company, another form that is provided by section 229(1) of the CL’65
should be mentioned. This form comprises the case of an offender who distributes a
company’s document or MoA or AoA containing false or misleading statements or
statements contrary to the provisions of the CL’65 while he/she is aware of the nature of
said contents.
It could be argued that the term ‘distribution’ in section 229(1) of the CL’65 is
synonymous with ‘publication’. Therefore, to ‘publish/distribute’ means to convey the
offending statement by any means to the mind of another.607 Distribution/publication
includes any act or conduct that may communicate to the public the contents of the
document. Consequently, any person (such as a founder or manager or member of the
Board of Directors) who publishes or conveys those constitution or documents by any

607

See Webb v Bloch (1928) 41 CLR 331, 363 (Isaacs J).
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means of declaration and advertisement (whether by writing, audio or video) is
included. The term ‘distribution’ implies a broad sense of usage, which means that the
document was made accessible to someone, who further distributes it.608 The CL’65 is
not interested in how ‘distribution’ is done. It can be done through delivery, dispatch,
distribution, publication, proclamation, or even photocopying of the document
(irrespective of whether or not the photocopy as such constitutes a ‘document’).609
Thus according to section 229(1) of the CL’65, when a defendant distributes any
company’s constitution or any other documents containing false statement or statements
contrary to the CL’65 by accident, he or she could not be found guilty of a crime, as she
or he did not have the requisite mens rea at the same time as the actus reus.
In light of the above analysis, and as pointed out in the section 229(1) of the CL’65, it
might be argued that the KSA has opted to protect the economic order, specifically the
security of economic transactions and hence public confidence in corporate activities.

608

Kouman and Hamid, above n 104, 45.
In terms of the MoA of a company, prohibited distribution as per section 229(1) of the CL’65 can be
envisaged in two instances: the first is in relation to the declaration procedures of the company’s MoA,
and the second is in relation to its publication. It should be noted that declaration is an important
procedure, the form of which differs according to the kind of company for which declaration is requested.
Failure to carry out this essential declaration may void the company’s MoA; it may even result in the
suspension of the right of some companies to enjoy the status of legal personality until completion of
such a declaration. Section 11 of the CL’65 directs that the managers or members of the Board of
Directors shall declare the company’s MoA and any amendments thereto in accordance with the CL’65. If
the MoA is not declared in this manner, it shall not be valid vis-à-vis third parties. This provision also
requires that knowledge of the contents of the MoA be conveyed to the public, with declaration
procedures to take place in accordance with section 22 of the CL’65, that is, an abstract/summary of the
company’s MoA shall be published in a daily newspaper within 30 days from date of the company’s
incorporation. There are provisions related to distribution with regard to other documents. For example, in
regard to the prospectus for the incorporation of a company, section 54 of the CL’65 states that if the
founders do not reserve all stocks to themselves, they must, within 30 days of the date of publication in
the Official Gazette of either the Royal Decree or the Minister of Commerce and Industry’s decision
authorising the incorporation of the company, offer for public subscription the stocks for which they did
not subscribe. Additionally, according to section 55 of the CL’65 the prospectus must be released through
banks that are nominated by the Minister of Commerce and Industry. Thus if any person, such as the
promoter, does not publish the prospectuses within the periods provided in section 54 or does not
distribute such prospectuses in the manner prescribed in section 55 of the CL’65, he or she will be
criminally liable for the crime of distributing company documents contrary to the provisions of the
CL’65.
609
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The behaviours that the CL’65 seeks to protect all against contain inestimable danger
not only for the companies themselves, but also for all those third parties involved. In
particular, the CL’65 condemns the illegal act committed by persons involved by
‘inscribing’, ‘signing’ or ‘distributing’ the company’s MoA, AoA, circulars, the licence
application or any other documents, irrespective of the possible knowledge or lack of
knowledge of the tortuous act by a third party who receives the false information or
information contrary to the law.
Mens Rea
The CL’65 demands for the element of ‘knowledge’. According to this writer’s view,
the mens rea of ‘knowing’ is fulfilled when the wrongdoer believes that the wrongful
result can be achieved and accepts it, as a result of his wrongful act, or the wrongdoer
accepts the possible result of his wrongful act. Again, according to this writers view,
and given the absence of any relevant case law in KSA, in the case of signing or
distributing documents the wrongdoer does not need to seek the wrongful result.
Acceptance of possible results is for the KSA lawmaker enough.
4. 4 Offenders in Crimes Related Company Constitution and other Documents
Committed during the Phase of Incorporation of a Company
Again, the CL’65 does not specify the wrongdoer based on his or her particular function
in the company. Importance is attributed to the act itself, that is, to the fact that
documents, with statements either false or contrary to the law, are signed or distributed.
To this end, a wrongdoer can be held to be not only a highly positioned person in the
company (that is, manager, shareholder, founder) but also any other employee acting on
behalf of the company.
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Examples
Examples of crimes related to the deliberate inscription of false or misleading
information:
i.

The founder enters in the company’s constitution the names of trustworthy banks
as founders of the company with the intention to delude the public and give them
the confidence to subscribe in the capital of the company during the incorporation.

ii.

The founders include in the company’s constitution false resolutions about the
distribution of capital between the partners or payments of all its value contrary to
the facts.

iii.

The shareholders resolve to increase the capital of the company and state in the
company’s constitution that such increase was fully paid up while it is not.

iv.

A person or persons intentionally falsely state in an application for company
incorporation that has been made in accordance with the law while it has been
prepared contrary to the legal regulations.

Examples of entering statements contrary to the provisions of CL’65
Upon reading the provisions of the CL’65, it is worth mentioning a number of
statements that, while true and accurate, may (as in the examples given immediately
below) constitute violations of the CL’65 and consequently constitute crimes within
section 229(1) of the CL’65. These statements are detailed in the following scenarios:
i.

If it is stated in the MoA or AoA that the company’s actual seat is outside the
KSA, because this is contrary to section 14 of the CL’65.
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ii.

If the application to incorporate a JSC is signed by less than five partners, in
violation of section 52 of the CL’65.

iii.

If statements in the MoA of the GPC disclose that the partners’ interests in the
company are represented by transferable instruments, because this practice (such a
use of negotiable warrants) is prohibited by section 18 of the CL’65.

iv.

If the MoA of the JSC contains statements to the effect that the paid up capital
upon incorporation is less than one half of the minimum capital (SAR 10 million)
prescribed in section 49 of the CL’65, in violation of section 49 the CL’65 (as
such prescribed minimum or more has to be paid during the incorporation of the
company); or if the MoA of the JSC contains a statement that the paid up value of
each cash stock upon subscription is less than one quarter of its value, in violation
of section 58 of the CL’65.

v.

If the AoA of the JSC specifies the term of the Board of Directors is more than
three years, in violation of section 66 of the CL’65.

vi.

If the AoA of the JSC specifies that a director may own a number of shares the
value of which is less than SAR 10,000 (approximately USD 2670), because this
violates section 68 of the CL’65.

vii.

If the AoA of the JSC deprives a shareholder who owns 20 shares of the right to
attend the GM, or allows a shareholder who owns less than 20 shares to attend the
GM, because these acts violate section 83 of the CL’65.

viii. If the AoA of the JSC provides for a distribution to the stockholders of a fixed rate
of dividends exceeding five per cent from the capital and for a period exceeding
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five years from the incorporation of the company, because this violates section
106 of the CL’65.
ix.

If the AoA of the JSC contains statements to the effect that the company capital
may be increased by the transfer of the founders’ shares to shares before the
expiration of the period provided for in section 100 of the CL’65 (that is, two
fiscal years from date of company incorporation),610 or to the effect that such
transfer may be made without the approval of the shareholders to this transfer (as
per section 86 of the CL’65), then this is contrary to section 140 of the CL’65.

4. 5 Penalties for Corporate Crimes Related to Company Constitution or any
Other Documents Committed during the Phase of Incorporation of a
Company
Theoretical Framework
When aggression towards goods protected by law is characterised as ‘crime’, then this
aggression results in punishment through the imposition of a sanction, which constitutes
the third and last phase of the penal ‘phenomenon’: the sequence of ‘protected good–
crime–sanction (punishment)’.
Two major theories have been put forward to support which form punishment should
take. According to Schlegel, sentencing practices have to follow a more systematic
approach, as far as both the crime and the perpetrator are concerned. The amount of
punishment must reflect the seriousness of the offence, which is determined by the harm

610

For example, for violation of section 100 of the CL’65, see Decree of the Ministry of Commerce and
Industry against Jabal Omar Development Company, where the Ministry cancelled the Constituent
Meeting of the company: [Transferring the Shares of Jabal Omar Company Two Years Ago was against
the Law] Aleqtes}adiah [Newspaper] ed no 5074 (2 September 2007) <http://www.aleqt.com/
2007/09/02/article_106636.html>.

185

Ch 4: Crimes during Incorporation – Company Constitution and Other Documents

caused or risked by the act as well as the culpability of the wrongdoer.611 John
Braithwaite has, on the contrary, supported a wider use of restorative justice, arguing
that this would have the results in the long run.612 Corporate self-regulation, government
regulation as well as persuasion613 could be more effective than any more ‘aggressive’
punishment, such as harsher sentencing practices.614
Many corporate crimes, given the lack of proof, as well as the power of well resourced
offenders, end up being dealt by regulatory agencies and not by the police or
prosecutors.615 In this case, the sanctions are lower: the fine imposed focuses on the
breach of the regulation committed and not on the actual outcome, which can even
include death.616 The complexity of the criminal trials, coupled with the fact that in the
case of a fine, money may end up going to the state, can function as an advantage that
favours the imposition of civil and not criminal sanctions. Sentencing practices,
however, may in fact function as a deterrent factor for corporate crime. According to
611

Kip Schlegel, Just Deserts for Corporate Criminals (Northeastern University Press, 1990). For more
about this theory, see Richard S Gruner, Corporate Criminal Liability and Prevention (Law Journal
Press, 2004) 9–29; also see Susan T Fiske, Daniel T Gilbert and Gardner Lindzey (eds), Handbook of
Social Psychology (John Wiley and Sons, 5th ed, 2010) 1145.
612
John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2002) 30,
143.
613
There is a school of criminologists who argued that persuasion is more effective than penalty in
securing corporate compliance with the law. See Brent Fisse and John Braithwaite, Corporations, Crime
and Accountability (Cambridge University Press, 1993) 16; Roman Tomasic, 'Corporate Crime and
Corporations Law Enforcement Strategies in Australia' (Working Paper No 1/93, Centre for National
Corporate Law Research, 1993) 34.
614
Braithwaite, Restorative Justice, above n 612, 30, 143; P J Fitzgerald, Criminal Law and Punishment
(Oxford University Press (Clarendon), 1962) 207; Wayne R LaFave and Austin W Scott, Handbook on
Criminal Law (West, 1972) 25. Both recognise other functions of punishment and give priority to specific
prevention, ie the need to prevent the person that has already committed a crime from committing other
crimes in the future. However, this approach of specific prevention appears not to be followed by AngloSaxon Courts: John Cyril Smith and Brian Hogan, Criminal Law (Butterworths, 1883) 15–16.
615
Tomasic, ‘Corporate Crime and Corporations Law Enforcement’, above n 613, 8.
616
Hazel Croall, ‘Victims of White Collar and Corporate Crime’ in Sven-Åke Lindgren, White Collar
Crime Research: Old Views and Future Prevention (National Council for Crime Prevention, Sweden,
2001) <http://www.uk.sagepub.com/stout/croall_white_collar%20-%20vics_crim_soc.pdf> 29. For
instance, Fisse has proposed the concept of ‘reactive corporate fault’ which would examine the fault of
the corporation both at the time of the commission of the offence as well as by reference to its actions
after the offence.In this way ‘blame can616 be allocated on the basis of both pre and post-actus reus
corporate policy.’ For greater detail, see Tomasic, ‘Corporate Crime and Corporations Law Enforcement’,
above n 613, 8; Fisse, ‘Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law’, above n 439, 1200.
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this writer’s view, the threat of imprisonment may deter highly ranked officials from
committing crimes, since it may destroy not only their public image and reputation, but
also the image of the company in dealing with third parties.
Penalties under the Companies Law 1965 (CL’65)
The penalties that may be imposed on all the offences at hand are: (i) imprisonment for
a period of three months but not, however, exceeding one year; and/or (ii) a fine of not
less than SAR 5000 (approximately USD 1330) and not exceeding SAR 20,000
(approximately USD 5330). Section 229 allows for a twofold approach as far as the
imposition of these penalties is concerned. Either penalty (that is, the imprisonment or
the fine) can be imposed or both. In this regard, section 288 of the Commercial
Companies Law 1997 (Yemen) imposes a term of imprisonment of not less than three
months and not exceeding two years or a fine of not less than YER 60,000 (Yemeni
Riyal, YER) (approximately USD 280) and not exceeding YER 480,000 (approximately
USD 2220); section 322 of the Companies Law 1984 in the United Arab Emirates
(UAE) imposes a term of imprisonment of not less than three months and not exceeding
two years and a fine of not less than AED 10,000 (UAE Dirham, AED) (approximately
USD 2720) and not exceeding AED 100,000 (approximately USD 27,220) or either of
these two penalties; and section 246 of the Commercial Companies Act 1960 (Kuwait)
imposes a term of imprisonment of not more than three years and a fine of not less than
KWD 5000 (Kuwaiti Dinar, KWD) (approximately USD 17,610) and not exceeding
KWD 20,000 (approximately USD 70,460) or either of these two penalties.
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Table 4.2: Penalties for Corporate Crimes Related to Company Constitution or any
Other Documents Committed during the Phase of Incorporation of a Company under
Company Laws in Some Arab Countries *
State
Section

The KSA
CL’65 s 299

Penalty of 3 months – 1 year
prison

The UAE
Companies
1984 s 322

State of Kuwait

Law Commercial
Companies
1960 s 246

Yemen

Commercial
Act Companies
1997 s 288

Law

3 months – 2 No minimum – 3 3 months – 2 years
years
years

Penalty of SAR 5000 – SAR AED 10,000 – KWD 5000
20,000
AED 100,000
KWD 20,000
fine

– YER 60,000
YER 480,000

–

(approximately
(approximately
(approximately
(approximately
USD 1330 – USD USD 2720 – USD USD 17,610 – USD 280 – USD
5330)
27,220)
USD 70,460)
2220)
* Source: Relevant law of the KSA, the UAE, Yemen and Kuwait.

Table 4.2 shows that sanctions imposed in the KSA are weaker then the ones imposed
in other countries. It could be argued, according to this writer’s view, that the sanctions,
both in terms of the length of imprisonment as well as in terms of fines that can be
imposed are the weakest compared to those able to be imposed by other Arab countries
This is particularly due to the fact that the CL’65 grants the court discretionary power to
impose either of the two penalties (imprisonment or fine) or both. For example,
imprisonment is optional in the KSA, and the fine applicable has very low minimum.
Such provisions for penalising the ones found guilty of the relevant crimes under the
law clearly lack a sufficient minimum fine and have no threat of mandatory
imprisonment. In addition, they are unlikely to deter those intent on serious financial
crimes, such as crimes relating to the company constitution or any other documents.
Increased severity of the penalties would, arguably, lead to a greater preventive effect
due to the fear that the penalties would be applied where offences are detected.
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Monetary Penalties
Many scholars have agreed that monetary penalties (fines) really can deter corporations
that have already committed a crime from doing so again.617 Many times, however, the
fine is too low and can be factored in as a business cost.618 The CL’65 imposes a fine on
the company based on section 231; it may also be imposed on an individual if he or she
committed a crime under section 229. However, some opponents of the imposition of
substantial fines may argue that the effects may be disproportionate. There have been
cases where the Court itself has lowered the level of the fine, in order not to have
negative consequences for the corporation.619 Those arguing against heavy fines may
also point out that such fines will further have perverse effects on the innocent, that is,
excessive fines can have perverse effects that may have to be borne by innocent
shareholders, creditors, employees or consumers. There may be investment and job
losses. Furthermore, the imposition of very substantial fines may have a direct impact
on the prices of the products that circulate in the market, and the prices may rise,
affecting the consumers. At the same time, a reduction in the share price may affect or
financially injure investors in the stock market. As a consequence, penalties imposed,
according to this writer’s view, be they imposed by judges or by governmental agencies,
must take into account the societal and economic factors related to the impact that these
fines will have on the consumers.
It is here argued, however, that not only the minimum but also the maximum pecuniary
penalty imposed in the KSA is too low as to be considered as a penalty that may deter
617

Han Lixin Faure and Shan Hongjun, Maritime Pollution Liability and Policy: China, Europe and the
US (Kluwer Law International, 2010) 171.
618
Tomasic, Bottomley and McQueen, above n 511, 253.
619
For instance in the case R v Wattle Gully Gold Mines NL, in which the Supreme Court of Victoria
reduced a fine from AUD 20,000 to AUD 500 so as not to have a very high fine ‘fall on the innocent’:
[1980] 4 ACLR 959. See Tomasic, Bottomley and McQueen, above n 511, 253.
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offenders. Greater deterrence — not less — is required to prevent wrongdoing. To this
end, higher penalties (in terms of possible level of fines and the duration of
imprisonment) should be available to be imposed on wrongdoers; and where such
penalties are available, they should be judiciously imposed in order to achieve the
desired deterrent effect.
The ‘softness’ of the current provision is not only, however, limited to the level of the
fine, but to the duration of potential imprisonment as shown below.
Imprisonment
Long prison sentences are an effective method of deterring corporate crimes.620
Corporate representatives are not willing to face risk prison, irrespective of the financial
gain.621 For example, a person would rather be fined up to USD 2 million than be jailed
for a year.622 This is, according to this writer’s view, the case in the KSA. Lack of
visibility and publicity with regards to company criminal liability cases, makes it very
difficult to follow cases. If the nature of the penalty generally imposed was altered from
a pecuniary penalty to that of a term of imprisonment, and penalties were effectively
increased, corporate representatives, in this writer’s view, would be deterred from crime
due to an increased fear of the results of their wrongful actions.623 Prison terms would
prove an effective deterrent, moreover, because imprisonment is stigmatising the
individual, especially in the Arab areas.

620

Robert H Lande and Joshua P Davis,'Comparative Deterrence from Private Enforcement and Criminal
Enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust Laws' (Working Paper No 2010-17, University of San Francisco
School of Law, 2010) 6.
621
Ibid.
622
Ibid.
623
Huynh, above n 548, 116, 133.
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If one attempts a comparison between imprisonment sanctions for corporate crimes
related to company constitution committed during the phase of incorporation of a
company in the relevant legislation in a number of Arabian countries, such as Yemen
and in the UAE624 (mentioned above), with the CL’65 of KSA, it is clear that the prison
term is shortest under the KSA legislation. In regards to the minimum term of
imprisonment, those in Yemen and the UAE are identical to those provided in section
229(1) of the CL’65, but differ in respect of maximum terms of imprisonment and fines
able to be imposed. For example, under section 322 of the UAE Companies Law 1984,
the term of imprisonment may reach two years, while it cannot exceed a year in the
KSA.625
In fact, the court in the KSA may penalise any convicted person either with a fine or
with imprisonment or with both. Where the court applies a fine only, the amount the
offender will pay may be about USD 1330. If the court decides to opt for imprisonment
as a sanction, the period may be as little as three months. Therefore, it can be said that
section 229(1) of the CL’65 does not provide a penalty sufficient to discourage a
potential offender from criminal behaviour.
Additionally, in terms of the penalties for these crimes, the CL’65 does not provide for
any supplementary penalties, such as publication of the crime committed and its penalty
in the media along with offender’s name, as well as deprivation of commercial /
business activities, a penalty found in section 26 of the Law of Companies Operating in
the Field of Pooling and Receiving Funds for Investment 1988 (Egypt).626 Moreover, the
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See analytically, Schlegel, above n 611; Gruner, above n 611; Fiske, Gilbert and Lindzey (eds)R above
n 611.
625
Companies Law 1984 (UAE) s 322.
626
Law of Companies Operating in the Field of Pooling and Receiving Funds for Investment, Law No 146
of 1988 (Egypt).
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CL’65 does not provide for compensation for economic losses nor does it penalise any
secondary offender concerned with a crime related to a company constitution.
Consequently, the penalties related to corporate crimes during the phase of
incorporation of company in relation to a company constitution, in terms of both
imprisonment and fines, are currently weak and do not effectively deter offenders. With
increases in both the number and activities of companies in the KSA, there will be more
opportunities to offend unless amendments are made to the provisions on corporate
criminal liability so that they include more effective penalties. Therefore, a reform of
these penalties is needed.
Such reforms could include increasing prison sentences and amending the maximum
and minimum amounts of fines, and also providing appropriate supplementary
penalties, such as publication in the media of the crime committed and its penalty along
with offender’s name, as well as deprivation of commercial / business activities, in
order to deter corporate executives and the founders from committing financial crimes
and to deter other persons from committing similar breaches. Such amendments are
required to create a stable financial environment, which will increase the tendency of
investors to be more strongly confident in participating in financial activities in the KSA
and accessing its financial markets.627
Defences
The CL’65 does not recognise any defence; however, section 229(1), with the usage of
the terms ‘deliberately’ and ‘while knowing as such’ implies that two defences could
exist. These would be the ‘ignorance’ and the ‘due diligence’ defences.
627

For further analysis, see Solaiman, 'Investor Protection and Criminal Liabilities for Defective
Prospectuses’, above n 22, 469–72.
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As a general rule, ignorance of the illegal character if the act is not a valid defence,628
but mistake of fact can be a valid defence.629 Sometimes when there is lack of
knowledge and understanding of the subjective status of the act, then there is no mens
rea and, as a consequence, there is no respective crime. Knowledge of the illegal act is
one of the subjective elements of a criminal act, which action takes place in reality. If,
however, the actus reus (the physical act or omission) is unaccompanied by the
subjective status of ‘knowing’ due to a wrongful perception of reality (that is, to a
wrong presentation of the facts in the mind of the wrongdoer), then this phenomenon of
lack of knowledge or lack of awareness necessarily excludes the existence of the
element of ‘deliberately’ as well as ‘knowingly’, and, as a consequence, it excludes the
element of mens rea for the whole act, thus eliminating the possibility of the action
against an illegal offender.
Ignorance
If the wrongdoer was ignorant, during the time of his or her offending conduct this
person is not punished by the law.630 However, if the ignorance of the real facts that
render the act ‘wrongful’ is due to a failure to exercise due diligence, what is examined
is whether or not the said act could be punished due to a failure to exercise due
diligence.631

628

Ignorantia non legis excludat: that ‘ignorance is not a valid defencey has been enacted into law in a
number of circumstances and jurisdictions. See, eg, Arizona, Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 13-204 (West 1989)
which states that ‘ignorance of the law does not relieve a person of criminal responsibility’ and
Oklahoma, Okla Stat Ann tit 21, § 152 (West 1983) which declares that ‘ignorance of the law does not
excuse from punishment for its violation’. This has been eroded in a number of areas: see, eg, Sharon L
Davies, 'The Jurisprudence of Willfulness: An Evolving Theory of Excusable Ignorence' (1998) 48(3)
Duke Law Journal 341, 343–7.
629
Glanville Llewelyn Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (Stevens, 1978) 405.
630
Mohammad Ja'far Habibzadeh, 'Legality Principle of Crimes and Punishments in Iranian Legal
System' (2006) 1(3) Educational Research and Review 108, 112, 113.
631
See State Rail Authority (NSW) v Hunter Water Board (1992) 65 A Crim R 101 (NSWCCA).
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Due Diligence
Committing an ‘intentional’ act simply requires a voluntary act.632 If the mens rea of
‘deliberately’ related to a voluntary act is nonexistent, due to the wrongful perception of
reality with regard to a certain element of actus reus, but the wrongdoer has
demonstrated adherence to proper due diligence, this crime is not punished for due
diligence reasons, and the act would not be considered as a crime that should be
punished by law. A failure to exercise due diligence is characterised by a lack of
attention, which the person could and should have, demonstrated under the
circumstances, and either he/she did not foresee the tortuous result of the act, or foresaw
it possible but believed, however, that it would not occur. If the person does not foresee
the offending result as a possible consequence to his act or omission due to this
inadvertent recklessness, and continues doing it, the inadvertent recklessness is
sufficient to make the act criminal.633
The due diligence defence only operates where a person has done what he or she could
reasonably have been expected to do (in accordance with any rules that may prevail in
that area) and therefore cannot be held to account as the results of the action could not
be foreseen and the person’s lack of knowledge was not due to any wilful ignorance on
his or her part.
Vicarious liability
Vicarious liability does not contain any element of personal blame. It is a form of
liability that may be imposed on a person for offending conduct committed by another

632
633

See Ryan v The Queen (1967) 121 CLR 205, 209.
See R v Kitchener (1993) 29 NSWLR 696, 697, 700–3.
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person, even though the person who is vicariously liable may not have been personally
at fault.634 This distinguishes personal liability from vicarious liability.635
It should be noted that the CL’65 does not impose vicarious liability in terms of
corporate crimes during the phase of incorporation of a company in regard to the
company constitution or any other documents under section 229(1) of the CL’65.
Vicarious liability is an important legal principle which prevents corporate crime and
deters others from engaging in criminal conduct because companies can be held liable
for their employees.
It is important as it holds employers responsible for the proper supervision of their
employees, for ensuring that they are carrying out their official duties in an effective
fashion. It leads to greater participation of a defendant’s employer, or employers more
generally, in relation to criminal liability. The vicarious liability and responsibility
accorded founders, board members, executives and the like should help ensure a higher
standard of business dealings across business entities. The ‘chain’ of responsibility
opens up those occupying such positions to liability and therefore gives them a greater
incentive to carry out their supervisory duties in regard to persons placed lower down; it
may also render more powerful officials less likely to ‘use’ their subordinates to achieve
risk-laden but potentially profitable ends via less than legal means. This emphasis on
justice and responsibility should contribute to building an attractive business
environment.636

634

Queensland Law Reform Commission, Vicarious Liability Report No 56 (2001) <http://www.qlrc.
qld.gov.au/reports/R56.pdf> 4; Paula Giliker, Vicarious Liability in Tort: A Comparative Perspective
(Cambridge University, 2010) 1, 2.
635
Queensland Law Reform Commission, Vicarious Liability, above n 634, 4; Giliker, above n 634, 1, 2.
636
Queensland Law Reform Commission, Vicarious Liability, above n 634, 10.
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However, the CL’65 like other Arabic companies law such as the Companies Law 1984
(UAE) and the Commercial Companies Act 1984 (Kuwait), still omits vicarious
liability, which clearly reveals another weakness in the legislation and emphasises the
need for its further amendment through the addition of efficient provisions to penalise
any person who intentionally or negligently takes part in, or authorises, corporate
crimes.
4. 6 Conclusions
Corporate crimes have become a phenomenon difficult to combat in most countries,
including the KSA. They take forms which may be difficult to identify under common
penal legislation.637 Moreover, the consequences they might have on the company’s
daily business and reputation can be detrimental not only to the company, but also to
third parties, as they can mislead investors, clients and consumers and cause severe
economic damage.
There are many corporations that are operating without a sense of social responsibility
and on a strictly cost-benefit analysis basis whether in the KSA or other countries.638 In

637

As already has been pointed out above, the lack of proof, as well as the well resourced official/s
involved, may render them very difficult to prosecute successfully. Also, see Fisse, ‘Reconstructing
Corporate Criminal Law’, above n 439, 1200; Tomasic, ‘Corporate Crime and Corporations Law
Enforcement’, above n 613, 8.
638
For instance, in the 1970s case of McDonnell Douglas, which due to heavy competition with the two
rival companies, Boeing and Lockheed Martin, supplied to both Turkish Airlines as well as American
Airlines DC-10 aircraft, which were initially defective. These hidden defects cost the lives of many
people who later became the victims of airplane ‘accidents’. The US Federal Aviation Authority, made
aware of flaws by a mid-air incident, had initially through ‘a gentlemen’s agreement’ with the company
wanted the company to solve the situation essentially ‘in house’. Inadequate modifications then allowed
DC10s to continue flying, with an irrevocable outcome. Ethically questionable decisions were taken by
the company and others. The company itself failed to accept its ‘primary liability’. The complex matter
proceeded to court but due to the lack of criminal evidence, ended up in civil court, where all law suits
were closed through settlements, without any public hearings. The sectioni concludes that although the
company believes it was acting ethically, its failure to concentrate on ethics and safety throughout its
operations and at every level had fatal consequences. See ‘An Analysis of McDonnell Douglas’s Ethical
Responsibility in the Crash of Turkish Airlines Flight 981: Executive Summary’ <http://turkishdc10.
files.wordpress.com/2008/01/an-analysis-of-mcdonnell-douglas-crash-74.pdf> 2. A number of wrongful
death actions (civil) were filed in the US: see, eg, In re Air Crash Disaster at Paris France, on March 3,
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the KSA their efforts focus on profit maximisation. Companies may commit crimes;
however, due to their increased economic and political power, obtaining their legal
conviction for those crimes has become a very difficult task in the KSA.639 Most of the
cases are closed after a compromise is reached, without the matter even becoming
public.640 As a consequence, third parties dealing with the companies are ignorant of the
fact that these companies may have developed ‘aggressive’, that is, law-breaking
policies. Such a lack of commercial and legal transparency is not helpful for a State
wishing to create a more open business environment conducive to the desired levels of
investor confidence and increased economic growth, including the growth of both
domestic ethical responsible corporate citizens and the attraction of similar overseas
entities.

1974, 376 F Supp 887 (Jud Pan Mult Lit, 1974), also 386 Supp 1404 (Jud Pan Mult Lit, 1975), cited in
‘Case Comment: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’ 1976(2) Rutgers Law Review 425, 425. Today, in
similar circumstances, executives may be among those subject to criminal prosecution: Richard B Jones,
20% Chance of Rain: Exploring the Concept of Risk (Wiley, 2012) 276.
639
See, eg, the Ford Pinto case: State v Ford Motor Co, Cause No 11-431 (1980). In 1978 two people
were burned to death and a third fatally injured when their car exploded following a collision, due to a
defective fuel system. The Ford Company was aware of the design defect, but had decided not to amend
it, given the increased economic cost involved (which Ford estimated to be USD 11 per vehicle, though
others thought it as low as USD 5; Ford calculated that the ‘break even’ point that warranted
implementation of a revised design was USD 3.96 (these figures include actuarial data on the loss of 180
lives, 180 serious burn injuries and the loss of 2100 vehcles. Instead, it spent countless USD millions
during the trial; the case was dismissed due to lack of evidence of ‘intentional or reckless misconduct’.
For a highly analytical discussion, see Matthew T Lee, 'The Ford Pinto Case and the Development of
Auto Safety Regulations, 1893-1978' (1998) 27(2) Business and Economic History 390, 390–400. As
Russell Mokhiber points out, ‘Corporations define the laws under which they live.’ For example, the
automobile industry over the past 30 years has worked its will on Congress to block legislation that would
impose criminal sanctions on knowing and wilful violations of the federal auto safety laws. Now, if an
auto company is caught violating the law, and if the cops are not asleep at the wheel, only a civil fine is
imposed.’ See Mokhiber, ‘Top 100 Corporate Criminals of the Decade’, above n 542.
640
For instance, Rockwell International Corporation was accused of having committed an environmental
offence and received a criminal fine of USD 6.5 million. The fine related to a 1994 chemical explosion
that killed two scientists at the firm's Santa Susana Field Laboratory in Simi Hills, California. Federal
officials in Los Angeles charged that in June and July 1994 Rockwell's Rocketdyne division illegally
stored and disposed of hazardous waste at the facility. The waste in question, triaminoguanidine nitrate
(TAGN), an explosive, was used as a gun propellant. For months following the blast, Rockwell officials
claimed that the two scientists died while conducting legitimate experiments with explosives; but
Rocketdyne President Paul Smith later admitted that the blast came as the two were illegally burning a
volatile explosive to get rid of it. See Mokhiber, ‘Top 100 Corporate Criminals of the Decade’, above n
542.
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Corporate conduct/activities can be identified during any stage of the company’s
operational life, the incorporation phase being one of those phases. During this phase,
crimes that can be committed can be related to the company’s two most important
documents, the MoA and AoA. Likewise, any other documents that are issued by a
company to accompany its incorporation can be the subject of a crime. In the KSA, the
CL’65 has created specific provisions with a view to combating such phenomena at the
incorporation stage in relation to the constitution and any other documents issued by a
company at this stage. In particular, section 229(1) of the CL’65 identifies as a crime
the deliberate inscription — in the company’s MoA or in its AoA or any documents —
of any false statements or statements contradictory to the provisions of the CL’65 and
the signing or the distribution of such documents, while aware that these documents
contain such material. The crimes identified comprise a large range of offences.
However, as far as sanctions are concerned, the prescribed fines are low and as a
consequence inadequate to strongly combat the corporate misconduct. The same could
be argued for the custodial penalty. The lengths of imprisonment prescribed by the
CL’65 are too short to have any substantial deterrent impact on corporate malpractice.
The legal regime should favour supporting continued investment. But it should not be
subjected to the abusive behaviour of big companies and multinationals, which can
afford strong teams of lawyers, the very size of which may serve to subvert justice when
being opposed by less powerful individuals or entities. This is also the case in the KSA,
where most of the cases close with a small fine and publicity is almost inexistent. In
addition, the legal regime needs to be strict and liability provisions very stringent with a
view to better controlling wrongful misconduct of employees of corporations. Firms
need to learn to comply with legal regulations and be able to conduct business in a
healthy, competitive environment.
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Chapter 5
5 Crimes Relating to Formation of Company Capital during the
Phase of its Incorporation
5. 1 Introduction
The previous chapter has analysed crimes related to company constitutions and other
documents that occur during the initial stage of setting up a company, which are
punishable under section 229 of the Companies Law 1965 (Niz}am
> Asharikaat / نظام
( ) الشركاتCL’65) of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). However, further types of
crimes, related to the formation of company’s capital, may occur. The definitions of
these crimes and their penalties are contained in section 229 of the CL’65.
In particular, these crimes are related to the amount of cash shares and shares in kind
invested in the company in order for it to be incorporated.641 The company’s capital
under the CL’65 can be made up of contributions, which may consist of a certain sum of
money (a contribution in cash), or of a capital asset (a contribution in kind).642 The
chapter, therefore, attempts a twofold analysis of crimes occurring during this phase.
Firstly, it focuses on the crimes related to the subscription in company shares; and,
secondly, it analyses the crime of exaggerating the estimated price of shares in kind.
The discussion in this chapter with regard to the aforementioned crimes is divided into a
number of sections: section 5.1 introduces the chapter; section 5.2 discusses crimes
related to subscription to company shares committed in violation of the provisions of
the CL’65; section 5.3 sketches forms of crimes relating to subscription to company
641

Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 3. For more details about the formation of commercial companies
under the CL’65, see section 2.4 in Chapter 2.
642
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 3. For more details about the formation of the company’s capital under
the CL’65, see section 2.5 in Chapter 2.
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shares committed in violation of the provisions of the Companies Law 1965 (CL’65);
section 5.4 examines the crime of exaggerating the estimation of shares in kind under
the CL’65; section 5.5 analyses penalties or sanctions for crimes relating to the
formation of a company capital during the phase of its incorporation under the CL’65;
and the last section, section 5.6, presents conclusions.
5. 2 Crimes Relating to Subscription to Company Shares Committed in Violation
of the Provisions of the Companies Law 1965 (Niz}am
> Asharikaat / ) نظام الشركات
(CL’65)
5.2.1

The Concept of Subscription

The ownership of a company is related to the concept of ‘shareholding’ or ‘ownership
through shares’.643 A share may be identified as an item of intangible property, which is
an interest of a shareholder in the net worth of a company.644
Some scholars define the subscription from the point of view of the subscriber, by
indicating that subscription is the announcement of the subscriber’s desire to contribute
to the company and be bound by all its obligations.645 The subscriber determines the
number of shares in which he or she desires to subscribe in the company’s capital and
remain bound to pay their value as provided in the Articles of Association (AoA) or the
Memorandum of Association (MoA) of the company. The subscriber would be liable to

643

D Venugopal Setty, T M Rangaswamy and K N Subramanya, 'A Review on Data Mining Applications
to the Performance of Stock Marketing' (2010) 1(3) International Journal of Computer Applications 24,
32, 33.
644
Lipton, Herzberg and Welsh, above n 345, 169. With a view to completing its incorporation phase,
capital subscription is important for a public company with share capital, as its subscription will
determine a company’s being able to come into existence or not. In addition, it may determine the final
value of the company’s capital and its ability to assume potential risks before its incorporation.
645
Al-Qlywby, above n 259, 578.
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pay their value in accordance with the provisions of the company’s AoA or MoA.646
Other scholars define the subscription from the point of view of the founder,647 as ‘the
offering of the shares to the public with a view to contributing in the company. If the
offered shares are not fully subscribed, then the company does not exist.’648 Yet other
scholars have tried to provide a more simplified definition by stating that a subscription
is ‘an agreement between the company during its incorporation and each of subscribers
based on the terms and conditions of the agreement’.649
The CL’65 identifies public subscription, comprising both founders and subscribers, by
defining it as the offering of shares to the public to enable them to contribute to the
company’s capital and announcing the subscriber’s desire and obligations depending on
the nature and conditions of their investment.650
Provisions of the CL’65 may be violated during the stage of subscription of a company
made in order for it to be incorporated. This violation will constitute crimes related to
subscription to company shares in violation of the CL’65. It should be pointed out that
such crimes can only occur in relation to a joint stock company (Sharikat Almusahamh
/ ( )شركة المساھمةJSC)651 and a company limited by shares (Sharikat Ataws}yah Bilashum
/ ( ) شركة التوصية باألسھمCLS),652 which are publicly traded companies that offer their
stocks to the general public for subscription. Therefore, the discussion regarding such
crimes will necessarily focus on JSC and CLS.

646

Abdul Aziz Izzat Al-Khayat, Asharikaat fy Ashari‘ah Alislamyah wa Alqanwn Alwad}‘y, Alqism
Ala’wal [Corporations in Islamic Law and the Rule of Law Part I] (Mu>’sasat Arisalah, 3rd ed, 1988) 92.

See Al-Qlywby, above n 259, 587.
See section 2.3.2.1 of Chapter 2 concerning the identification of founder.
648
Al-Qlywby, above n 259, 587.
649
Alghamdi and Hosni, above n 160, 259.
650
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) ss 54, 56.
651
See section 2.6.4 in Chapter 2.
652
See section 2.6.5 in Chapter 2.
647
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Subscription crimes in relation to shares that occur due to violation of the provisions of
the CL’65 are among those forms of corporate crimes committed during the
incorporation stage of a company. These crimes will be addressed through (i) the
examination of the general provisions for subscription to shares, (ii) the person that
commits such crimes, that is, the offender (perpetrator) in the share subscription crimes,
(iii) the conduct (actus reus) of that person, (iv) the mental state (mens rea) of that
person, and (v) the prescribed penalties for breaches relating to procedures for
subscription in the company shares (see below).
5.2.2

General Provisions for Subscription to Company Shares

5.2.2.1 The Legal Obligation for Public Subscription
Section 54 of the CL’65 states that:
If the founders do not reserve all stocks to themselves, they must, within 30
days of the date of publication in the official Gazette of the Royal Decree or
the Minister of Commerce and Industry’s decision authorising the
incorporation of the company, offer for public subscription the stocks for
which they did not subscribe. The Minister of Commerce and Industry may,
if necessary, authorise the extension of such period to not more than 90
days.
It is clear from this section that:
i.

The subscription can be offered to the public during the incorporation of a
company.

ii.

Founders are not obliged by the law to reserve all stock for themselves.
Additionally, the CL’65 does not restrict any particular proportion of the stocks to
be subscribed by the founders, what will residual stock remains available for
public subscription lies in their discretionary power.
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iii.

As soon as the authorising for the incorporation decision is issued, they must offer
for public subscription the stock they did not reserve for themselves. Through this
provision, the CL’65 imposes a legal obligation to make public offer of stock not
held by them.

iv.

The Minister of Commerce and Industry has, however, the discretionary power to
extend the deadline: it can be extended to more than 30 days from the date of
publication in the Official Gazette of the Royal Decree or the Minister of
Commerce and Industry’s decision authorising the incorporation of the company,
but to not more than 90 days from that date. It is to be noted that the extension
period (of up to 60 days) that may be granted by the Minister of Commerce and
Industry starts the day immediately following the expiration of the 30th day, as
provided in section 54 of the CL’65. In this regard, section 56 states that the
subscription lists shall remain open for a period of not less than 10 days and not
more than 90 days. The company shall not be incorporated unless all the shares
are subscribed in the said periods.

5.2.2.2 Invitation to the Public for Subscription
According to section 55 of the CL’65, the general subscription must take place through
banks that are nominated by the Minister of Commerce and Industry; however, the
CL’65 does not specify any criteria or conditions, such as financial criteria, for the
nomination of the banks. The provision of such criteria or conditions would ensure that
the subscription would be done through reliable banks, that is, through those with great
credibility. The transparency of the process would, moreover, further protect the
investors from any abuse of process, and also protect the reputation of the banks and the
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Ministry from any possible suggestion (however misplaced) of corruption or abuse of
due process.
The founders must deposit in any of the nominated banks sufficient numbers of copies
of the company’s AoA (as provided by section 55 of the CL’65). The subscription must
be effected according to a prospectus that has been published in a daily newspaper,
issued at the place where the company has its actual seat, at least five days prior to the
date of the opening of subscription. The prospectus must contain the particulars
mentioned in section 55 of the CL’65. These are: (i) the name, address, occupation and
nationality of founders/promoters of the company; (ii) the name, purpose and
headquarters of the company; (iii) the amount of the company’s capital, paid-up capital,
type of shares (cash shares or shares in kind), their value, the amount of shares offered
for subscription, the shares subscribed by the founders and the terms imposed on
dealing the shares; (iv) the details and rights related to shares in kind; (v) the privileges
granted to the founders and others, if any; (vi) the estimation of the expenses of
incorporating the company; (vii) the commencement, expiry, place and conditions of
subscription; (viii) the method of allotting the shares to the subscribers, if the number of
shares subscribed exceeds the number of shares offered for public subscription; and (ix)
the date of issuance of the Royal Decree licensing the company incorporation, and the
number of the issue of the Official Gazette wherein it was published. The prospectus
must be signed by the founders who have signed the application for the company’s
incorporation.
Section 57 of the CL’65 provides that the subscriber or his/her representative shall sign
the subscription, which must contain: (i) the name, capital and activity of the company,
(ii) the conditions of subscription, and (iii) the name, address, occupation and
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nationality of the subscriber and the number of the shares subscribed by him or her.
Subscribers cannot insert any condition into the prospectus. Any condition laid down by
the subscriber shall be considered as non-existent.653
In this context, several conditions related to the subscription of the company in a
company’s stocks during the initial stage of its incorporation should be mentioned.
These conditions are the following:
i.

The entire capital of the company must be subscribed. The subscriber determines
the number of shares in which he or she desires to subscribe to the capital and
remains bound to pay their value as provided in the AoA or the provisions of
CL’65.654 However, if all the shares are not subscribed within the subscription
period, this period may, by authorisation from the Minister of Commerce and
Industry, be extended to a period of not more than 90 days. The company shall not
be incorporated unless all the shares are subscribed in the said periods.655

ii.

The subscription should be complete and not subject to any condition. Any
condition related to the subscription made by the subscriber, will be deemed
invalid, but it will not affect the validity and enforceability of the subscription.656

iii.

The subscription lists must be kept for a period of not less than 10 days and not
more than 90 days unless the Minister of Commerce and Industry extends it
further. During this period the subscriber can examine and carefully review details
of the prospectus and the company’s AoA in order to decide whether it would be

653

Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 57.
Ibid s 57.
655
Ibid s 56.
656
Ibid s 57.
654
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appropriate to invest in the shares, taking into account all the information
contained in the prospectus and the AoA of company.657
iv.

If the Minister of Commerce and Industry extends the subscription period, this
total period shall not exceed the limit of 90 days.658

5. 3 Forms of Crimes Relating to Subscription to Company Shares Committed in
Violation of the Provisions of the Companies Law 1965 (CL’65)
Section 229(2) of the CL’65 clearly states that:
Any founder or manager659 or member of the Board of Directors660 who
issues an invitation for public subscription in shares in violation of the
CL’65 provisions [this is first crime] and a person who offers these shares
for subscription for the account of the company while he or she knows of
the violation involved [this is the second crime] shall be liable to
imprisonment for a term of not less than three months and not exceeding
one year and a fine of not less than 5,000 Saudi Riyals (SAR)
[approximately USD 1330] and not exceeding SAR 20,000 [approximately
USD 5330] or either or both of these two penalties.661
The crimes related to subscription to company shares during the phase of its
incorporation, their penalties and the offenders involved — according to the
aforementioned section — are as shown in Table 5.1.

657

Ibid s 55.
Ibid s 56.
659
See section 2.3.2.2 of Chapter 2 concerning the identification of manager.
660
See section 2.3.2.1 of Chapter 2 concerning the identification of a member of Board of Directors.
661
Note: all USD approximations are to the nearest dollar.
658
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Table 5.1: Crimes Relating to Subscription to Company Shares Committed in Violation
of the Provisions of the CL’65, Their Offenders and Penalties under the CL’65
Crime

Imprisonment

Fine

Offender

Invitation for subscription 3 months – 1 year
to company shares in
violation of the CL’65*

SAR 5000 – SAR Founder
or
20,000
manager
or
member of the
(approximately USD
Board of Directors
1330) – USD 5330)

Offering company shares 3 months – 1year
for the account of the
company in violation of
the provisions of the
CL’65**

SAR 5000 – SAR Any person
20,000

*

(approximately USD
1330 – USD 5330)

See CL’65 s 229(2)(i).

** See CL’65 s 229(2)(ii).

Through the legal provisions of section 229(2) of the CL’65, the CL’65 has opted to
protect the economic transactions with regard to public subscription. This protection is
provided by prohibiting and preventing the establishment or performance of
untrustworthy business activities. In particular, the CL’65 condemns the offending
conduct that may be committed by a promoter or a manager or a member of the Board
of Directors. The conduct is punishable if the person ‘invites’ the public to subscribe to
company shares in violation of the provisions of the CL’65, irrespective of the possible
knowledge of the misconduct by a third party662 who receives the invitation. Likewise,
the CL’65 prohibits the subscription of company shares in violation of the provisions of
the CL’65 and penalises any person who commits such crime, while aware of this
violation.
In general, the crimes related to the subscription of company shares in violation of the
provisions of the CL’65 committed during its incorporation takes two forms:
662

See section 2.2.1 of Chapter 2 concerning the identification of third party.
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i.

Invitation for subscription to company shares in violation of the CL’65 (section
229(2)(i)) and

ii.

Offering company shares on behalf of the company in violation of the provisions
of the CL’65 (section 229(2)(ii)).

5.3.1

The Crime of Invitation for Public Subscription in Company Shares
Committed in Violation of the Provisions of the Companies Law 1965
(Niz}am
> Asharikaat / ( ) نظام الشركاتCL’65)

According to section 229(2)(i) of CL’65, the first type of crime related to subscription
of company shares is the invitation for subscription when such invitation is in violation
of the CL’65. The said invitation can be issued by any means, such as an announcement
in newspapers, magazines, periodical publications, media publications, letters, and
generally any and all printed material that is not of a personal or private nature.663 The
invitation can also be issued by banks, in the form of an announcement.664 It may also
include speech — that is, using a microphone to make such an announcement in a
public place, or via an advertisement placed on radio or on television.665
The invitation may also be issued via the internet, either through an advertisement on
particular web networks, or through text messages (SMS), voice or visual streams
(MMS) on mobile phones.666 In general, the offer is realised by any act carried out by

663

Kouman and Hamid, above n 104, 36.
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) ss 55, 119, 136.
665
Husni Ahmad Al-Jundi, Alqanwn Aljin’y Lialmu‘amalaat Atijaryah, Alkitab Ala’wal, Alqanwn
Aljin’y Liasharikaat [Criminal Law for Trade Transactions, First Book, Criminal Law for Corporations]
(Dar Anahd}ah Al‘rabiah, 1989) 242.
666
Barry Silverstein, Business to Business Internet Marketing: Seven Proven Strategies for Increasing
Profits Through Internet Direct Marketing (Maximum Press, 4th ed, 2002) 109–20; Avinash Govindjee et
al, Commercial Law 2: Fresh Perspectives (Pearson Education and Prentice Hall, 2007) 224.
664
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the offender to invite the attention of the public to the existence of the subscription for
the shares of the company.667
Such an invitation may be contrary to the provisions of the CL’65 if it was not made in
the manner mandated by the law.
Actus Reus
The issuing of an invitation may take place contrary to the law and may constitute the
actus reus, for example, it may be made in one of the following situations:
i.

When a company is not a public company invites the public to subscribe. This act
is in violation of section 54 of the CL’65 which obliges the founders to offer for
public subscription any shares that have not been underwritten by them but only
in relation to public companies, namely JSC and CLS; or

ii.

when an invitation for subscription through a bank, nominated by Minister of
Commerce and Industry, is not sent; or

iii.

when statements required to be published in the prospectus are not published,
because the omission of such statements is contrary to section 55 of the CL’65; or

iv.

if the subscription was conditional or fictitious, or the duration of the subscription
period was less than 10 days or more than 90 days because this is contrary to the
provisions of sections 56 and 57 of the CL’65; or

v.

if the prospectus does not contain the particulars mentioned in section 55 of the
CL’65 such as the name, address, occupation and nationality of promoters of the

667

Govindjee et al, above n 666, 244.
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company, or does not contain some of such particulars, this violates the CL’65,
such omissions being contrary to this law.
Mens Rea
As a consequence, invitations that are issued in violation of the CL’65, as described
above, be it by a promoter or a manager or a member of the Board of Directors,
constitute a crime, as they violate the provisions of section 229(2)(i) of the CL’65. Such
types of crimes are committed as soon as the act of issuing occurs (that is, the actus
reus). For example, when a company is not a public company invites the public to
subscribe.
The CL’65 has opted not to elaborate upon further requirements with regard to mens rea
for the crime of invitation for public subscription in company shares committed in
violation of the CL’65. This implies that the CL’65 opts for punishment, without being
interested in whether or not the actus reus is coupled with any form of mens rea.668
Thus, the ‘founder’ or ‘manager’ or ‘member of the Board of Directors’ will be held
liable because he or she issued the invitation for subscription to company shares in
violation of the CL’65. Judicial authorities will not examine any further whether this act
took place due to negligence, intent, with knowledge or ignorance, with reckless
disregard, and so forth (a ‘vicious will’ level of mens rea).669

668
669

It is clear from section 229(1) of the CL’65.
Kouman and Hamid, above n 104, 82.
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5.3.2

The Crime of Offering Company Shares for Subscription in Violation of
Provisions of the Companies Law 1965 (Niz}am
> Asharikaat / ) نظام الشركات
(CL’65)

According to section 229(2)(ii) of the CL’65, the element for the criminal conduct
related to the subscription crime committed in violation of provisions of the CL’65 is
the offering of the shares by any person on behalf of the company in violation of the
provisions of the CL’65.670 Shares are offered after the invitation has been sent to the
public for subscription. The offer must be an invitation for subscription. In other words,
the offer must invite the public to subscribe in shares of the company, and the share
must be made to the public.
Actus Reus
As a consequence, any act in offering the shares to subscription in violation of the
CL’65 — by any person and whether directly or indirectly to the public — with a view
to contributing to the creation of the company capital will fulfil the requirements to
establish actus reus of crimes of subscription to company shares under the CL’65.
Thus, offering an invitation for subscription that allows people to be misled so as to
attract capital while bypassing legal requirements will constitute the actus reus of such a
crime. Therefore, a ‘founder’ or a ‘manager’ or a ‘member of the Board of Directors’ or
‘whosoever’ will be criminally responsible for inviting public subscription in company
shares in violation of the provisions of the CL’65, if the mens rea of the offence exists
at the same time.

670

Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 229(2)(ii).
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Mens Rea
Section 229(2)(ii) of the CL’65 stipulates a condition for the occurrence of the crime in
this case and infliction of its penalty on the offender. This condition is that the offender
should know that he or she is issuing an invitation for public subscription in these shares
in violation of the provisions of the CL’65. Thus, the crime cannot be constituted
without the existence of mens rea. For instance, he or she knows that the prospectus
does not satisfy the requirements for the statements to be included therein and that the
shares should not be offered for subscription, or knows that no approval was given for
their issue. If this knowledge is absent and the offender did not know that such an
invitation for public subscription is not permissible, then the mens rea is lacking. So the
second form of the crimes of subscription cannot be committed without the concurrent
existence of the actus reus and mens rea of the offence.
5.3.3

The Offenders in the Crimes Relating to Subscription to Company Shares
Committed in Violation of the Provisions of the Companies Law 1965
(CL’65)

The crimes of subscription to company shares in violation of the provisions of the
CL’65 are committed by:
i.

A ‘founder’ or a ‘manager’ or a ‘member of the Board of Directors’ for the crime
described in section 229(2)(i) of the CL’65 (the crime of invitation for public
subscription in company shares committed in violation of the provisions of the
CL’65), and

ii.

‘Whosoever’ for the crime described in section 229(2)(ii) of the CL’65 (the crime
of offering company shares for subscription in violation of the provisions of the
CL’65).
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The provisions related to offenders in the crimes of subscription to company shares that
have been briefly summarised above will be analysed in the following section below.
5.3.3.1.1 The Offender in the Crime of Invitation for Public Subscription in
Company Shares Committed in Violation of the Provisions of the

Asharikaat
Companies Law 1965 (Niz}am
> Asharik
aat / ( ) نظام الشركاتCL’65)
Section 229(2)(i) of the CL’65 clearly restricts the crime of invitation for public
subscription to three persons: the founder/promoter, the manager, and a member of the
Board of Directors.
The founder/promoter
According to section 53 of the CL’65, the founder is whoever (i) signed the MoA of a
JSC, (ii) applied for the licence for its incorporation, and (iii) contributed shares in kind
or actually participated in the incorporation of a company.
According to section 155 of the CL’65, provisions for a JSC also apply to a CLS in the
following circumstances and in regard to the following matters: (i) during the phase of
the company’s incorporation and its declaration, with the exception of the provisions
stated in section 52 of the CL’65 concerning the Royal Decree authorising the
incorporation of the JSC;671 (ii) the stock provisions and their pertinent rights and
obligations,672 (iii) provisions regarding to the shareholders Meetings,673 (iv) provisions

671

Section of the CL’65 52 states: ‘According to section 52 of the CL’65, the following JSCs cannot be
incorporated, unless a Royal Decree is issued, based on the approval of the Council of Ministers and
presentation of the Minister of Commerce and Industry: (i) Concessionary companies, (ii) companies
managing a public utility, (iii) companies receiving a subsidy from the Government, (iv) companies in
which the Government or any other public juristic person participates, and (v) companies engaged in
banking activities.’ For further details, see section 2.4.2.4 in Chapter 2.
672
Shares give equal rights to and impose equal obligations on their owner. Each share of a company is to
be equal in value. This equality in value entails equality in rights granted by the share, equality in
dividends, voting, obtaining a share of the company assets upon liquidation, attendance at shareholders
meetings, participation in their deliberations, and obligations that are created by the share. See the
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) ss 103, 108.
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with respect to the company finances674 and (v) the word ‘managers’ shall be replaced
with the phrase ‘members of the Board of Directors’ wherever it is mentioned in the
JSC. The provisions of section 53 of the CL’65 apply to the founder of a CLS.
Consequently, the person who signed the MoA of a CLS, applied for the licence for its
incorporation, and contributed shares in kind or actually participated in the
incorporation of a CLS shall be deemed a founder.
As mentioned in section 54 of the CL’65, if the founders do not reserve all stocks to
themselves, they must offer the remainder (those stocks which they have not
subscribed) for public subscription. A founder plays an important role with regard to the
incorporation a company, especially for the duration of the subscription. He or she is the
one who actually participates in the phase of the company’s incorporation, with the
intention of assuming the responsibility arising thereby. He or she is, in addition, the
person who issues an invitation for public subscription to form the company. The CL’65
through section 229(2)(i) attempts to ensure that a founder, who had an important role
in incorporating the company, is subject to criminal liability, when that person breaches
the legal requirements that constitute the crime of invitation for public subscription in
violation of the CL’65.
The manager
The CLS is a public company that offers its shares for subscription to the general public
and it is managed by one or more general partners. The manager of the CLS may
commit the crime of invitation for public subscription in company shares in violation of
673

The AoA of the company shall indicate who of the shareholders has the right to attend General
Meetings (GM); nevertheless, whoever owns 20 shares has the right to attend the GMs even if the AoA of
the company stipulates otherwise. See the Companies Law 1965 (KSA) ss 83–97.
674
Section 129 of the CL’65 states that the shareholders shall monitor the accounts of the company
according to the provision stipulated in the CL’65 with regard to ss 130, 132 and 133 that regulate the
supervision of the company accounts.
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provisions of the CL’65. Therefore, it could be argued that the word ‘manager’ in
section 229(2) of the CL’65 includes the manager of the CLS, for he or she is the one
who commits the crime of invitation for the public to subscribe to company shares in
violation of the provisions of the CL’65, which is the actus reus in such crime.675
Section 152 of the CL’65 provides that a CLS shall be managed by one or more general
partners. Their powers, liability and removal shall be subject to the provisions
governing managers in a general partnership company (Sharikat Atad}amun / شركة
( )التضامنGPC).676 According to section 155(4) of the CL’65, the managers of a CLS
resemble the members of the Board of Directors in a JSC with regard to the nature of
their functions, so the same provisions governing JSC board members are applied to the
managers of a CLS.677 The Board of Directors in a JSC is the executive authority in the
company.
Given the preceding description of potential offenders, a manager is the one held
criminally responsible for making the invitation for public subscription to stocks of a
company in violation of the legal provisions under section 229(2) of the CL’65.678
The Member of the Board of Directors
The Board of Directors may be identified as an executive body that manages a
company’s affairs.679 However, the Board is primarily responsible for determining
corporate policies. In practice, these policies are normally assigned to the managers.680

675

Kouman and Hamid, above n 104, 74.
For further information about the provisions governing managers in GPC, see sections 27–34 of the
CL’65.
677
Section 155(4) of the CL’65 states: ‘The word “managers” shall be replaced with the phrase “members
of the Board of Directors” wherever it is mentioned in the JSC part.’
678
Kouman and Hamid, above n 104, 75.
679
See section 2.3.2.1 of Chapter 2 concerning the identification of a member of Board of Directors.
676
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The Board members are the third category of persons (after the founder and manager)
who are addressed in section 229(2)(i) of the CL’65 and the third one to be subject to
the criminal liability and the penalty prescribed for committing a violation provided in
section 229(2)(i) of the CL’65. These catogories including the Board members can be
held criminally liable because they are generally legal representatives of a company.
They will be held criminally liable when they commit the crime of invitation for public
subscription in violation of the CL’65. However, if a suit cannot be brought against
founders or managers or Board members of a company found guilty of the crime of
invitation for public subscription in company shares, the fine for the said crime is
applied to the company itself.681
5.3.3.2 The Offender in the Crime of Offering Company Shares for Subscription
in Violation of Provisions of the Companies Law 1965 (Niz}am
> Asharikaat /
( ) نظام الشركاتCL’65)
With regard to the crime of offering company shares for subscription in violation of
provisions of the CL’65, the provision of section 229(2)(ii) of the CL’65 makes it clear
that the Saudi Law does not explicitly restrict incrimination to an appointed person as
far as his or her function in the company is concerned.682 The scope of incrimination has
been widened with a view to including any person that commits such crime within the
frame of the said section. In particular, the text of this section uses the word ‘whoever’
with no restriction as to a certain role of the person or entity. Therefore, the CL’65
penalises the act of any person who offers company shares for subscription in violation
of provisions of the CL’65 whether the offender is one of the persons mentioned in
680

Mohammed Taufiq Saudi, Almasu>lyah Almadanyah wa Aljena’yah lia‘d}a’ Majlis Idarat Asharikah
Almusahimah ‘n A‘maal Asharikah [Civil and Criminal Liability of Company’s Board of Directors of

Joint Stock Company for its Operations] (Dar Ala’myn, 2002) 31, 32.
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 231.
682
Kouman and Hamid, above n 104, 81.
681
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section 229(2)(i) of the CL’65 or any other person. Rather, it imposes liability on any
person regardless of his or her relation to the issuer of shares. Similar provisions can be
found in the laws of various Arabic jurisdictions that impose criminal liability on those
who are offering shares for subscription contrary to the law, without mentioning the
person’s position in the company. These laws include, for example, section 322(2) of
the Companies Law 1984 in the United Arab Emirates (UAE),683 section 324(4) of the
Commercial Companies Law 2002 (Qatar),684 and section 361(2) of the Commercial
Companies Law 2001 (Bahrain).685 With respect to whether or not lawmakers should
mention the function of the person that commits such crimes, there are scholars who
argue that ‘certainty about the persons who are liable for a contravention of the law
generally works better than any ambiguity or uncertainty in respect of the identification
of the potential accused’.686
Regarding the possibility of penalising a company for the crime of offering company
shares for subscription during its incorporation in violation of provisions of the CL’65,

683

Section 323(2) of the Companies Law 1984 (UAE) states: ‘Without prejudice to a more severe
punishment prescribed in any other law, he shall be punished with a fine of not less than ten thousand
Dirhams and not more than one hundred thousand Dirhams [AED]: Anyone who disposes of stocks
inconsistently with the provisions established by this law. Anyone who issues shares, subscription
receipts, temporary certificates or stocks or who offers the same for circulation inconsistently with the
provisions of this law.’
684
Section 361(4) of the Commercial Companies Law 2001 (Bahrain) states that ‘Every founder or
director who announces the public to underwrite in the securities, whatsoever, on account of the company
other than the shareholding or securities partnership companies and all those who offer such securities for
underwriting on account of the Company.’
685
Section 361(2) of the Commercial Companies Law 2001 (Bahrain) states that ‘Any founder, manager
or board member who has invited the public to subscribe for shares or bonds in contravention of the
provisions of this law and whoever has offered these shares or bonds for subscription for the account of
the company with his knowledge of this violation.’
686
Solaiman, 'Investor Protection and Criminal Liabilities for Defective Prospectuses’, above n 22, 473.
Moreover, it is argued that the enforcement of section 229(2)(ii) of the CL’65 would be more easier and
more convenient for both the judiciary and the prosecutors, if the potentially liable persons are
categorically mentioned in the section. Solaiman states: ‘A clear identification of potentially liable
persons in the legislation would automatically work as an inhibition to the commission of an offence to
some extent.’ See Solaiman, 'Investor Protection and Criminal Liabilities for Defective Prospectuses’,
above n 22, 473. It would will also be helpful for the enforcement of the liability provided in section
229(2)(ii) of the CL’65: at 473.
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the company may be held criminally liable and receive a penalty under section 231 of
the CL’65 when its representatives cannot be sued from any reasons whatsoever.
5. 4 Crime of Exaggerating the Estimation of Shares in Kind under the
Companies Law 1965 (Niz}am
> Asharikaat / ( ) نظام الشركاتCL’65)
Shares in kind and shares in cash are two essential elements in financing a company.
They are contributed by a shareholder in the company’s capital during the stage of its
incorporation. During this phase, a crime related to shares in kind can be committed.
This is the crime of exaggerating the estimation of shares in kind. This crime constitutes
the second type of crimes related to the formation of company’s capital during the initial
stage of its incorporation. This crime will be addressed below through an analysis of its
provisions with regard to exaggerating of shares in kind, conduct (actus reus), mental
state (mens rea), as well as the penalties imposed.
5.4.1

General Provisions of Shares in Kind

5.4.1.1 Contribution in Kind for Incorporation of a New Company
Under section 3 of the CL’65 the shares that create the company’s capital are either cash
or share in kind.687 The cash share is dominant in the creation of companies. A
shareholder undertakes to pay an amount of money by a certain date, with that date
being agreed among the founders.688 The share in kind is personal property, such as land
and real estate, contributed by a shareholder to the company.689 It can be, among other
things, movable property, equipment, machinery, instruments, commodities and so on.

687

Section 3 of the CL’65 states: ‘The partner’s share may be an amount of money (cash share) or share
in kind. It may also be in the form of work in cases not specified in the provisions of this law. However,
the partner’s share shall not be in the form of his/her influence or financial standing. Cash and in kind
shares only form the company's capital.’
688
Alghamdi and Hosmi, above n 160, 154.
689
Hanrahan, Ramsay and Stapledon, above n 339, 357.
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If a company’s MoA does not specify the partners’ proportions of the profits and losses
of the company, such proportions shall be determined based on their cash and their
contributions in kind to the company capital.690
Section 162 of the CL’65 provides that the limited liability company (Asharikah dhat

Almasw’liah Almah}dudah / ( )الشركة ذات المسؤولية المحدودةLLC)691 cannot be incorporated
unless all cash shares and shares in kind are distributed amongst partners and the value
of each share is fully paid. Therefore, both cash shares and shares in kind play a very
important role in the incorporation of the company. They constitute the company’s
capital, which is necessary to achieve the objective for which the company was
incorporated.692
5.4.1.2 Estimation of Shares in Kind
When payment is made either in cash or in kind, an independent expert valuation is
needed, in order to correctly value the contribution.693 Objective evaluation (that is, an
independent valuation) may prevent exaggeration of the value of these shares. In this
way, third parties who deal with the company will be properly informed of actual net
capital levels. In addition, an objective evaluation may determine both the balance
between the assets and the liabilities of a company, and reflect its real level of capital
and its financial capacity in the market. This information and the resulting balance will
inform potential investors as to whether the company may be able to function
successfully or not. This could protect the company’s interests and reputation, and help
ensure financial integrity which could assist a company avoid financial collapse or
690

Companies Law 1965 (KSA) ss 9, 53.
See section 2.3.2.2 in Chapter 2.
692
Mohammed Ibrahim, Asharikaat Atijaryah, Alah}kaam Al‘aamah Sharikaat Alashkhaas} [Commercial
Corporation, General Roles, Individual Corporations] (Faculty of Law Tanta University, 2008) 36.
693
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 60.
691
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major lawsuits. There is also danger for the partners who hold cash shares, because
exaggeration in the shares in kind enables their holders to obtain some profit that is in
fact the right of the holders of cash shares.694 Moreover, any incorrect share in kind
valuation will have a direct impact on the amount of net income for each share, which
leads to an effect upon the net income/profit of a company.
Shares in kind must be appraised without exaggeration, because such exaggeration will
harm the company, its creditors, and shareholders. To sum up, incorrect valuations have
a profound negative impact on economic performance within the country. Moreover,
they affect views held elsewhere about the integrity of a particular market or market
segment and therefore the desirability of investing in a particular country and, thus, on
subsequent investment decisions.
In fact, the CL’65 does not clarify the general origin of the specific procedures to be
followed in evaluating shares in kind; however, sections 60 and 61 refer to procedures
in respect of shares in kind which are contributed to a JSC. Section 60 of the CL’65
states that if there are shares in kind of the founders or others, the Companies General
Department (Al’idarah Al‘aamah Liasharikaat / (( )اإلدارة العامة للشركاتCGD) in the
Ministry of Commerce and Industry shall, at the request of the founders, ‘appoint one or
more experts to verify the accuracy of the evaluation of the shares in kind’. Section 61
of the CL’65 states that the founders shall invite the underwriters to a Constituent
Meeting to convene according to the situations stipulated in the company’s AoA.695 The
period from the invitation date till the convention date, however, must not be less than

694
695

Yahya, above n 220, 230.
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 61.
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fifteen days.696 Where shares in kind or special privileges exist, the Constituent Meeting
shall not convene prior to the elapse of fifteen days as of the date of depositing the
report, as indicated in section 61 of the CL’65, at the company head office. Each
underwriter shall, whatever his/her stocks are, have the right to attend the Constituent
Meeting; and it is stipulated for the meeting to be considered valid, it must be attended
by a number of underwriters, those underwriters representing at least half the total
capital.697 If the majority is not available, invitations for another meeting shall be sent
and the meeting shall be convened at least fifteen days after the invitation.698 This
meeting shall be valid with the attendance of any number of underwriters.699 Section 60
of the CL’65 states that if there are shares in kind for the founders or others, the CGD in
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry shall, at the request of the founders, appoint one
or more experts in order to verify the accuracy of the evaluation of the shares in kind.
The expert shall submit his or her report to the CGD within 30 days as of his assignment
date; and the CGD may, based on the expert’s request, grant him or her another respite
not exceeding 30 days.700
From the content of the above two sections (60 and 61 of the CL’65), the said
procedures could be limited in respect of evaluation of shares in kind which are
contributed in a JSC as follows:
i.

The CGD, upon request of the founders, is to appoint one or more experts to
ascertain the correctness of the evaluation of shares in kind.701

696

Ibid s 61.
Ibid.
698
Ibid.
699
Ibid.
700
Ibid.
701
Ibid s 60.
697
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ii.

Such expert is then to submit a report to the CGD within 30 days of the date of
his/her assignment to perform the work. The CGD may, however, upon the
request of the expert, grant him/her a delay not exceeding 30 days.702

iii.

The CGD is to send a copy of the expert’s report to the founders who must
communicate it to the subscribers at least 15 days prior to the holding of the
Constituent Meeting,703 the said report also is to be filed at the company’s head
office; and every interested party has the right to see it.704

iv.

The Constituent Meeting shall be held to discuss the report and vote on the
evaluation of shares in kind. This shall be by the numerical majority possessing
two thirds of the shares or the cash shares, after excluding what is owned by the
contributors of the shares in kind or the beneficial or special shares. The
contributors of these shares shall not have the right to vote in this matter, even if
they are holders of the shares or of cash shares.705

v.

The report shall be laid before the Constituent Meeting for deliberation. If the
meeting resolves to reduce the value fixed for the contributions in kind, such
reduction must be approved during the meeting by the contributors in kind. If they

702

Ibid.
Section 62 of the CL’65 states: ‘[T]he constituent meeting shall have competence on of the following
issues: (i) Verify underwriting of all capital and, according to provisions of this Law, performance of
minimum of the capital and the entitled deserved amount of the stocks value, (ii) draw up final
stipulations of the AoA of the company but the assembly may not introduce essential amendments to the
Law presented before it, save with the approval of all underwriters represented in it, (iii) appointment of
the first Board of Directors’ members for a term not exceeding five years and the first auditor of accounts
if they have not already been designated in the MoA or AoA of the company and (iv) discuss the
founders’ report on the operations and expenditures required by the company incorporation.’
704
Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 60.
705
Ibid s 61.
703
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refuse to approve the reduction, the MoA of the company shall be considered null
and void with regard to all its members.706
vi.

Shares representing shares in kind shall be delivered to their holders only after the
full transfer of such shares in kind to the company.707

5.4.2

Elements of the Crime of Exaggerating the Estimation of Shares in Kind

Company capital needs the protection of laws in order to be amassed successfully and to
be able to be used to participate in a healthy and attractive national economy. Because
of that section 229(3) of the CL’65 states that:
Any partner or third party who exaggerates in bad faith an evaluation of
shares in kind or special privileges shall be liable for imprisonment for not
less than three months and not exceeding one year and a fine of not less than
SAR 5000 [approximately USD 1330] and not exceeding SAR 20,000
[approximately USD 5330] or either of these two penalties.
The legal provision of section 229(3) of CL’65 aims to protect confidence and stability
in economic relations and, in particular, the formation of a commercial entity capital
through the prohibition of any manipulation related to its shares in kind. In particular,
the mentioned section condemns the offending conduct that may be committed by a
promoter or any person involved with bad faith (mala fides) by ‘exaggerating’ the
estimation of shares in kind as an important part in a company’s capital during its
incorporation.
Hence, the crime of exaggerating the estimation of a company’s shares in kind during
its incorporation in terms of actus reus is defined in section 229(3) of the CL’65 as the
act of presenting a higher value of company shares, demonstrating bad faith. It is clear
706
707

Ibid s 60.
Ibid.
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from the said section that the actus reus in this crime consists in such overestimation or
exaggeration of the property, while the mens rea consists of the element of ‘bad faith’
during the exaggeration. These elements are discussed in some detail below.
5.4.2.1 Exaggeration in Evaluating Shares in Kind: The Element of Actus Reus
Evaluation of shares in kind implies the estimation of the actual value of such shares in
order to assign to their holders shares in the company’s capital equal to that value.708
The timing of the evaluation of the shares in kind is often important in instances where
their value is exaggerated.709 The CL’65 provides the rules of evaluating of shares in
kind only in the JSCs (under sections 60 and 61 of the CL’65).
The actus reus in this crime takes the form of exaggeration in the evaluation of the
shares in kind, that is, evaluating them at a higher value than their actual value.
Therefore, if this evaluation is actually less than the real value of the shares in kind (that
is, that the evaluation was not exaggerated but that the value was, in fact,
underestimated), the crime of exaggeration will not be constituted as provided for in
section 229(3) of the CL’65. However, actus reus in this crime is not enough to
constitute crime. Both knowledge of exaggeration and an intention to violate the CL’65
(mens rea) are required to be present at the time of commission of actus reus. Thus,
proof of the crime of exaggeration in the evaluation of shares in kind in bad faith, either
by any of the partners or any other person, requires both actus reus and mens rea. This
is obvious from the use of the term ‘bad faith’ in section 229(3) of the CL’65.710

708

Al-Jundi, above n 665, 227.
Radwan, above n 596, 140.
710
Kouman and Hamid, above n 104, 82.
709
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5.4.2.2 Bad Faith: The Element of Mens Rea
The intention of this crime is that the offender intends to commit the criminal conduct
despite his or her knowledge that the action is in violation of the provisions of law.711
This is shown in the crime stated in section 229(3) of the CL’65 where the mens rea of
the offender is the ‘bad faith’ that is directed to deception by evaluating the share in
kind at more than its ‘true’ value.712 This mens rea should be directed to creating the
prohibited act which is represented in inserting this exaggerated value in the company
capital, which act then renders part of the stated company capital fictitious.
In this crime, the offender, whether a partner, or a third party such as an expert, knows:
(i) that the value he/she gave to the share in kind is exaggerated; and (ii) that the said
exaggeration was made in bad faith.
Therefore, it could be argued that exaggeration ‘in bad faith’ means that the person who
exaggerated the value of the shares in kind knows the real value of the said shares.
Thus, such crime cannot be committed by negligence under the CL’65. Moreover, if the
person (whether shareholder or any partner or founder or a third party) who made the
exaggerated estimation did so with no knowledge that the act is illegal or with no
intention to commit such offence, he or she would not be guilty, despite the
consequences of his or her action.713 Thus, the provision of section 229(3) of the CL’65
does not apply.

711

Ibid 113.
Ibid.
713
Ibid 82.
712
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5.4.3

Offenders of the Crime of Exaggerating the Estimation of Shares in Kind

Section 229(3) of the CL’65 divides the offenders in the crime of exaggerating the
estimation of shares in kind into two categories: (i) founders/promoters, and (ii) third
party / any person.
It should be noted that section 229(3) of the CL’65 explicitly provides for ‘partners’ as
potential offenders as well as persons that fall under the term ‘third party’. In fact, the
phrase ‘third party’ extends to include any person — such as groups of professionals,
agents, experts — other than founders.714 The CL’65 probably explicitly provides for
founders as result of importance of the role of the founders in collecting and estimating
the shares of kind during the formation of a company.
In this regard, section 60 of the CL’65 states that if there are shares in kind for the
founders or others, the CGD in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry shall, at the
request of the founders, appoint one or more experts to appraise the justification for the
valuations of shares in kind. Also, section 63 of the CL’65 states that the founders shall,
within 15 days as of the date of conclusion of the Constituent Meeting session, submit
an application to the Minister of Commerce and Industry for declaring the company’s
incorporation, and the following documents shall be attached to the said application: (i)
an attestation that all the capital has been underwritten, and what the shareholders paid
of the value of the stocks, and a list of their names and the number of stocks each one of
them has underwritten; (ii) minutes of the Constituent Meeting, (iii) the AoA of the
company that has been approved by the Constituent Meeting, and (iv) decisions of the
Constituent Meeting concerning the founders’ report, and evaluation of shares in kind.

714

Alghamdi and Hosni, above n 160, 174.
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Thus, based on the content of the two sections (sections 60 and 63 of the CL’65)
mentioned above, ‘a third party’ should include the expert who was appointed to
ascertain the actual and real value of shares in kind in order to assign the reported
evaluation of the shares in the company’s capital to their owners during the company’s
incorporation. Likewise, it should include any partner at the Constituent Meeting who
takes a decision and approves the said decision (with the exception of those who
objected to it).
To sum up, the alleged offender in the crime of exaggerating the estimation of shares in
kind is a company’s founder or any person, such as an expert or shareholder, as to
whom there is sufficient evidence to determine that he or she has committed the crime
set forth in section 229(3) of the CL’65.715
5. 5 Punishment for Crimes Relating to Formation of a Company Capital during
the Phase of its Incorporation
As has been addressed in this chapter, the crimes of formation of company capital are
comprised of two types of crimes: firstly, crimes relating to subscription in company
shares committed in violation of provisions of the CL’65, which include crimes in
regard to (i) the invitation for public subscription in company shares, and (ii) offering
company shares for subscription; and, secondly, the crime of exaggerating the
estimation of shares in kind.
Section 229 of the CL’65 provides, without prejudice to what is provided in Shari‘ah
law, that:

715

Kouman and Hamid, above n 104, 113. In this regard, section 433(4) of the French Companies Act
1966, section 162(3) of the Egyptian Companies Act 1981 and section 324(3) of the Commercial
Companies Act 2002 (Qatar) inflict a penalty on everyone who over-estimates the value of shares in kind.
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i.

any founder or manager, or member of the Board of Directors who issues an
invitation for public subscription in shares in violation of the CL’65 provisions,716

ii.

a person who offers these shares for subscription on behalf of a company while
he/she knows of the violation involved,717 and

iii.

any partner or third party who exaggerates in bad faith an evaluation of shares in
kind,718

shall be liable for imprisonment for a term of not less than three months and not
exceeding one year and a fine of not less than SAR 5000 (approximately USD 1330)
and not exceeding SAR 20,000 (approximately USD 5330) or either or both of these
two penalties.
In this regard, company laws in many Arab countries have provisions that explicitly
prohibit such crimes. Among such countries and regional organisations is the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC). Section 322 of the Companies Law1984 (UAE) imposes a
term of imprisonment of not less than three months and not exceeding two years, and a
fine of not less than AED 10,000 (approximately USD 2720) and not exceeding AED
100,000 (approximately USD 27,220) or either of these two penalties, on: (i) every
founder or manager who invites the public to subscribe in the shares of a limited
liability company, (ii) anyone who offers such shares to the account of the company,
and (iii) anyone, who mala fides, evaluates shares in kind contributed by the partners as
of greater worth than their actual value.

716

Companies Law 1965 (KSA) s 229(2)(i).
Ibid s 229(2)(ii).
718
Ibid s 229(3).
717
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With respect to Kuwait, section 246 of its Commercial Companies Act 1960 imposes a
term of imprisonment of not more than three years and a fine of not less than KWD
5000 (approximately USD 17,610) and not exceeding KWD 20,000 (approximately
USD 70,460) or either of these two penalties on: (i) whoever issues an invitation for
public subscription in shares in violation of the law, and (ii) whoever, whether partners
or a third party, who evaluates shares in kind for more than their actual value by fraud.
Section 324 of the Commercial Companies Law 2002 (Qatar) penalises: (i) every
founder or director invites the public for subscription in the securities on account of the
company other than in shareholding or securities partnership companies; (ii) any person
who offers such securities, and (iii) everyone who estimates in bad faith shares in kind
for a value greater than their actual value. Penalties are a term of imprisonment not
exceeding two years or a fine of not less than QAR 10,000 (Qatari Riyal, QAR)
(approximately USD 2750) and not exceeding QAR 100,000 (approximately USD 27,
450).
These categories of crimes relating to the formation of company capital in some of the
GCC member countries, together with their criminal sanctions, are shown in Table 5.2,
in order to compare the level of penalties imposed in the KSA.
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Table 5.2: Crimes Relating to the Formation of Companies’ Capital, and Their
Punishments under Company Laws in Selected GCC Member Countries *
State
Crime

KSA

UAE

Kuwait

Qatar

Invitation
for
public
subscription in
company shares,
or
offering
company shares
for subscription,
or exaggerating
the estimation of
shares in kind

Invitation
for
public
subscription in
company shares,
or
offering
company shares
for subscription,
or exaggerating
the estimation of
shares in kind

Invitation
for
public
subscription in
company shares,
or exaggerating
the estimation of
shares in kind

Invitation
for
public
subscription in
company
securities,
or
offering company
securities
for
subscription, or
exaggerating the
estimation
of
shares in kind

Penalty
of 3 months – 1 year 3 months – 2 No minimum – 3 No minimum – 2
years
years
years
imprisonment
Penalty
fine**

of SAR 5000 – SAR AED 10,000 – KWD
20,000

5000
KWD 20,000

100,000

– QAR 10,000 –
QAR 100,000

(approximately
(approximately
(approximately
(approximately
USD 1330 –USD USD 2720 – USD 17,610 – USD 2750 –
5330)
USD 27,220)
USD 70,460)
USD 27,450)
* Source: Section 229 of the CL’65 (KSA), section 322 of the Companies Law1984 (UAE), section 246
of the Commercial Companies Act 1960 (Kuwait) and section 324 of the Commercial Companies Law
2002 (Qatar).
** Fines applicable crimes relating to the formation of companies’ capital and their sanctions under
companies laws in some of the GCC member countries that are the concern of this thesis.

Table 5.2 shows that there is a variation in the level of sanctions. All the countries
mentioned in the table impose sanctions stronger than those of the KSA. It is clear that
the sanctions, both in terms of the length of imprisonment or even the level of fines able
to be imposed for the crimes relating to formation of company capital under the CL’65,
are the weakest compared to other company laws within the GCC. This is particularly
so as the CL’65 grants the court discretionary power to impose either of the two
penalties (imprisonment or fine) or both. For example, imprisonment is optional for the
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court in the KSA, and the fine applicable has very low minimum. Such provisions for
penalising those found guilty of the relevant crimes under the legislation clearly lack a
sufficient minimum fine and have no threat of mandatory imprisonment, and are
unlikely to deter those intent on dangerous financial crimes, such as corporate crimes.
Thus, it could be argued that the penalties in terms of both imprisonment and fines are
weak and do not effectively deter offenders. Increased severity of the penalties would,
arguably, lead to a preventive effect due to the fear that the penalties would be applied
where breaches are detected; and thus that increased penalties may reduce corporate
crimes rate. It is inevitable that penalties be provided that are more suited to the gravity
of these crimes, so that the penalties would have a greater deterrent effect.
In this regard it is worth noting that where a suit cannot be brought against the
individual who has committed the crimes relating to formation of a company capital
committed during its incorporation under section 229(2)–(3) of the CL’65, the fine for
such crimes can be imposed on the company in its capacity as a legal person.
Furthermore, this fine shall be doubled in the case of recidivism.719 It is evident that, the
liability of a company is not restricted to the actions made by its representatives. The
company shall be considered criminally liable for the offences committed by its
representatives during the performance of their functions in the scope of employment or
delegated to them. Nevertheless it should be noted that the penalties provided in this
section are not commensurate with the crimes, particularly given that these crimes may
be committed against innocent investors. And, as mentioned earlier, some companies
may be able to absorb such fines with little difficulty, thus further reducing their
deterrent value. This is a further argument for escalating the fines for such activities,

719

Ibid s 231.
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particularly where the fine is to be applied at the company level, thus diluting its effect
on any individual party.
It should also be mentioned that section 229(2)–(3) of the CL’65 does not provide any
solution concerning vicarious liability in terms of the crimes relating to formation of a
company capital during the phase of its incorporation. Therefore, it appears that no
penalty has been incurred as a result of vicarious liability in such crimes. Additionally,
the said section does not mention any supplementary penalty — such as the deprivation
of a right to continue commercial activities720 — that would enhance the original
penalties (of imprisonment and/or fine) and would deter companies and their
representatives from committing such crimes.721
5. 6 Conclusions
The lawmaker in the KSA has tried to impose — as presented in the above discussion of
section 229(2)–(3) of the CL’65 — rules of transparency, which may promote trust in
economic transactions. This legislative intervention focuses, firstly, on the act of
subscription and, secondly, on the value of the share, which has to correspond to its true
value.
According to this writer’s view, a new, revised Companies Law, with stronger
punishments (that is, heavier fines and/or longer imprisonment) could more effectively
protect the stock market and the investors. In this way, the Saudi lawmaker could
safeguard commercial transactions more efficiently and forbid a behaviour leading to
the deception of the third parties.

720

Either for a set period, or one that would involve the termination of the company’s right to conduct
such activities.
721
For defences and in order to avoid a repetition of information, see Chapter 4.
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As a consequence and with regard to the crimes committed during the phase of the
incorporation of a company concerning its capital, the CL’65 rules that the acts of: (i)
issuing of an invitation for subscription in violation of the CL’65, (ii) offering for
subscription while knowing that the CL’65 is violated, and (iii) exaggerating in bad
faith the value of the shares constitute crimes punishable by section 229 of the CL’65.
Those found to have committed such crimes are rendered liable to a fine ranging from
approximately USD 1330 to one not exceeding approximately USD 5330 or
imprisonment for a term from a minimum of three months to not in inxcess of one year,
or both.722 To this end, and in order to avoid facing the punishment imposed by the
CL’65, the following needs to be done:
i.

the issuing of an invitation should be done by the persons mentioned in section
229(2) of the CL’65 lawfully;

ii.

the offers for subscription should be done also lawfully, or in the worst case,
without the knowledge that the law is being violated; and

iii.

the value of the shares should correspond to their real economic value (as
mentioned in section 229(3) of the CL’65).

In this way, good faith and order can be maintained in the corporate capital raising
process. The crimes, however, related to the formation of the company’s capital during
its incorporation are committed when third parties become aware of the invitation to
subscribe in violation law, or when the value of the shares is exaggerated. In addition,
the CL’65 does not demand that a concrete damage or loss is caused to the financial
interests of assets of the third party.
722

Further analysis about sanctions stipulated under section 229 of the CL’65 see section 4.5 in Chapter

4.
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This chapter has revealed the weakness of the CL’65 in terms of the penalties for crimes
related to formation of company capital during the phase of its incorporation as
compared to those sanctions provided under company laws of some of the GCC
member states. In addition, this discussion has demonstrated that the CL’65 does not
provide for a clear explanation for persons who are held criminally liable for the crime
of offering company shares for subscription, under the scope of application of section
229(2)(ii) of the CL’65, which is considered another flaw in the CL’65. These
shortcomings may have a negative impact on the effective enforcement of the relevant
provisions of company laws and regulations in the KSA, which will be discussed in
detail in the following chapters.
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Chapter 6
6 Judicial Enforcement of Corporate Crimes under the
Companies Law 1965
6. 1 Introduction
The judicial enforcement of law is a basic approach to judicial reform. Law enforcement
evidences clearly the accomplishment of the inherent objectives of a certain law.723 The
benefit of enacting any law is based either on the voluntary obedience and adherence to
the provisions of such law, or on its compulsory enforcement efficiently, expeditiously
and justly by the competent authorities.724 To this end, the judicial enforcement of law
constitutes a vital tool to any legislative reform.
Indeed, if the legislative provisions and judicial rulings are not enforced, then the
promulgation of legislation and the issuance of judgments would be basically in vain.725
There is no doubt that enforcement of judicial rulings is one of the most important
stages of judicial proceedings, because it reflects justice in society by incarnating and
translating the wording of the judgment from theoretical texts into a concrete practical
reality, which through the judicial decision restores rights to their owners, and promotes
justice and stability in a country.726

723

S M Solaiman, 'Investor Protection and Judicial Enforcement of Disclosure Regime in Bangladesh: A
Critique' (2005) 34(3) Common Law World Review 229, 230.
724
Mohammed Abdullah Al-Shinqiti, 'Tanfiydh Ala’h}kaam fy Aniz}am
>
Alqad}a’iyy Tat}awu>ru>h
Attariykhiyy wa Atharu>h fy Tah}qiyq Al’mn' [Executing Verdicts in Judiciary, Its Historical
Development and its Influence on Achieving Security] (2006) 28 Majallat Al‘dl 1, 40; Solaiman,
‘Investor Protection and Judicial Enforcement’, above n 723, 230.
725
Al-Shinqiti, above n 724, 35.
726
Ibid.
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The enforcement of commercial judicial judgments on commercial disputes plays a
basic role in making the country’s investments flourish.727 One study, for instance,
found that in terms of encouraging foreign finance, the effectiveness of legal institutions
is of a far greater influence than that of the provision of new commercial legal texts.728
In addition to courts being formed, safeguarding a high level of education of the judges
and their assistants remains the most important stage for establishing the continuous
evolution of definitions and decisions in a changing commercial environment.729
A failure to enforce judicial decisions or a delay in their enforcement will endanger the
reputation of judicial authorities; they will come to be regarded as ineffective. It will,
further, lead to a loss of public confidence, especially among foreign investors, who will
find out that their rights, instead of being protected by the national laws, are put in
danger.730 It is not reasonable for a court to issue its judgments just as ‘ink on paper’
with no way to enforce them.731
Public confidence in the commercial courts in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is
still lacking. Reasons for this are, according to this writer, the following: (i) judges and
lawyers are not appropriately well qualified; (ii) the commercial laws such as the
Companies Law 1965 (Niz}am
> Asharaikaat / ( )نظام الشركاتCL’65)732 and the Commercial
Court Law 1931 (Niz}am
> Almah}kamah Atijary>ah / ( )نظام المحكمة التجاريةCCL’31)733 have

727

Sevrani, Gorica and Matruku, above n 38, 46.
Katharina Pistor, Martin Raiser and Stanislaw Gelfer, 'Law and Finance in Transition Economies'
(2000) 8(2) Economics of Transition 325, 328.
729
Such an evolution would lead to the existence of lawyers that only serve justice and honesty, claims
that are being dealt speedily and, judicial decisions that are enforced.
730
Neeraj Tiwari, 'Fair Trial vis-à-vis Criminal Justice Administration: A Critical Study of Indian
Criminal Justice System' (2010) 2(4) Journal of Law and Conflict Resolution 66, 70.
731
Al-Shinqiti, above n 724, 35.
732
The Companies Law 1965 (Niz}am
> Asharaikaat / ( )نظام الشركاتCL’65) was enacted by Royal Decree
No M/6 issued on 22 Rabi>‘ al-awwal 1385 AH (21 July 1965).
733
The Commercial Court Law 1931 (Niz}am
> Almah}kamah Atijary>ah / ( )نظام المحكمة التجاريةCCL’31) was
enacted by Royal Decree No M/32 of 15 Muh}arram 1350 AH (2 June 1931).
728
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become outdated; (iii) there are no specialised commercial courts; and (iv) there are
significant delays in the resolution of commercial lawsuits. Such delays can be
measured either by the average length of a trial, or by the percentage of the lawsuits
concluded in one year out of the total number of lawsuits.734 Using either of these as a
measure of delay, it can be concluded that lawsuits are not expeditiously concluded.
Based on the above, the discussions on the judicial enforcement of law in this chapter
are divided as follows. Section 6.1 provides an introduction; section 6.2 presents the
definition of judicial enforcement and the object of execution of judgments; section 6.3
investigates the judicial bodies that are responsible for the resolution of disputes
concerning commercial companies; section 6.4 concentrates on the role of lawyers in
the trial proceedings of corporate litigation; section 6.5 addresses the issues of delayed
justice and the acute lack of public confidence in the existing judiciary in the KSA;
section 6.6 underscores the need for specialised commercial courts to ensure judicial
remedies against the violation of the provisions of the companies law; and the chapter’s
conclusions are drawn in section 6.7.
6. 2 Definition of Judicial Enforcement and the Object of Execution of Judgments
6.2.1

Definition of Judicial Enforcement

Judicial enforcement has several definitions including but not limited to that of Ibin
‘bidiyn, namely ‘performing what the judge decided, under his/her terms and
conditions’, meaning carrying out the ruling issued by the judge.735

734

Daniela Fabbri, 'Law Enforcement and Firm Financing: Theory and Evidence' (2010) 8(4) Journal of
the European Economic Association 776, 777.
735
Mohammed Amyn Bin Omar Ibn ‘bidiyn, Radd Al-muh}tar ‘la Al-dur Al-mukhtar Aljuz’ Alkhamis
[The Mystified’s Feedback on the Chosen Pearl, Fifth Part] (Dar ‘alam Al-kutub, 2003) 297.
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Judicial enforcement may be defined as involving ‘forced imprisonment and taking
property by force and returning it to its rightful owner and redemption of all other
rights’.736 Others define it as ‘the enforcement of the legal provision in the case of
condemning the accused and proving the crime of which he is accused’.737 But in the
Saudi system, judicial enforcement is defined as the ‘application of the judgment or
decision of the court by officially authorised in accordance with what is set forth in the
judgment or the decision’.738
6.2.2

Object of Execution of Judgments

Section 264 of the Riyadh document for the Uniform Code of Penal Procedures for the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)739 stipulates that ‘the public prosecution shall
undertake to enforce judgments issued in all criminal lawsuits that are brought before
the courts.’
However, the issuance of judgments is not the main goal; the main goal is the
enforcement of verdicts expeditiously.740 Objectives behind the enforcement of law are
the maintainance of state order and stability, as well as the deterrence of offenders. In
respect to corporate crimes, one of the goals of judicial enforcement of judgments is to

736

Ibrahim Shamseddine Ibn Farhun, Tabs}irat Al-h}ukka>m fy As}wu>l Al-aqd}iyah wa Mana>hij Al-ah}ka>m
[Enlightenment of Rulers in Origins of Judicial and Methods of Judgments] (Dar Al-kutub Al-‘lmi>yah,
2002) 116.
737
Saad Bin Mohammed Bin Zufayr, Aniz}am
> Al-ijra>’iyy Al-jina>’iyy [Procedural Criminal System]
(Maktabat As}abah}, 1997) 305.
738
Wiza>ra>t Addakhilia>h, Murshid Al-ijraa>t Al-jina’iyyah [Commercial Procedures Guidance] (Al-a>’mn
Al-‘aam, 2003) 293.
739

Wathy>ga>t Ariyadh Lianiz}am
> (Al-qanwn) Almwu>hd} Li’ijraa>t Al-jaza’iyyah Lidwu>al Majlis Ata‘awu>n
Lidwu>al Alkhaly>j Al‘rabiah [Riyadh Document on the Unified Law for the Penal Procedures of the GCC

States] (Al-ama>na>h Al-‘a>mah, 2nd ed, 2006).
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Khadijah Al-Tuhami and Hajjaj Bin Isa, 'As}yghah Al-mwu>ah}adah Listra>tyjy>at Mu‘lajat Bu>t’} Al-bat
fy Al-qad}aya> wa Al-’ijraa>t Al-kafylah Bisu>r‘at Tanfy>dh Ala’h}kaam' [The Unified Manner for Strategy of
Delay in Settling Disputes and the Procedure May Contribute in Reforms of Enforcement of Judgments]
(Paper presented at the Rwu>‘sa>‘ Hy>aat At>afty>sh Al-qa>d}a‘> iyy fy Adwu>al Al‘rabiah, Beirut, 4–5 April
2011)
<http://carjj.org/%D8%A5%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%
D8%A7
%D8%B9/1027>.
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protect investors in corporations, and, thus, attract potential investors to the securities
market.741 Moreover, further benefits to be achieved as objectives of judicial
enforcement of judgments are the protection of the public trust in corporations as well
as the protection of national savings in corporations.742
It could be said that in order to achieve such goals, the government should: (i) ensure
that there are enough qualified employees to implement the verdicts; (ii) supply the
competent departments with modern tools; (iii) activate the role of the public prosecutor
in enforcing court verdicts; and (iv) criminalise the act of declining the enforcement of
judgments without proper justification.
6. 3 Judicial Bodies Competent to Deal with Corporate Crimes in the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia (KSA)

Shari‘ah courts have general jurisdiction over all disputes whether criminal or civil,
except in situations where other judicial bodies have been given exclusive jurisdiction.
This is clear from section 26 of the [old] Judiciary Law 1975 (Niz}am
> Alqa>da} ’> / نظام
( )القضاءJL’75),743 where it stipulates that:
Courts shall have jurisdiction to decide with respect to all disputes and
crimes, except those exempted by law. Rules for the jurisdiction of courts
shall be set forth in the Shari‘ah Procedure Law Courts and Law of Criminal
Procedure. Specialized Courts may be formed by Royal Order on the
recommendation of the Supreme Judicial Council.

741

Atif Hassa Annaqly, H}imayat H}uq> wu>q Al-aqaly>ah min H}amalat Al-ashum fy Alqanwn Almas}ry,
[Protection of Minority Rights of Stockholders under Egyptian Law], Faculty of Law, Zagaziq
University, Zagaziq (Egypt) <http://www.hawkama.net/files/pdf/event26paper2.pdf>.
742
Qhanaam Mohammed Qhanaam, Alh}imayah Aljina’yah Lialidikhaar Al‘a>m fy Asharikaat
Almusahimah [Legal Protection of Public Savings in Joint Stock Companies] (Dar Anahd}ah Al‘rabiah,
1988) 12–22; Fabbri, above n 734, 518.
743
The [old] Judiciary Law 1975 (Niz}am
> Alqa>da} ’> / ( )نظام القضاءJL’75) was enacted by Royal Decree No
M/64 of 14 Rajab 1359 AH (23 July 1975) which was repealed by the [current] Judiciary Law 2007
(Niz}am
> Alqa>d}a’> / ( )نظام القضاءJL’07), which was enacted by Royal Decree No M/78 of 19 Ramad}an 1428
AH (1 October 2007).
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It is noted that that according to the CL’75 the Shari‘ah courts had general jurisdiction
over all judicial matters such as criminal, civil, property and matrimonial claims. Yet it
allowed an exception, the establishment of several additional courts with laws and
regulations, if needed, to decide on disputes in accordance with such legislation. Such
an exception allowed for the establishment of the Board of Grievances (Diwa>n

Almaz{al> im /  )ديوان المظالمthat resolves commercial disputes, including corporate crimes,
and of around 26 committees that function as quasi-judicial authorities744 with similar
competence. This has led to conflicts in jurisdiction in the KSA which have been
harshly criticised.745
Such conflicts forced the Lawmaker (the King) in the KSA to enact two new laws in
2007, namely: (i) the Judiciary Law 2007 (Niz}a>m Alqa>da} ’> / ( )نظام القضاءJL’07)746 to
replace the JL’75, and (ii) the Law of the Board of Grievances 2007 (Niz}am
> Diwa>n

Almaz{al> im / ( )نظام ديوان المظالمLBG’07)747 to replace the [old] Law of the Board of
Grievances 1982 (Niz}a>m Diwa>n Almaz{al> im / ( )نظام ديوان المظالمLBG’82)748 so as to
eliminate or resolve such conflicts. It should, however, be mentioned that both new laws
have not yet been applied, with the excuse given that they are being implemented in
phases.
In this context, judicial bodies to settle disputes of companies will be discussed through:
firstly, a brief presentation on the litigation authorities in the KSA before and after the
744

The committees of quasi-judicial have been discussed below.
Al-Jarbou, ‘Judicial Independence’, above n 210, 32; Al-Ghdyan, above n 210, 238; Mirghani Ali
Mohammed Othman, Tana>zu>‘ Al-ikhti>sa} Al-qa>d}a’> iyy fy Almamlakah Al‘rabiah Alsa‘udiah
[Concurrence of Judicial Jurisdiction in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia] (Al-’sba>b wa Al-h}ul> wu>l),
<http://www.mohamoonmontada.com/default.aspx?action=Display&id=601&Type=3>.
746
The [current] Judiciary Law 2007 (Niz}am
> Alqa>d}a’> / ( )نظام القضاءJL’07) was enacted by Royal Decree
No M/78 of 19 Ramad}an 1428 AH (1 October 2007).
747
The [current] Law of the Board of Grievances 2007 (Niz}am
> Diwa>n Almaz{al> im / )نظام ديوان المظالم
(LBG’07) was issued by Royal Decree No M/78 of 19 Ramad}an 1428 AH (1 October 2007).
748
The [old] Law of the Board of Grievances 1982 (Niz}am
> Diwa>n Almaz{al> im / ( )نظام ديوان المظالمLBG’82)
was enacted by Royal Decree No M/64 of 14 Rajab 1359 AH (23 July 1975).
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issuing of the JL’07; and secondly, a discussion of the jurisdiction of commercial courts
in the KSA.
6.3.1

Litigation Authorities before the Issuing the Judiciary Law 2007 (JL’07)

Competence for the settlement of disputes is generally divided in the KSA between the
judiciary (Shari‘ah courts and the Board of Grievances (Diwa>n Almaz{al> im / ديوان المظالم
)) and quasi-judicial committees, which are completely independent from the judicial
bodies.749 It is worth mentioning that the said judicial bodies still exist, yet their
competences have changed since the JL’07 and LBG’07 were put in force, as will be
later clarified.750
Shari‘ah Courts
Shari‘ah Courts were established pursuant to the [old] Judiciary Law 1975 (Niz}am
>

Alqa>da} ’> / ( )نظام القضاءJL’75)751 and were organised in the following hierarchical
structure:

•

The Supreme Judicial Council: It is the highest authority in the Shari‘ah judicial
system.752 The Supreme Judicial Council is composed of eleven judges.753 The
Council performs legislative,754 consultative755 and administrative756 roles.

•

The Courts of Appeal: Each Court of Appeal is divided into three circuits:
criminal, personal status and a residual category circuit, the last circuit hearing

749

The judicial bodies in the KSA are the Shari‘ah courts and the Board of Grievances. For further details
about the judiciary in the KSA, see Al-Ghdyan, above n 210, 235–51.
750
See section 6.3.2 of the present Chapter.
751
The JL’75 was enacted by Royal Decree No M/64 of 14 Rajab 1359 AH (23 July 1975).
752
Judiciary Law 1975 (KSA) s 5.
753
Ibid ss 6, 7, 8.
754
For example, it reviews and approves all sentences of death, amputation (of fingers and hands as
punishment for theft) and stoning (eg, for adultery).
755
For instance, the Council replies to enquiries referred from the Minister of Justice.
756
It supervises on Shari‘ah Courts in accordance with the JL’75.
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cases that do not fall into the first two categories.757 Decisions of the Court of
Appeal shall be rendered by three judges. However, sentences involving death,
stoning, and amputation shall be heard by a panel of five judges.758

•

The Courts of First Instance: There are two kinds of First Instance courts under
the JL’75, namely the general and the summary courts.759

Figure 6.1: The Current Hierarchy of Shari‘ah Courts as Stated in the Judiciary Law
1975 (JL’75)
Shari‘ah Court*

The Supreme Judicial Council

The Court of Appeal
Criminal
Circuit

Personal
Status
Circuit

Residual
Category
Circuit

The Court of First Instance
General
Court

Summary
Court

* Given the fact that the JL’07 has not yet been implemented, in practice the Shari‘ah courts still operate
under this structure which was inherited from the JL’75.
Note: Arrows in this figure indicate the direction of appeals.
757

Judiciary Law 1975 (KSA) s 10.
Ibid s13.
759
According to section 25 of the JL’75 the summary court renders decisions through a single judge. And
it has jurisdiction over civil cases — except real estate cases — where the amounts involved in the
dispute do not exceed 20,000 Saudi Riyals (SAR) (approximately USD 5000). Based on section 23 of the
JL’75, the general court renders decisions through a single judge, except for sentences of death, stoning,
or amputation, which must be issued by a panel of three judges. The general court has civil and criminal
jurisdiction over all cases except those cases that are under the jurisdiction of the summary court. For
more details, see Al-Jarbou, ‘Judicial Independence’, above n 210, 22, 23.
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Board of Grievances (Diwa>n Almaz{al> im / )ديوان المظالم
According to section 1 of LBG’82, the Board of Grievances is an independent
administrative board. The Board of Grievances Headquarters is located in the city of
Riyadh and its President has the authority to establish other branches of the Board in
any region760 of the KSA as needed.761 It is called ‘Diwa>n Almaz{al> im /  ’ديوان المظالمand
has a judicial function762 that is carried out by different circuits (divisions). These are:763
i.

Appeals Circuits: There are four types of the Appeals Circuits which are called
Scrutinising Circuits. These types are commercial, administrative, criminal and
general circuits that function as appeal courts and have final authority in
Grievances. An Appeal Circuit is composed of three judges appointed by the
President of the Board of Grievances. However, the President of the Grievances
may establish an Appeal Circuit of one judge if needed and thereby increase the
number of courts if deemed required to hear an appeal on some simple cases
specified by a regulation.764 Therefore, there are many Appeals Circuits in the
KSA.

760

The KSA is divided into 13 (administrative) regions named as follows (with their respective
headquarters in brackets after each region): Riyadh Region (Riyadh City), Makkah Region (the Holy City
of Makkah), Madinah Region (the Holy City of Madinah), Qasim Region (Buraidah City), Eastern
Region (Dammam City), Asir Region (Abha City), Tabouk Region (Tabouk City), Hail Region (Hail
City), Northern Border Region (Arar City), Jizan Region (Jizan City), Najran Region (Najran City), AlBaha Region (Al-Baha City), and Al-Jouf Region (Sikaka City).
761
Law of the Board of Grievances 1982 (KSA) s 1.
762
Ibid s 1.
763
Ibid ss 6, 8.
764
The Procedural Rules before the Board of Grievances 1989 (Qawa>‘id Almura>fa‘a>t wa Alijraa>t Amam
Diwa>n Almaz{al> im / ) قواعد المرافعات واإلجراءات أمام ديوان المظالم, which issued by Council of Ministers
Resolution No 190 of 16 Dhul-'l-qi‘dah 1409 (19 June 1998) s 39.
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ii.

Circuits of First Instance: There are five types of First Instance circuits: the
commercial, administrative, criminal, disciplinary, and subsidiary circuits.765 A
First Instance Circuit is also composed of three judges selected by the President of
the Board of Grievances. However, the President of the Grievances may form a
First Instance Circuit of a single judge to hear simple cases specified by a
regulation.766 There are many circuits distributed within different regions of the
KSA. The Circuits of First Instance have the competence of administrative
appeals, commercial disputes, company disputes and disputes related to contracts
between the government and other entities, and some criminal cases such as
forgery.767 In regard to commercial circuits, there are six circuits distributed in
regions of the KSA.768 It should be mentioned that the Royal Decree No M/63 of
26 Dhul-'l-qi‘dah 1407AH (23 July 1987) granted commercial circuits the ability
to hear most of the commercial disputes including corporate crimes, whereas most
of the commercial disputes were under the authority the Commercial Dispute
Committees.

765

Law of the Board of Grievances 1982 (KSA) ss 6, 10; Procedural Rules before the Board of
Grievances 1989 (KSA) ss 16, 18.
766
Procedural Rules before the Board of Grievances 1989 (KSA) ss 14, 39.
767
Section 8(1) of the LBG’82 states that ‘the Board of Grievances shall have jurisdiction to decide the
following: (i) Cases related to the rights provided for in the Civil Service and Pension Laws for
government employees and hired hands, and independent public entities and their heirs and claimants; (ii)
Cases of objection filed by [the] parties concerned against administrative decisions where the reason [for]
such objection is lack of jurisdiction, a deficiency in the form, a violation or erroneous application or
interpretation of laws and regulations, or abuse of authority. It is considered as an administrative decision
the rejection or refusal of an administrative authority to take a decision that it should have taken pursuant
to laws and regulations; (iii) Cases of compensation filed by parties concerned against the government
and independent public corporate entities resulting from their actions; (iv) Cases filed by parties
concerned regarding contract-related disputes where the government or an independent public corporate
entity is a party thereto; (v) Disciplinary cases filed by the Bureau of Control and Investigation; (vi) Penal
cases filed against suspects who have committed crimes of forgery as provided for by law, crimes
provided for by the Law of Combating Bribery, crimes provided for by Royal Decree No 43 dated 29
Dhul-'l-qi‘dah 1377 AH (17 June1958) [Crimes related to government jobs], crimes provided for by the
Law of Handling Public Funds issued by Royal Decree No 77 dated 23 Shawwal 1395 AH (29 October
1975), and penal cases filed against persons accused of committing crimes and offenses provided for by
law, where an order to hear such cases has been issued by the President of the Council of Ministers to the
Board; vii) Requests for implementation of foreign judgments; and viii) Cases within the jurisdiction of
the Board in accordance with special legal provisions.’ Also, see Al-Ghdyan, above n 210, 246.
768
Al-Ghdyan, above n 210, 245.
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The procedures of the Board of Grievances are regulated by the Procedural Rules
before the Board of Grievances 1989.
Figure 6.2: The Current Hierarchy of the Board of Grievances as Mentioned in the Law
of the Board of Grievances 1982 (LBG’82)
Board of Grievances (Diwa>n
Almaz{al> im / )ديوان المظالم

The Court of Appeals
Commercial
Circuit

Administrative
Circuit

Criminal
Circuit

General
Circuit

The Court of First Instance
Commercial
Circuit*

Administrative
Circuit

Criminal
Circuit

Disciplinary
Circuit

Subsidiary
Circuit

* The commercial circuits still decide commercial disputes including corporate crimes that will be
addressed by commercial courts in the Shari‘ah Courts, because the JL’07 and the LBG’07 have not yet
been implemented in practice, as has been mentioned above.
Note: Arrows indicate appeals in this figure.

Quasi-Judicial Committees
There are many quasi-judicial committees which are temporary administrative
committees769 with judicial powers that were established in order to apply government

769

Quasi-judicial committees were established due to judges of Shari‘ah court did not willing to apply
government regulations applicable by these committees, fearing that may contain provisions conflict with
Shari‘ah law. A Jeerah, The Judicial System in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia [1988] 198, cited in Al-
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regulations until specialised courts are established.770 These include, for example, the
Committee for the Resolution of Commercial Disputes, Committees for Combating
Commercial Fraud, Committee for Hotels Management, Committees of Customs,
Committee for Publications Law, and the Committees for Settling Disputes of Work and
Workers, among others.771 Many rules that have been issued by the administrative and
executive authorities regulate the procedures of these committees. Although there are
defined time restrictions for these procedures, these were rarely considered or adhered
to, so opposing parties in disputes did not complain so as to avoid administrative
complaints that would be suffocated by red tape and bureaucracy. On the other hand, the
procedures of Shari‘ah courts have had greater effectiveness in terms of judicial
enforcement of judgments, after the issuing of the Law of Procedure before Shari‘ah
Courts 2000.

Ghdyan, above n 210, 247. These committees are considered to be temporary until necessary
arrangements are made for the establishment of specialised courts. Therefore, the quasi-judicial
committees’ jurisdiction was temporary, until the implementation of the Council of Ministers Resolution
No 167 on 14 Ramad}an 1401AH (16 July 1981), which prescribed the establishment of specialised
courts.
770
Al-Jarbou, ‘Judicial Independence’, above n 210, 27.
771
The committees of quasi-judicial competence have reached more than 26: (1) Committees for the
Settlement of Workers Disputes; (2) Customs Committees; (3) Committee for the Banking Disputes
Settlement; (4) Committee for the Settlement of the Violation of the Banking Control; (5) Committees
and Offices for Settling Commercial Paper Disputes; (6) Committees for Appeals Regarding Income Tax;
(7) Committee for Fraud, Cheating and Speculation; (8) the Cassation Judiciary for Disputes Arising from
the Application of the Mining Law; (9) Committee of the Settlement of Violations of Effects Law; (10)
Committees for Combating Commercial Fraud; (11) Judicial Committees for Catering; (12) Committees
for Violations of Hotels Law; (13) Committees for the Violations of Precious Metals and Precious Stones
[Laws]; (14) Committee for Violations by Legal Accountants; (15) Committee for Violation of
Commercial Register Law; (16) Committee for Practising Pharmacy and Selling Drugs and Medications;
(17) Committee for Violations of Cooperative Health Insurance; (18) Committee for Violations of Private
Medical Institutions; (19) Committees for Violations of Press and Publication Law; (20) Committees for
the Violations of Copyrights Law; (21) Committee for Violations of the Rule of Organising Trading
Agricultural Machines; (22) Lawful Medical Committee; (23) Committee for Violations of Sea Ports
Law; (24) Committee for Fishing and Diving; (25) Committees for Violations of Hunting Maritime
Animals and Birds and the Law of Natural Reservations; (26) Committees for Violations of Patent Law;
and (27) Financial Papers Committee; (28) Labour Settlement Disputes Committee; and (29) Committees
for Penalising Traffic Violations. To review a detailed statement of these entities and committees, see
Nasir Al-ghamdi, Al-ikhti>sa} > Al-qa>da} ’> iyy fy Al-fi>qih [Judicial Jurisdiction under Islamic Doctrine]
(Aru>shd, 2000) 128–38.
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The issuance of the JL’07 permits the establishment of new specialised Courts, such as
Commercial, Traffic and Labour Courts772 It is understood that as soon as the JL’07
becomes enforceable, certain quasi-judicial committees can be abolished. For example
Commercial Paper Committees773 will be replaced by Commercial Courts.774 However
there are three quasi-committees that have not been yet incorporated in the jurisdiction
of the specialised commercial courts, even after the JL’07 was issued.775 The excluded
committees are the following:776
i.

Committees for Customs Disputes Settlement777: They operate under the Ministry
of Finance. The members of each committee must be assigned by the Ministry of
Finance. These committees have jurisdiction to consider cases and determine
matters concerning cases of smuggling or attempted smuggling and customs
offences in the KSA.778

ii.

Committee for Resolution of Securities Disputes: This committee operates under
the Capital Market Authority in order to resolve cases of securities disputes, for
example, complaints that arise between investors and are related to the Capital

772

Judiciary Law 2007 (KSA) ss 9, 16, 23.
The Commercial Paper Committees, known in the KSA as the Offices for Commercial Paper
Settlement, operate under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Each committee is comprised of three
members selected by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. These committees have jurisdiction to hear
cases and determine matters concerning commercial paper disputes, such as cheques, promissory notes,
negotiable instruments and bills of exchange. The committees hear matters that arise under Law of
Commercial Paper 1963 (Niz}am
> Ala’wra>q Atijary>ah / )نظام األوراق التجارية, which was issued by Royal
Decree No M/73 of 11 Shawwal 1383 AH (1963).
774
Othman, above n 745.
775
Clause 2 of the third section of executive work mechanism for the JL’07.
776
Some argue that the reason for excluding such committees is that (i) most of their transactions contain
usury (Riba /  )رباand the Minister of Justice, when upholding the practice of usury, violates the Shari‘ah
Law on the one hand and then, (ii) on the other hand, because the judges of Shari‘ah still are not satisfied
and qualified to hear such sensitive cases. See Baamir, above n 53, 187.
777
Committees of Customs Disputes Settlement established based on section 52 of the Customs Law
1952, which issued by Royal Decree No M/425 of 5 Rabi>‘ al-awwal 1372 AH (23 November 1952).
778
Customs Law 1952 (KSA) s 52.
773
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> Swq Almal / ( ) نظام سوق المالCML’03)779 and its
Market Law 2003 (Niz}am
implementing regulations, as well as complaints concerning disputes against
violators of the CML’03 and its implementing regulations. It should be noted that
the committee consists of three members appointed through the Board of Capital
Market Authority (CMA).780
iii.

Banking Disputes Settlement Committee: It was established under the Saudi
Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) to resolve disputes of a banking nature
involving domestic or foreign banks or between banks and their customers. This
committee comprises three members assigned by the Ministry of Finance. There is
only one committee, which is located in Riyadh City.781

The exclusion of some of quasi-judiciary bodies and the delay in applying the JL’07
have led to multiplication of procedures that need to be followed. For example, each
committee has a distinctive procedure, different from the procedures of other
committees. The multiplicity of these procedures is irrational, considering that most of
these committees resolve cases related to commercial disputes.782
It could therefore be said that the enactment of the JL’07 and the LBG’07 was a positive
step, given that they restructure the judiciary and dispute resolution bodies as well as
establish new commercial courts. Moreover, enactment of the JL’07 and the LBG’07
has rendered the Board of Grievances an administrative board without judicial

779

Capital Market Law 2003 was issued by Royal Decree No M/30 of 2 Juma>da al-thani 1424 AH (31
July 2003).
780
For more details about the Committee for Resolution of Securities Disputes please visit their website
<http://www.crsd.org.sa/En/Pages/Home.aspx>.
781
Baamir, above n 53, 23.
782
Al-Jarbou, ‘Judicial Independence’, above n 210, 53.
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function.783 However, their effectiveness cannot be yet evaluated as that they have not
yet been applied (for almost five years now). No optimistic signs appear to indicate their
practical application. This situation requires immediate attention and remedy so that
specialised commercial courts may function as soon as possible.
The delay in reform of the judicial system adversely affects people’s sense of stability
and their lives as well as the stability of domestic and foreign investments. Also the
delay in enforcing the JL’07 and the LBG’07 — which will resolve the scattered nature
of the judicial entities — is deemed an obstacle to the creation of an environment
conducive to justice. This environment would contain all the components required to be
a basis for the facilitation of economic development and protection for investors. Undue
delay in implementation of the laws and the enforcement of decisions also reflects the
weakness of the current legal environment and is indicative of a situation that prompts
the continued distrust and worry among investors regarding Saudi laws and their
effectiveness.
Consequently, in this regard, it should be mentioned that the sound solution for reform
of the judicial system in the KSA is to apply the JL’07 and the LBG’07, as well as to
transfer all the quasi-judicial committees, including the three currently excepted
committees,784 to the jurisdiction of the commercial courts in Shari‘ah courts without
any exception or further delay.

783

Faiees Zwaied Al-Thaqafi, Tana>zu>‘Alikhti>s}as} Alwala>’iyy fy Alqa>da} ’> Asa‘udi Dirasah Ta’s}yl> y>ah
Muqaranah [Concurrence of Jurisdiction under Saudi Justice: A Comparative Study] (Masters Thesis,
Naif Arab University for Security Sciences, 2010) 73–7.
784
Committees of Customs Disputes Settlement, Committee for Resolution of Securities Disputes, and
Banking Disputes Settlement Committee.
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6.3.2

Litigation Authorities after the Issuing the Judiciary Law 2007 (JL’07)

The JL’07 organises the Shari‘ah Courts system in the following hierarchical structure
in descending order:
i.

High Court: This court will be the highest authority in the judicial system in the
KSA and will function instead of the Supreme Judicial Council that has been
mentioned above. The High Court will be located in Riyadh city and will consist
of a president who possesses the qualifications required of the Chief Appellate
Judge. He is assigned by the King.785 All members of the High Court must be
judges holding the rank of Chief of the Appellate Court appointed by a Royal
Order.786 The JL’07 is silent regarding the number of members the High Court
members. The High Court performs legislative, consultative and administrative
roles. It reviews judgments issued and upheld by the Courts of Appeal. The High
Court is divided into specialised circuits. Each circuit is composed of three judges.
However, the Criminal Circuit which reviews and approves sentences of death,
amputation and stoning is composed of five judges.787

ii.

The Courts of Appeal: Each Court of Appeal is divided into five specialised
circuits namely: Criminal Circuits, Labour Circuits, Personal Status Circuits, Civil
Circuits and Commercial Circuits.788 Each specialised circuits comprised of three
judges except for the Criminal Circuit, which appeals death, stoning, and
amputation sentences must consist of five judges.789 It should be mentioned that

785

Judiciary Law 2007 (KSA) s 10(1)(2).
Ibid s 10(3).
787
Ibid s 10(4).
788
Ibid s 15(1).
789
Ibid s 15(1).
786
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the JL’07 permits establishment of one or more Courts of Appeal in each of the
KSA’s regions.790
iii.

The Courts of First Instance: There are five types of specialised First Instance
courts under the JL’75, which are, Criminal Courts, Labour Courts, Personal
Status Courts, General Courts and Commercial Courts.791 The Criminal Courts
consist of three specialised circuits namely: (a) Circuits of (Al-Qis}as} / )القصاص
and (Al-H}du>d / ( )الحدودQis}as and H}udud);792 (b) Circuits of (A-Ta‘aziyr / )التعازير
(Ta‘zir);793 and (c) Circuits for Juveniles. The Criminal Courts are composed of
three judges. However, the Supreme Judicial Council794 can form Criminal
Circuits of a single judge to handle minor offences.795 The Personal Status and the
Labour Courts796 are composed of specialised circuits; each circuit consists of one
or more judges as per a request by the Supreme Judicial Council.797 The General
Courts hear other cases that do not fall into competence of the other four courts.
Therefore,

the

General

Courts

consist

790

of

various

circuits

including

Ibid s 15(1).
Ibid s 9(3).
792
Al-Qis}as} [Qis}as] means punishments for certain crimes specified in the Holy Qur’ān. Cases of AlQis}as} include murder (punishable by death) and injuries (punishable by amputation). Al-H}du>d means
specific punishments for certain crimes laid out in the Holy Qur’ān and the Sunnah (Tradition) of the
Prophet (PBUH) [ie the crimes are subject to the Hudud provisions]. Cases of Al-H}du>d include theft
(punishable by amputation), armed robbery (punishable by death or amputation), adultery (punishable by
death or flogging), false accusation of adultery (punishable by flogging), drinking of alcohol (punishable
by flogging), and apostasy or renunciation of Islam (punishable by death). See A Q Oudah Shaheed,
Criminal Law of Islam (Adam Publishers and Distributors, 2010) 86, 87.
793
Ata‘aziyr [Ta‘zir] crimes (those attracting penal punishment) are less serious than the Al-Qis}as} and AlH}du>d crimes. A-Ta‘aziyr crimes are not specified in the Holy Qur’ān or the Sunnah, and Shari‘ah law
does not lay down any set punishments for such crimes. See Shaheed, above n 792, 87, 88.
794
Under the JL’07, the Supreme Judiciary Council is no longer the highest authority in the Shari‘ah
judicial system as was under the [old] law (JL’75). The Council is the dominating entity on administrative
aspects of the judiciary in the KSA. The Supreme Judicial Council is composed of 11 members, including
the president who is appointed by the King. For more details about the Council, see Judiciary Law 2007
(KSA) ss 5, 6, 7, 8. See also the Council’s official website<http://www.scj.gov.sa/index.cfm?do>.
795
Judiciary Law 2007 (KSA) s 20.
796
It is worth mentioning that the Labour Settlement Disputes Committee (a Quasi-Judicial Committee)
will be replaced by Labour Courts. This committee is one of Quasi-Judicial Committees that have been
criticised earlier. See section 6.3.1 of the present Chapter.
797
Judiciary Law 2007 (KSA) ss 20, 21.
791
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Implementation and Approval Circuits and Traffic Cases Circuits. Each circuit is
composed of one or more judges as specified by the Supreme Judicial Council.798
Concerning Commercial Courts, which deal with corporate criminal liability, are
discussed in more detail below.
6.3.3

Structure of the Commercial Courts

It is noted that section 22 of the JL’07 includes the establishment of commercial courts
as Courts of First Instance. Every Court shall be composed of commercial circuits. The
circuit must be exercised by a single judge or more as determined by the Supreme
Judicial Council.799 A chairman of the Commercial Circuit and its judges and members
shall be recommended by the Chief of the Commercial Court. However, all judges shall
be appointed by Royal Order on the recommendation of the Supreme Judicial
Council.800
Section 15 of the JL’07 permits establishment of one or more Commercial Courts of
Appeal in each of the KSA’s regions. Each Court of Appeal operates through a circuit,
which must be composed of three judges holding the rank of Appellate Judge including
a president. Judges of the commercial appellate circuit including its chairman shall be
appointed by Royal Order on the recommendation of the Supreme Judicial Council and
the Chief of the Appellate Court.801

798

Ibid s 19.
Section 22 of the JL’07 states that ‘commercial court consists of specialised circuits and every circuit
shall be exercised by a single Judge or more as determined by the Supreme Judicial Council.’
800
Judiciary Law 2007 (KSA) ss 24, 44.
801
Ibid ss 15(3), 44.
799
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The first degree circuits (courts of first instance) and appeal circuits are held in the
headquarters of the Commercial Court, as provided for in section 15(1) of the JL’07.802
Thus, the first degree circuit of the commercial court will be based in the headquarters
of the court of appeal of each area. The commercial circuit shall be held in its
headquarters unless the Minister of Justice — when necessary — decides to hold it in
another place. The variety of locations for the headquarters of first degree circuits is
considered to be necessary in order to ensure that there will be no hardship to the
litigants, which might otherwise occur if they could not find a ‘Commercial circuit of
first degree’ in the headquarters that is near them.
As a practical measure in regard to the specialised courts, the Supreme Judicial
Council803 has issued three decrees on establishing three specialised commercial
courts.804 The establishment of these courts aimed to rectify the defect from which Saudi
companies suffer when they establish contracts between them and foreign companies,
and thus ensure the expeditious settlement of commercial lawsuits and help establish
trust in local commercial transactions.805 The organisation of the business of the said
three commercial courts is represented (i) in the exclusion of the commercial judicial
bodies from the commercial circuits and commercial appeal circuits in the Board of
Grievances, and (ii) through the transfer of competences to the commercial courts in the

802

Section 15(1) of the JL’07 provides that in every region there shall be a court of appeal or more to look
into cases through specialised circuits.
803
Section 9 of the JL’07 gives the Supreme Judicial Council an authorisation for establishing specialised
courts after an approval of the King.
804
Decree No 474/7/31 of 17 Rabi>‘ al-awwal 1431 AH (3 March 2010) establishing the commercial court
in Riyadh city, Decree No 475/7/31 of 17 Rabi>‘ al-awwal 1431 AH (3 March 2010) establishing the
commercial court in Jeddah city, and Decree No 476/7/31 of 17 Rabi>‘ al-awwal 1431 AH (3 March
2010) establishing the commercial court in Dammam city.
805
It can be argued that the establishment of the three specialised commercial courts will settle the
question of whether the specialised commercial courts are to absorb the legal nature of commercial
contracts, banking transactions, insurance, shares, market businesses, that leads to, consequently,
developing trust in an active commercial environment as in the KSA.
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Shari‘ah Courts.806 The implementation of this entire new commercial courts system
awaits the construction of the new court buildings. Without this construction and
allocation of personnel, the new procedures remain as ‘ink on paper’ and the old
procedures continue.
According to this writer’s view, that was not a successful solution, because the JL’07
has excluded three commercial judicial bodies namely, Committees of Customs
Disputes Settlement, Committee for Resolution of Securities Disputes and Banking
Disputes Settlement Committee807, from joining within competence of the new
commercial courts as has been discussed earlier.808
6.3.3.1 Jurisdiction of Commercial Courts
One of the most prominent features of the JL’07 is the activation of the principle of the
specialised courts in the KSA. The establishment of specialised commercial courts is
considered a good first step for the judicial system in the KSA.809 As pointed out,
however, the JL’07 has not yet been implemented in practice. The much anticipated
specialised courts, which would lead to an increased quality of work, still lack judges
for these particular cases, as well as specific training in this area of the law, which is an

806

Clause 8(6) of the first section of executive work mechanism for the JL’07 stipulates: ‘The commercial
circuits in the Board of Grievances shall be excluded with their judges, assistants, and their jobs [go] to
the commercial courts in the Shari‘ah courts. Furthermore, commercial appeal circuits with their judges,
assistants, and their jobs from the Board of Grievances [will go] to the courts of Appeal in the Shari‘ah
courts, that shall be after preparing the headquarters of these courts and undertaking their competences
providing that they shall continue working in these courts for not less than five years with the same
competence they had.’ Clause 8(7) of the first section of executive work mechanism for the JL’07
stipulates: ‘The commercial lawsuits which are still under consideration by the commercial circuits and
commercial appeal districts in the Board of Grievances shall be referred to the Shari‘ah courts. Also, the
completed commercial lawsuits shall be transferred to the Shari‘ah courts.’
807
Clause 2 of the third section of executive work mechanism for the JL’07.
808
See section 6.3.1 of the present Chapter.
809
Further details about reasons for needing specialised commercial courts in the KSA; see section 6.6.1
of the present Chapter.
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important step in strengthening the judicial process.810 Professional judges with a body
of specialised practitioners, in particular in commercial disputes, have become crucial in
the KSA as a result of the plurality of the laws applicable to the commercial sphere.811
The jurisdiction of the commercial court includes the following:812
i.

cases arising from commercial deeds/transactions,813 known as ‘the exchanges
between traders’;814

ii.

lawsuits arising during the enforcement of the CL’65;815

810

Km Saroj Gupta, 'The Role of Judiciary in Promoting Sustainable Development: Need of Specialized
Environment Court in India' (2011) 4(2) Journal of Sustainable Development 249, 250–2; Christopher R
Drahozal, 'Business Courts and the Future of Arbitration' (2009) 10 Cardozo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 491, 492; Eve S Buzawa, Carl G Buzawa and Evan Stark, Responding to Domestic Violence:
The Integration of Criminal Justice and Human Services (SAGE, 2011) 318, 331.
811
The commercial courts have competence for applying several Saudi laws. Some of these laws are:
• the Foreign Investment Law 2000 (Niz}am
> Alistithma>r Alajnabiy /  ) نظام االستثمار االجنبيissued by
Royal Decree No M/1 of 5 Muh}arram 1421 AH (10 April 2000),
• the Law of Commercial Books 1989 (Niz}am
> Ad>afa>tir Atijary>ah /  )نظام الدفاترالتجاريةissued by
Royal Decree No M/61 of 17 Dhul-h}ijjah 1409 AH (27 June 1989),
• the Law of Commercial Register 1995 (Niz}am
> Assijil Atijariyy /  )نظام السجل التجاريissued by
Royal Decree No M/1 of 21 S}afar 1416 AH (17 July 1995),
• the Arbitration Law 1983 (Niz}am
> At>ah}ky>m /  )نظام التحكيمissued by Royal Decree No M/46 of 12
Rajab 1403 AH (24 April 1983),
• the Law of Trade Names 1999 (Niz}am
> Al’sma’ Atijary>ah /  )نظام األسماء التجاريةissued by Royal
Decree No M/15 of 12 Sha‘ban 1420 AH (20 November 1999),
• the Law of Trademark 2002 (Niz}am
> Al‘alama>t Atijary>ah /  )نظام العالمات التجاريةissued by Royal
Decree No M/21 of 28 Juma>da al-awwal 1423 AH (7 August 2002),
• the Law of Commercial Data 2002 (Niz}am
> Albayana>t Atijary>ah /  )نظام البيانات التجاريةissued by
Royal Decree No M/5 of 14 Rabi>‘ al-thani 1423 AH (25 June 2002),
• the Commercial Mortgage Law 2004 (Niz}am
> Ar>ahn Atijariyy /  )نظام الرھن التجاريissued by Royal
Decree No M/75 of 21 Dhul-'l-qi‘dah 1424 AH (27 February 2004),
• the Competition Law 2004 (Niz}am
> Almunafasah /  )نظام المنافسةissued by Royal Decree No M/25
of 4 Juma>da al-awwal 1425 AH (22 June 2004), and
• the Law of Handling Public Funds 1975 (Niz}am
> Mubasharat Alammwa>l Al‘a>mah / نظام مباشرة
 )األموال العامةissued by Royal Decree No 77 of 23 Shawwal 1395 AH (29 October 1975).
812
Commercial Court Law 1931 (KSA) ss 443, 444, 445.
813
Section 2 of the CCL’31 describes commercial deeds/transactions as follows: ‘Commercial
transactions include purchase of goods or crops including foods and other products for the sake of selling
them as they are or as finished products.’
814
Section 1 of the CCL’31 defines a merchant as ‘Any person who undertakes commercial activities as a
profession’.
815
For further details of the CL’65, see Chapter 2.
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iii.

a mere ‘original’ commercial activity/transaction, even if the executor is not a
trader;816

iv.

consequential activities related to commercial transactions, that is, the civil
transactions that are undertaken by the merchant as a service for his or her
trade;817 and

v.

any lawsuit may be heard by the Commercial Court upon a special Royal Order.818

In this regard, it should be mentioned that the Saudi judiciary has decided to exclude
certain businesses from the scope of commercial activities, and they are not considered
commercial activities. These include, for instance, agricultural activities,819 explorative
industries,820 intellectual products,821 and the free professions822 and consultancies.823
Hence, it is shown that the jurisdiction of commercial court is held to decide on the
disputes related to original commercial activities and consequential activities.824 The

816

These commercial activities include, for instance, purchase with the intention of sale or lease,
exchange of commercial papers, banking activities, currency exchange, maritime trading activities, and
brokerage. See Commercial Court Law 1931 (KSA) s 2.
817
Cases arising from consequential commercial activities have been incorporated to the jurisdiction of
the commercial courts in accordance with the resolution of the Council of Ministers No 261 of 17 Dhul-'lqi‘dah 1423 AH (20 January 2003).
818
Commercial Court Law 1931 (KSA) s 444.
819
See judgment of the Board of Grievances No 197/T/4 dated 1415 AH (1995) which states: ‘The
activity exercised by the owner of the agricultural land or the farmer including selling crops or engaging
someone to market them or the like is not considered a commercial activity.’
820
See case No 172/T/3 for 1417 AH (1997), which was issued by the Board of Grievances.
821
See judgment of the Board of Grievances No 74/T dated 1412 AH (1992) which stipulates: ‘The
dispute under consideration is not of a commercial description or nature at all; it is a dispute over an
intellectual product which has no commercial nature.’
822
Eg, medical and educational consultancies.
823
See judgment No 105/D/Com/6 dated 1426 AH (2006) issued by the Board of Grievances which states
that ‘the Board has no jurisdiction to consider a lawsuit the subject of which is the printing of flexes and
designs done for the plaintiff as such activities are professional ones and are not included in the
jurisdiction of the commercial judicial system.’ Also, see judgment of the Board of Grievances No
357/T/3 dated 1426 AH (2006) which stipulates that ‘Consultancy activities are not commercial ones and
therefore they do not fall under the jurisdiction of the Board of Grievances because it is a commercial
judicial tribunal.’
824
Eg, when a merchant signs a contract with a company to provide electricity or gas to service his/her
business.
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jurisdiction of the commercial court in the KSA depends upon the nature of the action
related to the subject of the dispute as a civil or a commercial action.
6.3.3.2 Trial and Appeal Procedure
The lawsuit undergoes three correlated stages in terms of the task of the judge.825 These
three correlated stages are discussed below.
The first stage comprises research and investigation with a view to finding out the facts
of the dispute/lawsuit. Where the lawsuit is brought before the judge, he reviews firstly
whether it is a valid application, with all necessary conditions fulfilled; and secondly,
the judge needs to look into the legal basis of the lawsuit, that is, whether it is the
correct one or not. If it is not valid, the judge dismisses it and is not obliged to search
for any way to prove its validity. If it is valid, he undertakes an investigation in its facts,
and requests for the necessary proofs and negations from both of the opposing parties.
In regard to the second stage, searching for legal provisions regarding the lawsuit, only
the judge undertakes this matter, the opposing parties do not undertake the search for
the legal provisions. The judge should not assign such a matter to them. However, the
attorneys and their clients have the right to make their view of the legal provisions in
the case clear and support their view by proofs. However, searching for the appropriate
legal provision and applying it is in fact a duty which is performed only by the judge.826
In regard to the third stage, that is, in the application of the law’s provisions in a binding
form to settle the dispute, the theoretical side is a duty performed by the judge alone,
while its application, which is the enforcement of such provisions, is performed in
825

Al Shinqiti, above n 724, 35.
Min C Kim and Steven D Penrod, 'Legal Decision Making among Korean and American Legal
Professionals and Lay People' (2010) 38(4) International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 175, 176.
826
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accordance with the provisions of Law of Procedure before Shari‘ah Courts 2000

> Almura>fa‘a>t Ashar‘iyah / ( )نظام المرافعات الشرعيةLPBSC’00)827 and the Criminal
(Niz}am
Procedure Law 2001 (Niz}am
> Alijraa>t Aljaza>’iyah / ( )نظام االجراءات الجزائيةCPL’01).828
6.3.3.2.1 Trial and Appeal Procedure in the Commercial Courts
Each commercial circuit is presided over by its respective president who, with judges of
the circuit, should sign at the end of each hearing all decisions taken.829 It is forbidden
for any judges or the president to sit alone with the litigants during the trial.830 It is also
prohibited for the president and judges of the court to express an opinion during the trial
and before the appearance of litigants at the hearing.831 The president and each judge are
free to express an opinion during the proceedings, and decision shall be reached
unanimously or by a majority vote.832 Objections and appeals against rulings of
commercial circuits of first instance should come before commercial appeal circuits,833
whilst objections and appeals against judgments issued or approved by commercial
appeal circuits should come before the Supreme Court. In general, litigation
proceedings before the competent Commercial Courts shall be subject to the same
procedures followed before other courts. Thus, procedures involved in litigation
proceedings before the Commercial Court shall be subject to JL’07, the LPBSC’00 and
the CPL’01.
To sum up, it can hardly be argued that the above jurisdiction of commercial courts is
clear for the following reasons: (i) it is settled by the CCL’31 (although some of its
827

The LPBSC’00 was issued by Royal Decree No M/21 of 3 Juma>da al-awwal 1421 AH (19 August
2000).
828
The CPL’01 was issued by Royal Decree No M/93 of 28 Rajab 1422 AH (16 October 2001).
829
Judiciary Law 2007 (KSA) s 15(3), 24; Commercial Court Law 1931 (KSA) ss 435, 436.
830
Commercial Court Law 1931 (KSA) s 440.
831
Ibid s 441.
832
Ibid s 437.
833
Judiciary Law 2007 (KSA) s 17.
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sections have been canceled due to the issuance of other laws such as the CPL’01,
LPBSC’00), and the JL’07 and the LBG’07, both of which have not yet been activated,
and (ii) there are three quasi-judicial committees, each one of them having a distinctive
procedure that differs from the procedures of other committees and courts, and these
three committees will remain outside the commercial courts. Therefore, the way of
determining the jurisdictions of Commercial Jurisprudence (new Commercial Courts)
should be reconsidered in order to be clarified and expand the concept of commercial
activities in a way that copes with the developments involved in economic globalisation
and the new trends of comparative commercial law and regulations. Determination of
the jurisdiction of commercial courts will achieve the purpose envisaged by the JL’07,
which is the incorporation of specialised commercial courts. Generally, it can be argued
that the determination of commercial court’s jurisdiction, in addition to the immediate
and considered establishment of competent commercial courts, will help in unifying the
procedures of litigation, proceedings and their cessation, the reporting thereof, the rules
of attendance, absence, and conduct of sessions, consultations, sentencing, and
procedures of appeal and conditions thereof, and the speed of issuing and implementing
commercial rulings. In light of the enactment of JL’07, there are some specific practical
steps suggested to implement commercial/corporate rulings, as follows:
i.

It is necessary to accelerate the decision to incorporate within the new system the
three quasi-judiciary committees that are currently excluded from the rules of
incorporation stipulated in the JL’07.834

834

The Committees of Customs Disputes Settlement; the Committee for Resolution of Securities
Disputes; and the Banking Disputes Settlement Committee. See subheading of Quasi-Judicial Committees
in section 6.4.1 of the present Chapter.
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ii.

Employees that have been working in such committees and have acquired
experience in the field of litigation in corporate cases should be properly
exploited.

iii.

The Commercial Court should be willing to seek assistance from experienced
traders and managers of companies, who are known for their commercial
commitment and are of good repute, in the event that such experts are considered
necessary in some commercial disputes, such as corporate crimes. For example,
the law should provide for the use of corporate experts to resolve corporate
disputes for a limited category of corporate crimes.

iv.

A unified law for the Commercial Courts, in regard to economic and financial
crimes, should be issued as disputes between partners are considered a burden on
commercial justice in the KSA because the procedures of some quasi-judicial
committees are scattered. In addition, Shari‘ah judges are not adequately qualified
to decide on some corporate crimes such as financial disputes.835 Further
substantial reform is required in relation to companies. This should include, for
example, (i) authentication bodies reviewing the drafting of company contracts
and inserting amendments so as to guarantee that no conditions are set to cause
problems that will subsequently come before the courts; (ii) creating legal
frameworks to solve the problems of the partners, in such a way as to avoid the
demise of a company, especially companies that are operating and productive; and

835

Baamir, above n 53; Catherine Gowthorpe, Business Accounting and Finance for Non-Specialists
(Cengage Learning EMEA, 2nd ed, 2005) 187. See also, Catherine Gowthorpe, Business Accounting and
Finance for Non-Specialists (Cengage Learning EMEA, 2nd ed, 2005) 6, 7; Thomas W Golden et al, A
Guide to Forensic Accounting Investigation (John Wiley and Sons, 2nd ed, 2011) 575.
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(iii) appointment of judges who have judicial and legal experience, and academic
qualifications related to corporate cases.836
Figure 6.3: Hierarchy of Shari‘ah Courts as Stated in the Judiciary Law 2007 (JL’07)
Shari‘ah Courts

High Court

The Court of Appeals
Criminal
Circuit

Labour
Circuit

Personal
Status
Circuit

Civil Circuit

Commercial
Circuit

The Court of First Instance
Criminal
Court

Labour
Court

Personal
Status
Court

General
Court

Commercial
Court*

* When the JL’07 and the LBG’07 are applied / activated the commercial courts will decide commercial
disputes including corporate crimes that have been addressed by commercial circuits in the Board of
Grievances.
Note: Arrows in this figure indicate the direction of appeals.

6. 4 Role of Lawyers in the Trial Procedures of Corporate Litigation
6.4.1

The Need for Qualified and Trained Lawyers

Section 1 of the Code of Legal Practice 2001 (Niz}am
> Almu>ha} ma>h / )نظام المحاماة
(CLP’01)837 defines ‘a legal profession’ as:
836

For further legal analysis of reforms of the CL’65, see Chapters 5 and 6.

261

Ch 6: Judicial Enforcement of Corporate Crime

Representation of third parties before courts of law, the Board of
Grievances, and other committees as may be set up pursuant to laws,
decrees and decisions to consider the cases falling within their respective
jurisdictions. It shall also mean rendering consultancy services based on the
principles of Shari‘ah and the rule of law. Whoever practices this profession
shall be called a lawyer. Any person shall be entitled to litigate for himself.
The legal profession is an exalted profession and one that occupies a position of trust,
participating with the government and the judiciary in securing justice, pursuing the rule
of law and assuring the people of their rights and freedoms.838 As of April 2011, the
number of lawyers registered in KSA reached 1555,839 a number inadequate for the task
of meeting contemporary challenges. This may be due to the fact that the legal
profession is a relatively new one in the KSA, in comparison with other countries,840 as
well as to the fact that there is no union (or professional body) for lawyers inside the
KSA that will maintain their rights. The problem is not only lack of numbers, but also a
lack of specialised legal training. No law schools in the country thus far teach company
law as a separate subject. Law schools only include the study of company law within a
commercial subject in their curricula. Therefore, lawyers in general have not been
trained locally in company law. Few lawyers have studied company law overseas as a
part of their postgraduate course work programs. A recent study reveals that the
structure and methodology of law schools in the KSA neither cope with the current
reality, nor with the developments taking place in the KSA. They need to be

837

The CLP’01 was issued by Royal Decree No M/38 of 28 Rajab 1422 AH (15 October 2001).
William P Statsky, Robert N Diotalevi and Pamela McCoy Linquist, The Florida Paralegal: Essential
Rules, Documents, and Resources (Cengage Learning, 2009) 97.
839
Osama Al-Jamaan, 'Al‘dl Tasht}ub ‘ashrat mu>ha} miy>n Jana‘wu bay>n Almu>ha} ma>h A’‘ma>l A’ukhra'
[Ministry of Justice Has Cancelled Licence of Ten Lawyers because They Were Lawyers
and Employees at the Same Time], Alriyadh Newspaper (Alriyadh), 25 April 2011
<http://www.alriyadh.com/2011/04/25/article626810.html>.
840
The CLP’01 was issued in 2001 as is the first law for the legal profession in KSA history, while the
state of Kuwait, for example, passed a law for the legal profession in 1964, and the first regulation of the
legal profession in Egypt was published in 1884 and the first law passed in 1912, and passed in Kingdom
of Bahrain in 1973. Thus, the history of the legal profession has a great role in determining the number of
practising lawyers.
838
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restructured in order to be able to have graduates suitably qualified for practising in this
area of the legal profession.841 Thus, it could be said that, in addition to the problem of
an insufficient number of lawyers working in the KSA, there is another obstacle, the
lack of a sufficient number of lawyers qualified in company law.
The dearth of such lawyers, as well as the generally inadequate qualifications and lack
of practical training of lawyers more generally,842 highlights the dire need to increase the
number of qualified lawyers in all fields. This necessity will become even more
apparent after the establishment of the specialised courts and the issuance of the new
laws. In addition, lawyers need on-going training in order to be acquainted with new
issues concerning legal thinking and judicial applications as they arise. In terms of
lawyers working in the commercial area, this will particularly be the case in regard to
the new Saudi laws related to commercial issues.
6.4.2

The Need to Develop the Legal Profession

The foregoing discussion of the need for qualified and trained lawyers in the KSA
suggests that the legal profession in the KSA is, in general, still in real need of
improvement. There is in practice a great disparity among lawyers concerning their
preparation, understanding and experience. In addition, a number of matters that should
be seriously considered are currently largely ignored by judges and/or other relevant
authorities, namely the extent to which lawyers are accepted and the importance of their
role as understood by judges and other authorities, and the degree to which cooperation

841

Ayoub M Al-Jarbou, 'Tqiyym At>‘ly>m Al-qanwu>ny fy Almamlakah Al‘rabiah Alsa‘udiah’ [Evaluation
of Law Education in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia] (Paper presented at the Almu’tamar Al‘alamiy
Ala’wa>l H}awl At>‘ly>m wa At>‘lu>m, Riyadh, 2011) 14, 33.
842
Ibid 21.
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is extended to them and their rights ensured by these same entities.843 One of the most
important means of enhancing the status of the legal profession and to improve the
performance of lawyers is to review and amend the provisions of the relevant law. For
example, section 13(6) of the regulations of the CLP’01 bans lawyers from promoting
themselves through advertisements. Such a section denies the the legal profession the
right to promote their services by prohibiting them from advertising themselves and the
services they provide, despite such self-promotion being legal in most countries.
Lawyers should be allowed to present their services and to highlight their position and
fields of experience through various media channels — as a private right — without
prejudice to the privacy and honesty the profession. In fact, a lawyer in the KSA lacks
adequate immunity, since Saudi legislation does not provide lawyers with sufficient
immunity before the judiciary and investigators; a judge has the right to ask for the
removal of a lawyer from the court or to issue a final judgment of imprisonment for 24
hours in the event of the lawyer breaching of rules of court or exhibiting poor conduct
during a hearing.844 While it is acknowledged that a court must have rules for its
operation to be controlled, the current practice whereby the judge acts as both opponent
and an arbitrator at the same time (without any apparent guidelines or sanctions
applying in the event of a misuse or abuse of power) is a breach of the lawyer’s
immunity, and could pose a threat to lawyers and to justice. In addition, this could be
considered to be a breach of legislative rules which guarantee the neutrality of the

843

Mohammed Saleh Al-Jadlaany, 'Al-qa>da} ’> Atijary lam Yabrah} Makananh ba‘d Niz}am
> Al-qa>da} ‘> Aljady>d' [Commercial Litigation Has Not Improved After Judiciary Law], Dar Al Hayat (London), 2011
<http://international.daralhayat.com/internationalarticle/242700>.
844
Section 69 of the LPBSC’00 states: ‘Order and management of the hearing are assigned to the
Presiding Judge. In pursuance of this he may expel from the courtroom anyone who disturbs order. If he
disobeys, the court may forthwith sentence him to prison for up to twenty-four hours. Such a judgment
shall be final but the court may reverse that judgment.’
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judge.845 Moreover, there is no direct provision stating that any attack on the lawyer
shall be considered as an attack on the judge himself.846 The laws in the KSA do not
provide lawyers with immunity during the practice of their profession. The CLP’01 also
does not control the appearance of a lawyer (for example, a uniform), nor their dealings
with members of judicial institutions and investigative bodies.
The Ministry of Justice dominates; it has the authority to grant work permits for lawyers
and also has the power to penalise them, and thus weakens the authority of the legal
profession and perceptions of that authority in the community. However, judges also
make decisions that undermine their authority.847 Sometimes, judicial power in the KSA
is determined by the will of the prince.848 In an example of judges undermining lawyers,
the licence of the lawyer for a Canadian citizen (Mohammed Kohail) (who had
confessed, allegedly under torture, despite its prohibition,849 to the murder of a young
Syrian national) was withdrawn and the lawyer disbarred by the orders of a trial judge
in 2008, despite the fact that the CLP’01 does not contain any provisions that give a
judge the authority to suspend a lawyer’s licence.850
Consequently, given the control that the Ministry of Justice can exercise, coupled with
the willingness and the ability of trial judges to suspend the licence of lawyers in their

845

See, eg, the lawyer Mohammed Al-Jadlaany was fired from a hearing after conducting a controversy
with the Court’s judge: Khaled Al-Shalaahy, ‘Moh}amoon Yatahimoon Qud}ah Bilmubalaqhah
fy Istikhda>m As}alah}iya>t,’ [Lawyers Accuse Judges of Exaggerating of Using Powers
<http://www.okaz.com.sa/new/Issues/20110208/Con20110208399466.htm>.
846
So far no female has been appointed as a judge in the KSA and Saudi scholars have said that women
should not be burdened with such a job. See Baamir, above n 53, 28.
847
Note: as far as the present writer is aware, there is also no Saudi law prohibiting lawyers from
commenting on decisions by judges.
848
Rasheed Abou-Alsamh, 'Saudi Rape Case Spurs Calls for Reform', New York Times (New York), 1
December 2007 <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/01/world/01saudi.html>.
849
Criminal Procedure Law 2001 (KSA) ss 2, 35, 102. See also Amnesty International, Affront to Justice:
The Death Penalty in Saudi Arabia, 20 <http://www.amnesty.org/ar/library/asset/MDE23/027/
2008/ar/dc425c41-8bb9-11dd-8e5e-43ea85d15a69/mde230272008en.pdf>.
850
See Amnesty International, Affront to Justice, above n 849, 22.
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courts,851 results in a weakening of the independence and the credibility of the legal
profession. The degree of power exerted by trial judges over lawyers in the practice of
their profession may deter lawyers from accepting some important and critical cases in
relation to companies. This in fact occurs despite the CPL’01 guaranteeing access to
lawyers for accused persons852 and that lawyers will not be ‘penalized simply for
defending their clients’ and requiring that ‘courts, investigating bodies853 and other
official authorities … co-operate with defence lawyers’.854 There are many exceptions
where persons are not afforded a right to representation nor access to a lawyer at an
early stage, whereas almost unfettered rights of access and powers are granted to the
investigating parties.855 An independent judiciary, a strong legal profession, and the
putting into practice of key provisions of the relevant laws are keystones to deterring
crimes, in particular corporate crimes, and attracting foreign investors in the KSA.
As underlined above, there is no union (or syndicale) or professional representative
body for lawyers in the KSA. Such a body would contribute to the activation and
development of the judicial work, through managing and controlling the criteria for
joining the profession, in addition to organising ongoing education as well as initial
qualifying sessions. It would serve to organise progression in the profession, and

851

Without any provision in law empowering them to do so.
Criminal Procedure Law 2001 (KSA) ss 4, 35, 64, 116, 119: referred to in Amnesty International,
Affront to Justice, above n 849. 17.
853
Such as the Bureau of Investigation and Public Prosecution.
854
Amnesty International, Affront to Justice, above n 849, 17, referring to the Code of Legal Practice
2001 (KSA) ss 13, 19.
855
For instance, in May 2004, the High Court in Riyadh rendered a ruling of imprisonment of Dr
Abdullah Al-Hamid (seven years), Dr Matrook Al-Faleh (six years) and the writer Ali Al-Domini (nine
years) because of their advocacy for political reforms. The trial lost defence supervision and a free
attorney when one of the defence lawyers (Abdulrahman Al-Lahem) was arrested and imprisoned. (It is
worth. however, mentioning that in the same year, a Royal pardon was issued and they were released. See
Human Rights Watch, 'Precarious Justice Arbitrary Detention and Unfair Trials in the Deficient Criminal
Justice System of Saudi Arabia' (2008) 20(3) Human Rights Watch 1, 20, 31. At the time, Human Rights
Watch said that it did not know of a single full time criminal defence lawyer: 31. Abdulrahman Al-Lahem
was one of a few to take on such work.
852
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provide lawyers with ongoing training sessions on new laws as they were being drafted
and promulgated. It could also facilitate a greater voice for lawyers in the formulation of
the legislation. Moreover, a lawyers union or professional body could also organise the
rules of practice for the profession, whether concerning the duties, rights or behaviour
of lawyers. Consequently, a union or professional association for Saudi lawyers should
be established, just as it has been for their peers in other professions who have their own
unions and associations. Such a matter would have a very good effect, enabling lawyers
to better perform their roles in securing justice.
Moreover, the CLP’01 has shortcomings that need to be remedied. For instance,
currently an applicant wishing to obtain a licence to practise law does not have to pass a
competency test. This should be modified in order to limit the number of unqualified
lawyers.856 Another example is section 18(A) of the CLP’01 which allows a person who
is not a lawyer to practise in the profession; so courts do not ban them from practising.
Thus, anybody can plead before courts without having a licence to practise law, a
situation that can only lead to a continued underestimation of the profession’s status and
a loss of the rights of litigants. It is prejudicial to the efficient and fair operation of the
justice system. This is evident from Case No 232/15.857 The plaintiff’s claim arises out
856

The current requirements for appointment as lawyer in the KSA are set out in section 3 of the CLP’01.
It states that ‘A person who wishes to obtain a licence to practise the profession shall have his/her name
included in the list of practicing lawyers, and shall satisfy the following requirements: (i) Must be a Saudi
national. However, a non-Saudi shall be entitled to practice law subject to the terms of agreements
concluded between the KSA and other countries; (ii) must be a holder of a degree from a Shari‘ah college
or a bachelor of law from one of the KSA’s universities or an equivalent of any of these degrees obtained
from abroad, or a post-graduate diploma of legal studies from the Institute of Public Administration; (iii)
Must have at least three years of practical legal experience. This period may be reduced to one year for a
holder of a Master's degree in Shari‘ah or in law, or an equivalent of any of these degrees, or a postgraduate diploma in law for the graduates of a Shari‘ah college. This requirement shall not apply to a
holder of a doctorate in these fields of specialization. (iv) Must be of good conduct and not under
interdiction; (v) must not have been subjected to any Al-H}du>d punishments or any other sentence in
connection with a crime that impugns integrity, except where a minimum period of five years has expired
since execution of that sentence; (vi) must be a resident of the KSA; and vii) the Minister of Justice shall
cause to be prepared a declaration form to be signed by the applicant.’
857
Case No 232/15 dated 24 Dhul-h}ijjah 1424 AH (16 February 2004).
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of a lease contract and is made against a particular company (the defendant). The case
was heard before the High Court in Riyadh. The defendant was represented by a person
who was not a lawyer,858 but the court accepted his plea for the company because he had
obtained a power of attorney issued by Jeddah notary office. It should be noted that the
High Court accepts such pleading based on sections 18(A) and 20 of the CLP’01 that
allow pleading under the power of attorney. During the hearings, it became evident that
the representative of the company was not familiar with either the case or the possible
legal defences because he was not a lawyer. The company’s manager (the defendant)
cancelled the power of attorney of his representative and he himself attended the last of
hearings as a lawyer for the company, again under the instrument of a power of
attorney. In the end, the company lost the case and paid a fine of SAR 1,200,000
(approximately USD 319,900),859 largely as a result of the absence of a qualified and
licensed lawyer.
As can be seen from the above case, the Saudi courts accept lawsuits from an agent,
whether a qualified lawyer or not. The agent simply has to have a court documented
power of attorney. Their lack of knowledge, however, may lead to longer trials and the
loss of rights. Lawyers, on the other hand, are qualified and specialised in practicing
their profession, because they are a judge’s partner or co-worker in securing justice and
in the application of law.860 Consequently, the practice of law by power of attorney is
not a process that should be continued, and the situation should be corrected by limiting
the practice of law to those who have the appropriate licence to practise after passing an

858

Section 18(A) of the CLP’01 allows a person who is not a lawyer to practise in the profession.
Note: all USD approximations are to the nearest dollar.
860
Judy Gutman, 'Litigation as a Measure of Last Resort: Opportunities and Challenges for Legal
Practitioners with the Rise of ADR' (2011) 14(1) Legal Ethics 1, 4, 5.
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eligibility test, especially given that the KSA is witnessing great development in all
fields, particularly investment.
This would give confidence to foreign investors at the stage of assessing options in the
targeted area for investment, where the size of the risk and potential costs involved will
be reduced due to the clear rules and working methods of the targeted investment
environment. The state of uncertainty that exists when foreign investors face legal
hindrances that affect the process of investment and may threaten its future
sustainability shall thereby be reduced, thus benefiting development that requires an
inflow of investment capital into the country. It is most important that the laws
governing the legal profession are adequately reformed and they are applied in practice,
and not just put ‘on paper’ only. Therefore, the KSA needs to enhance its legal
institutions and laws, in addition to providing lawyers with more training sessions in the
skills of the legal profession, because the resolution of disputes in corporate law, and
justice more generally, requires the existence and services of skilled professional
lawyers.861
6. 5 Delayed Justice and the Acute Lack of Public Confidence in the Existing
Judiciary in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA)
A former judge862 stated that the judiciary dealing with commercial cases in the KSA
has not been united into a single unified body, but rather it is scattered among
commercial circuits of the Board of Grievances, and among judicial and quasi-judicial
committees.863 For many years, all those concerned with commercial and economic
issues in the KSA have called for the rapid reform of commercial legislation and the
861

Maurits Barendrecht, 'In Search of Microjustice: Five Basic Elements of a Dispute System' (Working
Paper No 002/2009, Tilburg Law School Tilburg Law and Economics Center, 2009) 7, 8.
862
Mohammed Saleh Al-Jadlaany, a former judge of the Board of Grievances.
863
Al-Jadlaany, above n 843.
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commercial disputes process so that it can cope with the scope of development
witnessed in the KSA.864 There is no doubt that, given the current circumstances and the
rolling series of economic crises, countries are racing towards finding some possible
manner of implementing economic reforms to deal effectively with such crises and
prepare to move to the next phase.865 The economic reforms envisaged necessitate far
more appropriate legislation that will be able to deal with existing, as well as emerging
financial and economic crises.866
The efficiency of commercial courts arises from the existence of an honest and efficient
judiciary. Generally speaking, the efficiency of the judiciary is measured in terms of
trial length and the ratio of the number of trials pending to the number of incoming
trials.867 It is often said that the worst courts are those that take a long time to complete
trials.868 Due to the difficulty involved in gaining access to recent and reliable statistics
in the KSA, and also due to the lack of publication of Saudi judicial rulings (itself a
result of the lack of democracy and transparency in the KSA),869 this section of research
is based on statistics published in 2002. It is there stated that the Board of Grievances
received about 8179 cases in 2001, out of which 5799 cases were settled, whereas the
relevant number of cases referred to in the year 2002 was 2380. Of the commercial
cases received by each court over that year, commercial circuits completed just 56 per
cent, administrative circuits completed 47 per cent, and each of the criminal and
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Ibid.
Nauro F Campos, Cheng Hsiao and Jeffrey B Nugent, 'Crises, What Crises? New Evidence on the
Relative Roles of Political and Economic Crises in Begetting Reforms' (2010) 46(10) Journal of
Development Studies 1670, 1683; Bruno Amable et al, 'Crisis in the Regulation Regime – A New
Paradigm?' (2010) 8(3) Socio-Economic Review 537, 539.
866
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disciplinary circuits in Riyadh region settled 19 per cent.870 Such statistics indicate the
length of the delay in settling disputes in the KSA. Nevertheless, the Saudi judiciary
still suffers from a lack of judges. The number of judges in the KSA per head of
population is below the international average.871 The international standard suggests that
the KSA should have 5200 judges.872 Yet, according to the latest statistics provided by
Hammond, the number of Saudi judges does not reach 1000 for a population of 25
million.873 Human Rights Watch refers to studies which demonstrate that the number of
judges per 100,000 citizens is 4.2 in the KSA, whereas in Egypt is rises to 27.76, in
France 41.77, in Britain 43.5, and in the United States 22.8. In the KSA, each judge
settles a total of approximately 1461 lawsuits per year.874 To make the problem worse, a
large number of judges are working in committees and other institutions outside the
court system, something which causes delays in trials and adversely affects the process
of achieving justice expeditiously. Some believe that reasons for delays include the
problems of the Saudi judiciary (their inadequate numbers and training, their
employment in other areas) as well as ineffective regulations (both as cause of problems
for the judiciary and a result of the judiciary’s ineffective enforcement of laws), and
ambiguity within and between laws. The judiciary is somewhat isolated, and is also
circumscribed by sophisticated bureaucratic laws and procedures. It is also hampered by
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poor planning and implementation of laws, and even by a lack of job security for its
members.875
The main reasons for the delay in the disposal of cases in the KSA are summarised
below.
i.

Inefficiency of the laws and regulations, and a lack of clarity in how they apply to
cases.876 Moreover, judges are unable to cope with the multiple and successive
amendments that occur to these laws and regulations.

ii.

The deterioration of the institutional, regulatory situation, and, particularly, the
lack of a suitable environment to assist judges to work effectively. This includes a
lack of physical infrastructure, both ‘hard’ (such as, an insufficient number of
courts, a lack of offices, and the failure to adopt systems of modern technology
needed for the rapid determination of cases) and ‘soft’ (such as, personnel
including court assistant officers, lawyers, and judges, and the training required to
best fit them for their tasks). Judges in the sphere of commercial law lack
pragmatic, precise and comprehensive training and experience to prepare them for
their position.877 The lack of such facilities for the judge and associated staff
combined with their lack of appropriate training (see also (iv) below) negatively
affects the ease and speed of judgments.878
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iii.

The assignment of judges to works outside the judicial bodies, despite the
apparent lack of judges for the various courts and the existence of serious delays
in cases being heard and decisions given, such that justice itself may suffer.

iv.

Appointment of unqualified judges to decide on certain types of cases such as
corporate crimes, although extensive experience and skills, and legal
qualifications are needed to successfully handle these cases. This is all-pervasive
and a result of the use of Shari’ah scholars rather than law graduates as judges. A
recent study879 shows that that the methodology and plan of study in all faculties
and departments of Shari‘ah law/Islamic law at universities880 do not contain a
subject related to companies law nor a period of training in that field, or law other
than Islamic law or its methodology more generally. Students are not taught using
case studies and facts, and are not trained to implement the principles, rules,
Islamic law and legal theories on those cases and the facts. There is no idea or use
of ‘precedents’ (‘common law’ as western courts understand them), rather a
decision is made on the case in hand and the law, which can lead to lengthy
disputation and a wide variance in outcomes, even in cases of similar facts. Lack
of generalised studies may create difficulty for the judges who have gained
academic qualifications to practise their functions in relation to the
implementation of the Islamic law and its legal principles.
The same study881 also shows the presence of a clear division or duality in the
education related to law generally and the education related to Islamic law, in
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terms of its structuring and its institutions. There are academic schools —
faculties and departments of Shari‘ah law in many universities — with graduate
specialists whose acknowledged expertise is only in Islamic law, with a lack of
knowledge of other laws. And there are academic school (law faculty) graduates
who are specialists, familiar only with legal subjects, within simple knowledge of
some aspects of Shari‘ah law. However, judges are Shari‘ah scholars without
formal legal training. As a consequence, those qualified in the field of law cannot
be judges. The situation in the KSA does not permit law school graduates to work
in the judicial profession as judges, including the administrative, labour or
commercial courts. These types of courts settle the disputes by reference to laws
and regulations. However, they cannot be handled by anyone except a graduate of
Shari‘ah law, who is insufficiently trained in the legal aspects that apply in such
disputes. It can be said this study proves that the judiciary dealing with
commercial disputes, including corporate crimes, in the KSA is currently being
handled by non-specialist judges, a matter which is considered as a large gap in
judicial functioning that must be resolved by assigning judges qualified in
commercial field to specialist commercial courts.
v.

The poor atmosphere in which lawyers work. Legislation provides lawyers with
sufficient immunity before the judiciary and no investigation can be carried out
against a lawyer. In addition there is no a lawyers’ union or their professional
organisation in the KSA. Their authority might be undermined by a presiding
judge, who may not fear any retribution despite ignoring existing law. This could
intimidate lawyers and slow cases coming to court.
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vi.

Lawyers are participants with judges in the achievement of justice.882 However,
there is a lack of on-going training programs for them. Without such programs,
the necessary guarantees for the adequate performance of their professional
functions are eroded over time.

vii.

The continued use of non-lawyers in cases (subject to their obtaining a power of
attorney from a notary public) may also cause further delays due to their lack of
knowledge. Certain representations, such as the handling of a corporate crime,
require knowledge and experience. Lack of knowledge may prevent non-lawyers
from competently advancing a matter such as collecting proofs, which leads to
undue delay.

In light of the above analysis, a number of solutions are proposed that may address the
issues related to delayed justice in regards to corporate cases in the KSA. These are
shown below.
i.

Determine a sure and certain procedure for assigning cases to judges. That means
each court should have a written plan or system for assigning cases. For example,
assign cases by rotation, subject matter, which helps to ensure a fair distribution
of cases among the judges and gives each case its right in discussion

ii.

Avoid unnecessary and repeated postponing of the claim. For instance, the request
for postponement of cases should be made in enough time with sufficient reason
before the hearing.

iii.

Avoid dealing with persons who aim at prolonging the litigation.
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iv.

Avoid assigning judges to work in non-judicial bodies; given that the KSA still
lacks judges.883

v.

Work within a system of specialised judges. Specialised judges will improve the
litigation because they will get specialist training and practical studies in their
field of speciality. Thus, such judges will help parties involved in litigation to
save both time and expense.

vi.

Publish judicial decisions.

vii.

Increase the number of qualified judges in the commercial field especially in
corporate area.

viii. Assign enough experts and qualified lawyers and preserve their rights, and also
increase the number of assisting bodies, such as the headquarters of the experts,
installing the modern technology required for work (see further below), and
increase the capabilities and technological skills and professionalism of the staff
of these bodies.
ix.

Adopt the modern technology required in all the courts. Technological reform
should include an information network linking all the courts and the Ministry of
Justice and all involved parties to ensure ease of communication and interaction
among staff and judges, lawyers and disputants, and to impart to them in a timely
and accessible manner not only a collection of existing legislation but also any
new legislation, amendments to laws and any other important information. A
section able to be accessed by legal professionals could also be used to publish
decisions, and establish a data base of precedents, if and when that is approved.
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Technological reform also requires linking courts to an electronic archive, with a
website for each court and assisting body to facilitate information entry on the
Network and access to the necessary information on issues, instead of going to
court several times.884 This may mitigate the logjam of corporate cases, the
backlog congestion, and contribute to a reduction in the delays in justice, which
might deter potential corporate crimes.
6.5.1

Commercial Cases that Reflect Delayed Justice in the Existing Judiciary

There are commercial cases have been pending for more than a decade. For example,
Case No 827/2/k of the year 1415 AH (1995) was referred to the 10th Commercial
Circuit of the branch of the Board of Grievances in the Makkah region. The ruling (No
122/d/ Commercial/10) was issued in 1427 (2007). This lawsuit was submitted by the
Saudi Industrial Development Fund (the plaintiff) against a commercial company
(defendant). In brief, the main facts of this case are that the plaintiff had provided the
defendant with a loan of SAR 16,000,000 (approximately USD 4,265,360) to help in
financing construction and operation of the company’s factory; yet the company (the
defendant) has not paid the annuity due. The 10th Commercial Circuit released its
judgment against the company, and the ruling has been upheld by the Circuit of Appeal
in the Board of Grievances in the Riyadh region, under the judgment No 68/T/3 of 1428
AH (2008). Delay is clearly evident in this case, as the lawsuit was referred to the
commercial circuit in 1995, and the final ruling was rendered in 2008, thus the
proceedings had lasted for about 13 years, which is a very long time indeed. Such a long
delay may cause any benefit to the plaintiff derived from the ruling to be far outweighed
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by the harm done. The prolonged process of litigation is one of the serious problems
that threaten the rights and interests of parties to a suit protected by law.
In another instance, the Board of Grievances for the 10th Commercial Circuit in the
Makkah region concluded a case in which the plaintiff (a Saudi citizen) had in 2005
accused the defendant of committing a fraud against the plaintiff and of having received
from him SAR 400,000 (approximately USD 106,634), as the defendant had
fraudulently convinced him to invest money in an investment project. After many
hearings, in 2008 the Circuit decided that such a dispute is not a commercial dispute,
and considered the case as a fraud crime, which is a criminal dispute and as such should
be heard by the Criminal Circuit, and, consequently, as criminal fraud is not included in
its jurisdiction, the court could not consider it.885 This case demonstrates a weakness of
the regulator, given that the lawsuit had been submitted by the plaintiff and the
application of the case had been accepted. It had, therefore, been referred to the
previously mentioned Commercial Circuit of the Board of Grievances; yet, after a long
period, the circuit decided that its jurisdiction did not apply to this lawsuit, and so, it
must be asked, on what basis was the case accepted at the very beginning? The lawsuit
was pending from 2005 till 2008; which means that the proceedings had lasted for about
three years, during which the plaintiff had spent money and effort; and yet, in the end,
the ruling was that the lawsuit is not within the court’s jurisdiction. It can be argued that
such a verdict was issued due to the fact that existing judiciary competent to deal with
commercial cases is scattered among judicial and quasi judicial bodies. Hence the great
need for accelerating the gathering together of all types of commercial disputes and

885

Judgment No 59/D/ Commercial/10 of 1428 AH (2008).

278

Ch 6: Judicial Enforcement of Corporate Crime

making them all subject to one judicial body, with such a judicial body to be a
specialised commercial court for deciding commercial disputes.
In another commercial case,886 the 4th Commercial Circuit in the Riyadh region issued
judgment No 35/D/commercial/4 in 1430 AH (2009). In brief, the plaintiff (a partner in
a commercial company) accused the defendant (a partner and director of the same
company) of having taken company funds and transferred them to his personal bank
account, and, additionally, of having utilised such money for his own farm. The
defendant was also accused of having breached the company constitutions, in addition
to having committed many breaches concerning the performance of his work as a
director of the company. These actions had led to the deterioration of the condition of
the company, bringing it to the brink of bankruptcy.887 Many hearings took place and
then the circuit issued its ruling No 31 in 1423 AH (2003), stating that the defendant
was to repay around SAR 4,200,000 (approximately USD 1,119,660) to the account of
the company. The defendant objected to this judgment and the lawsuit was referred to
the circuit of appeal that considered the lawsuit and rendered ruling No 137 in 1424 AH
(2004). Through this ruling, the lawsuit was reversed, returning it to the Commercial
Circuit due to the existence of differences in the amounts that were mentioned in the
report of the accountant. As a consequence, the lawsuit was sent then back to the former
circuit (the Commercial Circuit). The judge there issued ruling No 120 in 1426 AH
(2006), which ordered the assignment to another accounting firm officer outside the
company. This officer had to take over the audit and consider the differences in the
amounts that the first accounting firm officer had referred to in his report. In 2007, the
second accountant submitted his report. After holding several sessions attended by the
886
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disputants, the agent of the plaintiff stated that he would be willing to leave the
company by conciliation, provided that the defendant did bear all the companies
responsibilities and obligations.888 The defendant accepted the conciliation. Therefore,
the court passed a ruling stating the settlement of the dispute by conciliation in 2009. In
this case the Commercial Circuit spent about nine years adjudicating the matter;
however, it did not render a decisive ruling. This case is one where the plaintiff was
provoked into offering a conciliation in order to end the suffering he had endured due to
the prolonged litigation, and to put a stop to expenditure on lawyers, transport and other
matters. He had become so frustrated in attempting to gain his right that, in the end, he
simply wanted to put an end not only to the tangible costs (outlays on lawyers, lost
profits and so forth) but he also wanted to avoid the intangible costs (anxiety,
frustration) which often occur as result of delayed justice.889 In other instances too, it is
the ‘other’ associated costs (such as, family disharmony and emotional distress of
dependents and so forth not just the suffering of the plaintiff alone) that may force
conciliation instead of continued pursuit of justice in the courts.
It is worth mentioning that the issue of delay in rendering a ruling and the lack of judges
in the KSA continue to this present moment. In March 2011, the President of the Board
of Grievances stated that a single judge considers 233 lawsuits, and settles about 135
cases per year, meaning that almost 100 cases are being carried over per judge per
year.890 This confirms that judges and their assistants are far too few, which leads to
unacceptable delays in settling disputes. The efficiency of the judiciary is usually
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measured either by the average length of trials, or by the ratio of the number of trials
that remain pending after one year to the total number of cases concluded.891 When such
a measure is applied on the judiciary in the KSA, it is clear that it is inefficient and
replete with problems that require real reform. There is no doubt that the problem of
delay in the litigation process is creating a deadlock in the justice process and
hampering economic progress and development.892 In this regard, a study893 attested that
66 per cent of investors were reluctant to invest in the KSA because of difficulties in the
application of laws and regulations. Additionally, 90 per cent of businessmen in the
KSA have difficulty in predicting judicial decisions.894 This is due to the adoption by the
KSA of commercial laws that are ambiguous and lack transparency.895
It can also be said that one of the main reasons for the low level of performance of the
judicial systems and courts in the KSA is the existence of a bureaucracy that prevents
dispute settlement.896 The complexity of the procedures to settle disputes leads to a loss
important safeguards for the disputants and a weakening of the chances of securing
justice.897 The weakness in the achievements of judiciary and the delay in the disposal of
cases in the KSA have resulted in the public having a profound lack of confidence in the
judiciary. This lack of confidence is symptomatic of the public living in a state of
discontent and resentment towards what is offered to them in terms of judicial services,
and makes their quest for their rights or for an answer to their complaints a difficult
matter to pursue.
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Although much progress has been made with the passing of the CPL’01, there still
remains, however, a number of significant shortcomings. Generally, there is neither a
guaranteed initial, or continued, access to a lawyer, nor guaranteed access to legal
assistance in a timely manner.898
In addition to the above weaknesses of the judiciary, there is a failure in the judicial
rulings especially in relation to commercial cases. A person who has the right to pursue
legal action may wait for around three years to claim his or her right within the courts
and spend money, time and effort to materialise such right. The use of other dispute
resolution mechanisms, the adoption of efficient procedures, less ambiguous laws, and
adequate training of members of the judiciary, may also be very useful in achieving this
goal. Surely decisions should be accessible in a far shorter period.899 Again, one of the
most important goals that the KSA must achieve is creating confidence in the judiciary.
While confidence in the judiciary may encourage people to access it more frequently,
the very reforms that encourage that confidence will also ensure a speedier resolution of
cases. This confidence could be provided through a lessening of the losses and damages
that occur within the courts, judicial and quasi-judicial committees due to the
organisational confusion and the frustration experienced by all parties, that is, the
judges, judges’ assistants and litigants. In fact, as underlined above there is no possible
solution other than the establishment of specialised commercial courts with court staff
and judges adequately trained in the court’s special area of responsibility. Such a
solution may deter corporate crimes as the speedier more reliable outcomes and

898

Human Rights Watch, ‘Precarious Justice’, above n 855, 31–4.
Matrook Al-Faleh, Istiqla>al Al-qa>da} ’ Asaudi ‘wa>’iquh wa Kay>fy<at Ta>‘zy>zuh [Independency of Saudi
Judiciary; Its Obstacles and How to Enhance It] (Almmu>’s>as>ah Al‘rabiah Al’u>rwu>biyah Lianashr, 2005)
68.

899

282

Ch 6: Judicial Enforcement of Corporate Crime

subsequent predictable imposition of penalties may deter other potential offenders from
committing similar crimes.
6. 6 Specialised Courts for Commercial Cases
The foregoing discussion of the judiciary of the KSA suggests that the existing
commercial courts are, in general, inexperienced in dealing with corporate cases,
particularly corporate crime cases. Many Arabic countries, such as Qatar900 and
Egypt,901 have adopted specialised courts. Such courts require specific training and
knowledge for judges, which help them improve the decision making process and assist
them to more informed interpretation and implementation of evidentiary law.902
There are currently no specialised commercial courts in the KSA that deal with
commercial cases, including corporate crimes.
Their establishment, thus, has become a dire need due to the following reasons.
i.

To restore and maintain investor and public confidence.

ii.

To improve the accuracy of judicial decisions, which is essential for the effective
judicial enforcement of corporate criminal liability provisions. Judicial experience
in specialised commercial courts will increase the efficiency and accuracy of court
processes and outcomes.903 Specialised commercial courts would allow judges to
gain an in-depth understanding of the cases. Adequately funded, specialised courts
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can provide the judges with a pragmatic, precise and comprehensive program to
prepare them in the commercial law.
iii.

To avoid the inordinate delay in the disposal of commercial cases.904 One of the
features of effective special courts is the prompt settlement of the disputes.
However, the current KSA commercial courts (both commercial circuits and
commercial committees) may spend years (as long as a decade) to settle disputes
before them. Moreover where a ruling is to be issued, it remains in the appeal
courts (appeal circuits) for a long period, further delaying the delivery of the
rulings after they have being issued. Since the issuing of the JL’07, members of
the public have looked forward to its rapid application as a tangible reality,
including the establishment of the specialised commercial courts, However, over
five years after the promulgation of the JL’07, the jurisdiction of courts in
commercial matters is still scattered among the commercial circuits in the Board
of Grievances, the Banking Disputes Settlement Committee in SAMA, and the
Committee for Resolution of Securities Disputes in the Capital Market
Authority.905 Although both the JL’07 and the BLG’92 do not recognise these
committees as part of the judicial authority, these committees still settle
commercial disputes but in a confused way that lacks the simplest guarantees for
proceedings.

The delay in establishing such courts will necessarily negatively affect the skills of
judges. Thus, it is vital that specialised commercial courts are established as soon as
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possible with greater training, in order to instill confidence in the judiciary, and enhance
transparency and accelerate the settlement of corporate disputes, all of which are
necessary to attract more foreign investment and deter corporate crimes.906
6. 7 Conclusions
As indicated in this chapter, judicial supervision of the implementation of commercial
rulings has a substantial impact on gaining and maintaining the confidence of the
investors and developing investment markets. This confidence cannot be gained without
efficient judicial enforcement. To this end, the chapter has thoroughly sketched out the
situation concerning judicial enforcement in the KSA. It has, further, enumerated a
number of the most prominent causes of the acute lack of public and investor
confidence in the Saudi judiciary bodies dealing with corporate cases. These include: (i)
an inordinate delay in the disposal of the absence of training for judges and their
assistants; (ii) the absence of a fair conditions for the trial; (iii) the lack of transparency
(such as the one provided by the publication and dissemination of accurate statistics of
the final rulings); (iv) the lack of qualified judges and lawyers; and (v) the absence of
specialised commercial courts. These require the development of a clear plan for the
reform of the judiciary bodies, as well as the safeguarding of the claim of individuals
and companies to be heard by a specialised court.
As it has been argued in the foregoing discussion, the laws related to corporations are
outdated. For example, the CL’65 was issued in 1965, while the CCL’31 was enacted
some 80 years ago, and some of its sections have been cancelled due to the introduction
of other laws, such as the CPL’01, LPBSC’00, and the JL’07. It is time, therefore, to
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abolish the outdated laws and put into force new laws, with a view to creating a
comprehensible and consistent legislation. Such reforms will promote enforcement of
judgments of corporate laws and contribute to the prevention of violations. The
discussion in this chapter has demonstrated that commercial disputes are currently
settled by: (i) the commercial in circuits Board of Grievances, and (ii) the administrative
committees with judicial power. Corporate criminal conducts will be dealt by the
commercial circuits in Board of Grievances until the JL’07 and the LBG’07 become
applicable. When these laws will be applied, the settlement of commercial disputes —
except for the banking disputes, disputes involving securities and customs disputes —
will be transferred to the specialised commercial courts.
As indicated in the chapter, the lack of specialised commercial courts has led to the
presence of multiple judicial bodies entitled to settle disputes, and, despite their
different functions, their activities may overlap in a single dispute. The consequence is
an insufficient, inadequate judiciary. Thus, there should be a unified commercial
judicial system within one judicial jurisdiction, which is the ‘commercial courts’.
Updating the laws, simplifying the procedures and avoiding bureaucracy go ‘hand in
hand’ with specialised commercial courts to create an efficient judicial system to ensure
the development of the commercial markets in the KSA.
The JL’07 and the LBG’07 were enacted to create a legislative renaissance. However,
as it can be seen from the foregoing discussion, the courts (including the commercial
courts) are still in need of reform and modernisation — such as publishing judicial
precedents, and assigning judges that have the prerequisite judicial and legal experience,
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relevant academic qualifications in the corporate field, and ongoing training — 907 all of
which are essential for the effective judicial enforcement of corporate laws.
This chapter shows that judges should have a sound understanding of the laws and
regulations involved in all the judicial proceedings, and the CLP’01. The CLP’01
should restrict the practice of law to licensed lawyers, who are admitted to practise law.
Commentators, accountants, engineers or others should be prohibited from participating
in the proceedings as defence lawyers before the commercial courts. It should be
stressed that a lawyer is a ‘mirror of a court’ and both judges and lawyers act as
caretakers of justice.908 Finally, the Commercial Court should use what is produced by
modern techniques in order to working remotely, and to provide easy communication
with the lawyers and disputants. Establishment of a website to simplify the task of those
seeking to find court dates and locations of sessions, and the procedures, would help
save time and prevent congestion in the court. The combination of the minor and the
major innovations, outlined above, is required to provide the incentives necessary to
prevent corporate crimes.
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Chapter 7
7 General Conclusions
7. 1 General Concepts
Complex provisions set by modern legal systems determine the structure of today’s
companies. Depending on the type of company, their structure may be complicated,
multi-layered, centralised or decentralised, and organised somewhat hierarchically.
They might also contain a hidden structure underlying and undermining the supposed
and reported hierarchical structure followed in theory by that company. The
combination of organisational structure and modes of functioning, as well as the powers
and obligations of those who take part in corporate operations, are determined by each
country’s corporate law.909
The reply to the question of why hidden organisational complexities exist within
companies is related to issues of protection concerning their corporate structure. It is
often said that there are diverse modes of entities and diverse chains of command or
control even within the same entity. The complexity of the corporate structure raises
difficult issues with regards to the allocation of responsibility in regard to the
consequences of illegal acts undertaken by individuals in the company’s employ who
are acting on the behalf of the company.910
Corporate crime has, in the past few decades, become a worldwide phenomenon, with
severe consequences not only in the developing but also in the developed countries. In
909
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the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), as elsewhere, cases related to corporate corruption
have become a daily praxis. During the last 10 years nearly all commercial companies
in the KSA have paid heavy fines for falsification of their logistics, and for all kinds of
frauds and direct abuses committed by their CEOs. However, none of the persons
responsible for such types of crimes have been imprisoned. Companies may have been
fined for the frauds they committed, but neither the managers, nor the members of the
board of those companies have been punished. These fines represent a very small
proportion of the illegal profit.
Understanding the types of companies that operate is a necessary prerequisite to further
investigation of the nature of corporate crimes. To this end, Chapter 2 outlines the legal
regime governing the incorporation, operation and dissolution of commercial companies
in the KSA. The Chapter explains in depth the concept of a ‘company’, which in the
KSA presupposes firstly, publicity of its Memorandum of Association (MoA) and entry
of the company on the register in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry; and second,
the existence of a valid legal personality against third parties. Through these procedures,
the lawmaker aims to achieve the highest possible visibility and information diffusion to
all interested parties.
As underlined above, corporate law constitutes the means through which a company can
become established and develop its functional role in the market. With a view to better
supporting market mechanisms as well as consumers, criminal law has been used by
governments and regulators to address issues arising from the actions or omissions of
corporations, among others. However, such a task has not been easy. In this context,
Chapter 3 attempts a thorough theoretical and conceptual analysis of corporate criminal
law. Many definitions have been attempted with a view to better describing the
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phenomenon of corporate crime. Indeed, a company cannot take decisions on its own;
persons, however, can. It is difficult, thus, to have companies condemned for serious
crimes, given that responsibilities are divided in such a way that is difficult to attribute
guilt accurately. Sadly, the human characteristics that society condemns, such as greed
and self-regard, may also often constitute the key to success for a company in the
market. On the one hand, the desire for profit maximisation may motivate actions of an
illegal nature; on the other, the risk of losing a good reputation and clientele, as well as
imprisonment and fines, may constitute obstacles to that illegal behaviour. Corporate
criminal law of the KSA follows the indirect approach with regards to criminal liability
and the sanctions imposed. The relevant sections render the persons involved guilty, and
not the company itself, of the crime.911
Combating corporate crime can be a very difficult task, given that such crimes may take
forms that do not even constitute ‘crimes’ in the traditional sense of penal law. It is
sometimes debated whether or not it is desirable to punish an entity such as a corporate
body, which is not, like a natural person, capable of thinking for itself or of forming any
intention of its own. Corporate crimes committed during the phase of incorporation, as
Chapter 4 analyses, may have detrimental consequences not only for the persons

911

Khanna, above n 39, 1495, 1496. As the author points out: ‘Probably the best reason for relying on
corporate liability over direct liability is that corporate agents are often judgment-proof. For example, if
we rely exclusively on direct liability when agents are judgment-proof, then agents will probably “invest
inefficiently little ... in the avoidance of wrongs.” In addition, when agents are judgment-proof, the
production costs to the corporation and its agents are less than the total costs to society, and the
corporation increases the level of production beyond the socially desirable level. Corporate liability
addresses these problems to the extent that the assets of the corporation improve the ability of the
corporation and the agent together to pay actual awarded damages. A corporation exposed to liability
internalizes the costs of harm and provides incentives for its managers to avoid harm. Because the cost of
harm is internalized, the costs of production will reflect the true economic costs and the level of
production will approach the optimal level.’ On this debate, see also Lewis A Kornhauser, 'An Economic
Analysis of the Choice Between Enterprise and Personal Liability for Accidents' (1982) 70 California
Law Review 1345, 1351–2; A Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, 'Should Employees be Subject to
Fines and Imprisonment Given Existence of Corporate Liability?' (1993) 13(33) International Review of
Law and Economics 239, 239–42. (Discussing when imprisoning employees may be socially desirable).

291

Ch 7: General Conclusions

involved, but also for the company itself, since they may cause severe loss of
investment and reputation, as well as reduction of the clientele.912 Such crimes may be
related either to the documents of a constitutional nature, such as the MoA and the
Articles of Association (AoA), or to other relevant documents issued during this initial
phase of incorporation, such as the prospectus. To this end, Chapter 4 provides an in
depth analysis of the nature of corporate crimes committed during the incorporation
phase with regards to MoA and AoA, focusing on which actions may constitute such
crimes, and the persons that may commit them. Moreover, the Chapter analyses specific
provisions with a view to combating such phenomena at the incorporation stage in
relation to the two constitutional documents and any other documents issued by a
company at this stage.913 Identified crimes comprise the deliberate inscription — in the
company’s MoA or in its AoA or any documents — of any false statements, the
deliberate inscription of any statements contradictory to the provisions of the CL’65, the
signing of such documents while knowing such material is included, and the distribution
of such documents, while aware that these documents contain such material. The crimes
identified comprise a large range of tortuous acts.
Imposing a penalty on a behaviour, without referring to the person’s state of mind,
would be unfair, since the person might be subject to conviction without being actually
blameworthy, that is, without acting with criminal intent.914 The CL’65 recognises as
degrees of mens rea ‘deliberation’ and ‘knowledge’. The important element of the
912
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‘deliberation’ is the existence of both the will as well as the knowledge of the objective
causality (actus reus). They should both ‘accompany’ the physical act or omission, that
is, the result wrought by it in the external world. For example, the founder, acting
‘deliberately’ wants to provide to the public false information about the amount of the
capital, and knows that the false information will mislead interested parties. This
element indicates foresight of particular consequences and of a desire to act or not to act
so that these consequences occur. The element of ‘knowledge’ implies that the
individual that commits the tortuous act or omission is aware of the illegal character of
his or her act or omission and accepts possible damage that may occur to a third party.
Sanctions that may be imposed on such types of violations are thoroughly presented.
According to this writer’s view, the available sanctions are too low and, thus,
ineffective.915
Recognition of mens rea is, in relation to the development of corporate responsibility,
the most difficult area, given that a responsibility is to be attributed to the corporation
similar to that of a natural person. Further investigation would, however, be needed with
regards to the mens rea of the crimes committed, if the scheme developed for corporate
criminal responsibility corresponds to the one developed for criminal liability of natural
persons.
However, further types of crimes, related to the formation of company’s capital, may
occur. These crimes are analysed in Chapter 5. They are, in particular, related to the
amount of cash shares and shares in kind invested in the company in order to be
incorporated. Regarded as ‘crimes’ are tortuous acts that may be committed by a

915

On the effectiveness of sanctions and in particular of the imprisonment, see Dan M Kahan, 'What’s
Really Wrong with Shaming Sanctions' (Working Paper No 125, Faculty Scholarship Series, 2006) .

293

Ch 7: General Conclusions

promoter or a manager or a member of the Board of Directors, who ‘invites’ the public
to subscribe to company shares in violation of the provisions of the CL’65, irrespective
of the possible knowledge (or not) of the tortuous act by a third party who receives the
invitation. Likewise, the CL’65 prohibits the subscription of company shares in
violation of the provisions of the CL’65 and penalises any person who does this, while
aware of this violation.
As a consequence and with regards to the crimes committed during the phase of the
incorporation of a company concerning its capital, the CL’65 rules that the act of
issuing of an invitation for subscription in violation of the CL’65, the act of offering for
subscription while knowing that the CL’65 is violated, as well as the act of exaggerating
in bad faith the value of the shares, constitute crimes punishable by section 229 of the
CL’65 by a fine or imprisonment. The crimes, however, related to the formation of the
company’s capital during its incorporation are committed when they are ‘externalised’
to the third parties, that is, when third parties become aware of the invitation to
subscribe or of the exaggerated value of the shares. The CL’65 does not demand that a
concrete damage or loss is caused to the assets of the third party. The potential influence
with regards to the choices of the third parties concerning investment is considered
sufficient cause. Sanctions for such types of crimes are presented and analysed. Again,
findings of the study suggest that they are also too low.
The effectiveness of any good law is based in large part on its effective enforcement by
the competent entities, not only of the legal provisions, but also of its judicial rulings.916
The question of judicial enforcement mechanisms and their effectiveness is thoroughly
analysed in Chapter 6. The Chapter presents the definition of judicial enforcement and
916
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the object of implementation of judgments, the goals of the judicial enforcement of the
judgments issued for corporate crimes, the judicial bodies that are competent to decide
disputes of commercial companies, and the role of lawyers in the trial procedures of
corporate litigation.
As the Chapter points out, the real success in implementing judicial judgments lies in
establishing economic security and stability through the development of trust in existing
legal relationships, and the ability to anticipate issues.917 Further, it underlines that there
is a lack of trust and confidence as far as the effectiveness of the judicial mechanisms
are concerned due to the lack of specialised legal training for judges and their assistants,
a lack of transparency and lengthy procedures. To this end, the Chapter concludes that
specialised commercial courts are needed to ensure judicial remedies where there are
violations of the provisions of the CL’65.
7. 2 Major Findings of the Thesis
The development of a strong market is a gradual process, an effort which presupposes
the cooperation of honest regulators, courts and prosecutors.918 To this end, penal law
provisions aim to drastically protect lawful goods as well as human freedom and
economic stability, by characterising as ‘crimes’ acts or omissions that put certain goods
in danger.
The strength of the KSA market economy is mainly based on the following factors.
Firstly, there is a plethora of investors interested in participating. Secondly, there is an
increased interest by the state in promoting competitiveness and the administration is
917
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very keen on accelerating market growth. To this end the time taken by a number of
procedures has been reduced.
The basic regulatory frame of the penal law of corporations is contained in section 229
of CL’65. According to the writer’s view, the main drawbacks of its legal provisions are
their outdated character, the weak correlation with the needs of today’s society,
inadequate theoretical and legal judicial process, the lack of clear identification of the
persons that can be held liable, the ineffective sanctions, and a lack of public confidence
in the legislation.
Outdated character and weak correlation with the needs of today’s society
The CL’65 was enacted in 1965 with a view to boosting a healthy competitive
environment in the KSA market. However, the formation, management and supervision
of today’s companies differ from those of 1965. According to this writer’s view, its
current penalties cannot deter the new corporate crimes, and the law does not provide
for any supplementary penalties, such as publication of the crime committed and its
penalty, as well as deprivation of the ability to conduct commercial/business activities.
Moreover, the Commercial Court Law 1931 (CCL’31) was issued in 1931. Both the
CCL’31 and the CL’65 are no longer able to deter corporate crimes and should be
replaced by effective new legislation.
Lack of sufficient theoretical and legal process and lack of trust
The commercial courts in the KSA still lack public confidence. In writer’s view, one of
the reasons for this lack of confidence is that the judges and lawyers are not properly
qualified for the tasks in hand. In addition, there are a lot of delays with regards to the
issuing of the decisions. Such delays can be measured either by the average length of
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the trial, or by the percentage of the lawsuits concluded in one year out of the total
number of lawsuits. Moreover, the laws related to corporations are outdated; and there
are no professional judges for, nor a body of specialised practitioners in, company
disputes; nor specialised commercial courts.
Individual Liability
The CL’65 does not provide for a clear explanation for persons who are held criminally
liable for the crime of offering company shares for subscription, under the scope of the
application of section 229(2)(ii) of the CL’65. This, the writer considers, is another flaw
in the CL’65.
Ineffective Sanctions
The study has revealed the weakness of the CL’65 in terms of the penalties for crimes
related to formation of company capital during the phase of its incorporation as
compared to those sanctions provided under company laws of some of members of the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Sanctions in other member countries include
imprisonment and fines. In comparison, however, the KSA fines are very low. The
CL’65 imposes a fine on the company based on section 231; it may be imposed on an
individual if he or she committed a crime under section 229 of the CL’65. However,
some opponents of the imposition of substantial fines may argue that the effects may be
disproportionate. There have been cases where the Court itself has reduced the fine, in
order not to have negative consequences on the corporation.919 Those arguing against
heavy fines may also point out that such fines will further adversely affect the innocent,
that is, excessive fines can have perverse effects that may have to be borne by innocent
919

For instance, in the case R v Wattle Gully Gold Mines NL, in which the Supreme Court of Victoria
reduced a fine from AUD 20,000to AUD 500 so as not to have a very high fine ‘fall on the innocent’
[1980] 4 ACLR 959. Tomasic, Bottomley and McQueen, above n 511,253.

297

Ch 7: General Conclusions

shareholders, creditors, employees or consumers. However, penalties in terms of both
imprisonment and fine are very low in the KSA compared to the ones imposed by the
legislation of other countries.
7. 3 Conclusions and Way Forward
The set of rules with regards to criminal liability, which each country puts in force, may
differ. Countries may choose to impose criminal liability on the basis of legal principles
or empirical evidence, or on the basis of both of these elements. The legal liability of
employees is determined differently by each country. Determining how much legal
responsibility an employee is charged with within the corporate structure is chosen by
each country using that country’s precedents and legal boundaries. For example, legal
liability may lie not with the employee who actually committed a crime, but with a
higher authority in the corporation who had ordered the lower employee to follow their
instructions. Corporate criminal liability is not a universal characteristic of modern legal
systems.920 Some countries, such as Mexico, Germany, Greece, Hungary, and Sweden,
do not provide for criminal liability, but they do have administrative penalties that may
be imposed on corporations for the criminal acts of certain employees.921 On the other
hand, some countries, such as Bulgaria, Luxembourg Brazil and the Slovak Republic,
do not recognise any form of corporate criminal liability 922
With regards to the implementation of legal schemes regarding corporate criminal
liability, legislative approaches have been divided. There are countries, for instance
Saudi Arabia, that are in favour of the inclusion of provisions related to corporate
920
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criminal liability in their legal systems. Others, however, for instance Germany, are
unwilling to incorporate the concept of corporate criminal liability into their legislation.
Topics related to corporate criminal liability and national legislation were thoroughly
discussed during a Colloquium on ‘Criminal Responsibility of Legal and Collective
Entities’ which was held in May 1998 with the participation of representatives from the
Canada, the United States, China, Japan, Uruguay, South Africa and several European
countries. At this conference, the group of experts reviewed various forms of criminal
responsibility and their application to the various countries/corporations. It also
reviewed the development of criminal sanctions.923
Sanctions are rarely applied for any illegal actions in terms of corporate crime. The
reality is that most of the corporate crimes that have been committed are not even taken
seriously enough to warrant serious investigation. It is rare that a corporate crime is
made public. For cases in which the crimes are made public, a low fine is generally
imposed on the company, that is, the investors. The representatives responsible have no
reason to worry as they are not held liable.
The high level of corruption in every part of the world generates a series of significant
questions with regards to the causes of these crimes as well as the means through which
those who instigate and/or perpetrate these crimes could be brought to justice. It is often
difficult to control corporate crime; however, corporate crime and the associated
questions of liability must be addressed sooner rather than later. Contributing to the
difficulty in controlling corporate crime are two main factors. First, today’s giant
companies are often multinationals operating across a number of jurisdictions, whereas
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governments simply govern on a national basis; hence jurisdiction enters the equation.
Multinational companies have also become so powerful that governments may be
reticent to stand against them. Second, and increasingly apparent and well-known, due
to social media and networking, are the sometimes covert operations by companies
which may thereby participate in undemocratic political campaigns and support
candidates amenable to their interests, as well as exert an undue influence on new laws
being passed. By sponsoring politicians, corporations have enabled their profits to soar
ever higher, with fewer legal complications and fewer taxes to be paid by corporate
entities. An ever higher percentage of global income has come into the hands of ever
fewer people. Even in those cases where governments attempt to fight corporate
corruption, multinational corporations employ a significant number of lawyers capable
of fighting legal battles for years. Lack of punishment, thus, becomes expected.
Corporate crimes affect consumers, shareholders and the state. Their results are
significant with severe economic, social and psychological consequences. Results may
range from financial loss to death. Lack of publicity perpetuates a lack of knowledge,
so, consequently, members of the public may fear such crimes considerably less than
‘street crime’. ‘White collar’ crime is still seen many quarters as somehow ‘less
criminal’ although the devastating effects on the family income of consumers, or in
some instances shareholders, may be the same as if the breadwinner were robbed at gun
point.
However, often when such cases end up at court, corporations hire ‘armies’ of highlypaid lawyers, exercise whatever political influence they have and use every possible
means to escape punishment. There are many examples that illustrate the procedures
through which many big corporations take decisions with devastating consequences for
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the public. These decisions emerge as a result of the competitive nature of the market,
the desire for profit maximisation as well as to maintain or improve the position of the
company, and a belief that the company, according to its employees, can be placed
above any moral dilemmas.
The above analysis makes clear that such kind of criminality may be difficult to deal
with. When sanctions target individuals working for a company, such sanctions can
never act preventively. Not only may employees feel constrained to obey a directive due
to financial necessity, but a corporate culture can develop where loyalty is to the
company above all other parties. Even conscience may become seared. Individuals,
however, can become scapegoats for a corporation’s misdeeds, allowing it to largely
escape sanction.
On the contrary, only when the corporation fears that the sanctions will target it
collectively, impair its ability to reach its collective goals, damage its reputation, and as
a consequence, its profits; only then it may revise its whole strategy.
To this end, legislation should be strengthened and more effective enforcement
mechanisms be put in place.924
Taking into account the analysis attempted with regards to the KSA, the following
could be underlined as far as the country’s legal framework is concerned with regards to
corporate criminal responsibility.
Firstly, the relevant legislation should be amended. The CL’65 should be updated,
particularly the sections related to corporate crimes, namely, sections 229 and 230. The
924
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CCL’31 (enacted some 80 years ago) should also be updated. A number of its sections
have already been cancelled due to the issuance of other laws.
Secondly, the KSA must create independent and specialised commercial courts with
qualified and trained judges and prosecutors to hear only commercial cases.
Thirdly, the database of commercial cases and the commercial statistics, in particular
corporate cases and statistics, should be published in the KSA. Such publication would
help judges, investors, companies, lawyers, and researchers.
Fourthly, an official English translation of the legal database and statistics should be
available. This would avoid any misunderstandings that might otherwise arise due to a
lack of an officially recognised text or use of a poor translation.
Fifthly, the length of judicial proceedings should be appropriate, and the problem of
unreasonable delay in judicial proceedings should be tackled. To this end, unnecessary
postponing of any claim against a corporate entity should be avoided; judges should be
specialised; and decisions should be published in such a way that a large number of
consumers will be aware of the crime. Moreover, modern technical means should be
adopted in all courts. A network linking all courts and the ministry could be facilitated
as well as easy communication and interaction among judges and staff, lawyers and
disputants encouraged, with a view to easier transfer of the new legislation,
amendments to laws and any other important information.
Sixthly, the system of sanctions also needs to be reformed in order to better address the
current corporate reality and address corporate crimes in a more punitive way. To this
end, fines should be higher and length of imprisonment longer.
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To this end, it is crucial that breaches of corporate law should be prosecuted and those
who are convicted for their criminal behaviour should be duly penalised. This principle
must be applied irrespective of whether the convicted is a natural person or a company.
The CL’65 does not prefer the imposition of criminal liability against a company and
consequently most prosecutorial activities are directed towards individual wrongdoing.
A framework for corporate criminal liability that reflects corporate behaviour should be
developed. Similarly, to this end, and with a view to better deterring corporate crimes,
such crimes should be reported to the appropriate authority in the appropriate time.
In order to develop a strong market, complex supportive mechanisms are necessary. To
this end, the analysis in the thesis adheres to the proposition that the laws of the
jurisdiction should be more supportive. In addition, rules imposing corporate criminal
liability should be strict. Companies are real entities, which possess immense power and
may perform actions that can harm individuals as well as society. In this context,
regulatory authorities and governments should possess a full range of legal tools that
will allow them to combat the various forms of corporate crime more effectively.
Finally, reforms to the CL’65 related to corporate crimes committed during the phase of
company incorporation are important, but not in and of themselves sufficient to increase
market confidence to a level that would ensure the optimal development of corporate
markets in the KSA. To secure this goal, in-depth analyses also need to be conducted of
crimes committed during the period of operation of corporations as well as of those that
occur where corporations are in crisis or threatened with dissolution or in the process of
dissolving. Such analyses may be the subject of future research and should be
undertaken with reference to the operation and enforcement of the CL’65 and other
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relevant law. It could be expected that such research would generate additional
recommendations for reform.
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